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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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CASE NO. CV-2012-734 
MOTION FOR A WARD OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
COMES NOW The Plaintiff, ROBERT ARON KANTOR, by and through his attorney of 
record Scot M. Ludwig of the firm Ludwig Shoufler Miller, LLP, and hereby moves this Court to 
award Plaintiff his reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred herein pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
12 l, paragraph 29 (designated as paragraph 28.03) of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement, 
and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )( 5) and as further set forth in the Affidavit of Scot M. 
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SCOT M. LUDWIG, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am the one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff in this matter and I make this affidavit 
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based upon my own personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Reporter's Transcript 
with respect to the Hearing held on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Monday, 
the 24th day of June, 2013. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, 
Defendant. 
) Case No. CV-2012-734 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_________________ ) 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Monday, 
June 24, 2013, at the hour of 11:24 a.m., at the Blaine County 
Courthouse, Hailey, Idaho. 
BEFORE: The Honorable Robert J. Elgee 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Susan P. 
P. 
SCOT M. LUDWIG, ESQ. 
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
209 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
DANIELE. WILLIAMS, ESQ. 
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
121 N. 9th Street, Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 1776 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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I N D E X 
MONDAY, JONE 24, 2013 
Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
and Defendant's Motion For Leave To Amend: 
Argument By: 
Mr. Ludwig. 
Mr. Williams 
Mr. Ludwig. 
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is 2012-734. 
MONDAY, JUNE 24, 2013 
11:24 A.M. 
THE COURT: Good morning, gentlemen. 
MR. LUDWIG: Good morning. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Good morning. 
THE COURT: This is Kantor versus Kantor. This 
I know who you are, but would you introduce 
yourselves for the record and for the court reporter. 
MR. LUDWIG: Good morning. Scot Ludwig here on 
behalf of the plaintiff. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Dan Williams on behalf of 
defendant and counterclaimant Sondra Kantor. 
THE COURT: We are before the Court for a 
motion for partial summary judgment and a motion for leave 
to amend. The motion for partial summary judgment is 
yours, Mr. Ludwig, and the motion for leave to amend is 
Mr. Williams'. Let's take them up in that order, unless 
you have another preference? 
MR. LUDWIG: I think that makes sense, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
I've read the briefs. I've read the motion for 
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leave to amend. I'm familiar with the issues. 
I have read Ms. Kantor's deposition. Go ahead. So you 
don't need to repeat what's in your briefs I guess is my point. 
MR. LUDWIG: Okay. I'll summarize, maybe, just 
some highlights, but I won't go into each and every item. 
Your Honor, right now I want to address that 
fraud claim in the allegation because that's a significant 
claim that's been litigated extensively. 
THE COURT: The fraud claim in the 
MR. LUDWIG: 
that that be dismissed. 
In the counterclaim. We've asked 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me -- I want to take 
these up in two parts, I think, the breach of contract 
claims, so you argue those, and then I'll let Mr. Williams 
go first on his motion to amend, and then you can respond. 
MR. LUDWIG: Okay. 
THE COURT: Because the basis of your objection 
to the fraud claim is he is seeking to amend to continue to 
add the fraud claim, and isn't the basis of your argument 
that he should not be allowed to amend and include this new 
fraud claim? 
for today. 
Were the old fraud claims dismissed? 
MR. LUDWIG: Not yet. That's what we're here 
So the discussion about dismissing the existing 
fraud claim on summary judgment and why an amendment are 
4 
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real the same argument in a lot of respects. 
THE COURT: You're do both. Okay. Somehow 
I was thinking -- I read these about last Thursday or so, 
and I was thinking that the fraud issue came in on his 
motion to amend the counterclaim. 
MR. LUDWIG: Currently, Your Honor, there's a 
motion for summary judgment on our original contract claim 
for the breach that created this case, and then a 
counterclaim was filed by Stan Welsh's successor, Ed Simon, 
alleging three -- four items. The one that's not before 
the Court today is the breach of fiduciary duty for not 
providing financial records. That hasn't been included in 
the summary judgment proceeding. What has is the 
allegation of fraud by Mr. Kantor. 
No. 2, that miles weren't transferred pursuant 
to an agreement that was executed post-property settlement 
agreement, and that credit card obligations, the payment 
thereof, have been breached. 
So those are what the summary judgment pertain 
to, four items; one in the original complaint and three in 
the counterclaim. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LUDWIG: So in light of that, can I address 
all of them at the same time? 
THE COURT: Sure, sure. Yes. 
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MR. LUDWIG: Okay. I will go to the breach of 
contract claim, though, first. I was going to address the 
fraud claim, but I'll do that shortly hereafter real 
quickly. 
On the breach of contract claim there was a 
Property Settlement Agreement in this case. And, Your 
Honor, the history of that was that this divorce was 
litigated comprehensively and extensively and very 
expensively over the course of a year by Stan Welsh and 
myself. The Court is very aware of Stan Welsh and his 
abilities to represent clients in the area of family law. 
In addition -- and this is all in the 
deposition under oath, so I don't want to be too belaboring 
on it, but I do want to hit on a couple high points on the 
background of this case. 
Ms. Kantor hired a CPA in Twin Falls and hired 
a CPA in Boise, Idaho. So she had two CPAs on board 
reviewing this somewhat complex financial structure that 
these parties have. So she had two experts and a 
consultant to give her a second set of eyes. So there are 
lots of people on board over on the other side. 
That culminated in a Property Settlement 
Agreement that the parties laid out and the Court has had 
an opportunity to see. That's an extensive document and it 
covers a lot of things. And the Court can probably surmise 
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that these people had a lot of money at one time. The 
recession was been difficult on this sort of real estate 
activity. 
But, nevertheless, Paragraph 28.02 of the 
Property Settlement Agreement states -- and the document 
was signed under oath by Ms. Kantor, and she was 
represented by Stan to finish this case -- that there was 
no undue influence, there was no fraud, and no 
misrepresentation in executing that document and finishing 
this divorce case. 
So ten months later, after an original count to 
have the breach of contract case and an order allowing us 
to sign documents so we could sell this house, which the 
PSA requires Mr. Kantor to sell within a reasonable period 
of time, we take her deposition. 
THE COURT: Let me jump in just because you 
mentioned a point I do want to address. 
MR. LUDWIG: Yes. 
THE COURT: I think a party can put in a 
written contract there's been no undue influence because 
they know whether they've been unduly influenced or 
pressured, and that's difficult to contradict later. 
But a statement that I haven't been defrauded 
is -- to me, that's the essence of fraud is that you don't 
know that you've been defrauded. So, to me, putting that 
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cular representation in a written contract is -- it 
doesn t carry much weight, because if a person has actually 
been defrauded, that means they've been cheated without 
their knowledge, and that's something that even with -- to 
me, even with that language in there, they could always 
come back and say, well, now I have found out that, yes, I 
was cheated or defrauded because I have found out facts I 
didn't know. 
I just don't think that that particular 
contractual provision about fraud carries much weight. 
MR. LUDWIG: Your Honor, I agree, and if it 
carried all the weight, we wouldn't be here today. But it 
is a darn good starting point when you have a negotiated 
divorce with competent counsel and two experts on board and 
a set of eyes looking at all the documents, that you sign a 
document that says that. It bears some weight I would 
suggest to the Court. But, nevertheless, what happened 
certainly after that is very -- and the information that's 
not been obtained in this process is very dispositive. 
So, with that background, I'll go through the 
contract claim real quick. 
Your Honor, the original complaint was filed to 
get a court order to get a document signed on the sale of 
this house, and that culminated after the Property 
Settlement Agreement where they talked about the parties 
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sel ing this house. 
On September 26th there was another agreement, 
because prior to that on September 24th, and this is all in 
the record, Ms. Kantor says I'll sign your document, but I 
want some SLuff for it. So it was a leverage play, and she 
acknowledged that in her deposition as you saw. So a new 
document comes out that addresses some different issues, 
like the miles and a Mercedes, and it's not part of this, 
and then the sale of this house. And in that document 
prepared by Stan Welsh it said that Sondra Kantor would 
execute any documents necessary. 
that's in that agreement. 
It was a "shall," and 
So, here we go, several weeks later and the 
same leverage play comes up and a document is necessary to 
be signed by Ms. Kantor regarding the sale. And at that 
time they didn't know the sale was going to fail. 
Ultimately, B of A unilaterally canceled the sale because 
they had an appraisal issue. 
But at that point in time there was a contract, 
and to keep the sale going because of a potential loss here 
in the value of that home and there's a big second for a 
million 1, and all kinds of issues, the first was 3.4 
million, we needed that mandatory document that she would 
sign any sale contract so we wouldn't lose the deal. 
So two weeks later, after we get this agreement 
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on r 26, 2012, she the leverage play again, 
calls it that in her deposition, where she tried to get 
some more things before she would sign a document. We 
didn't have time, we needed that document signed, so we 
filed a breach of contract action and a request for a TRO 
allowing Mr. Kantor to execute documents on her behalf if 
she wouldn't so this deal could move forward. What 
happens, she immediately signs the document that was 
necessary to be signed. 
So that breach of contract has been unrefuted. 
And so we're asking the Court on that issue that there be a 
breach of contract order with regard to that particular item. 
Now, moving on to the counterclaim -- and, by 
the way, the damages there, because that sale was 
ultimately canceled, ~ill be a request for fees that 
related to that filing of the complaint and forcing her to 
sign the document. So that's the damage phase. And, 
obviously, on summary judgment we will follow-up, because 
it is unrefuted she breached the contract, and hopefully 
avoid a trial with a request for fees on that item, along 
with some of these other items. 
THE COURT: That case was never dismissed. 
That's morphed into this? 
MR. LUDWIG: It's still pending. We have a 
summary judgment on that breach today, right now. 
10 
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THE COURT: Okay. But on the issue of 
attorney's fees, then, is that a question for the jury? 
Is there an attorney's fees provision in the Property 
Settlement Agreement? 
MR. LUDWIG: In the Property Settlement 
Agreement I believe there is, but that won't be a question 
for the jury. We'll be asking for fees from this Court, or 
this Court could give fees today, obviously, but we'll be 
asking for those fees after summary judgment on that item 
today. So that will go away. That won't be as this cloud 
uncovers this case, in our opinion, because the breach was 
unrefuted. It's clear she breached, and there's no 
defense. That will not be something that's heard by the 
This Court will address that in a subsequent 
motion, if you can see procedurally how we're moving 
through this. 
THE COURT: Well, yeah, that's where I have a 
problem. And I may be making some of Mr. Williams' 
arguments for him -- or I guess he's already made these, 
but I just want to kick this around. 
You're saying, well, she wouldn't sign. And 
Mr. Williams' position is she wouldn't sign, you came to 
court, she signed. They, I think, revived the -- or maybe 
that one died, that deal died, and then they revived it 
with the Augusts later, and then there was a subsequent 
11 
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refusal the bank to go forward because Mr. Kantor had 
while he was seeking a short sale, apparently there are 
some facts indicating that he had -- was also seeking a 
loan modification. So I think Mr. Williams is going to 
argue, well, whatever we did didn't cause or it wasn't a 
material breach, it didn't cause those. 
Now I see, ah, no, the true damages are we had 
to go to court and seek her and seek to force her to 
sign, so wouldn't that be a claim you make to the Court as 
attorney's fees? 
MR. LUDWIG: Yes, absolutely, and that's what I 
was saying. 
This subsequent discussion about the 
transaction being revived down the road, the Court may very 
well grant leave on that particular item today because it 
is a subsequent occurrence. And, obviously, we're going to 
refute that there was any breach by Mr. Kantor. But as the 
Court knows, a motion for leave to file an amended 
complaint doesn't have to have a factual basis to support 
that necessarily versus if you're defending a summary 
judgment. 
So if the Court ultimately allows that, that's 
a count that's going to be included in the counterclaim and 
we'll defend that vigorously. But they're separate items. 
Just because it's the same buyer and it happened down the 
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road there are lots of defenses to why that transaction 
hasn' happened yet. But, again, that's a separate matter. 
We're talking about a breach, a clear breach, 
an unrefuted breach of the PSA and subsequent agreement 
that she would sign any documents necessary immediately to 
keep that sale rolling, and we were forced to come to court 
and deal with that. 
So, again, that's the breach of contract claim 
that originated this case, and we would ask the Court 
ultimately for summary judgment on that because it is clear 
there was that breach. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I'm trying to part out 
breach from attorney's fees. Breach is -- ordinarily you 
breach the contract, now there's damages, damages in the 
form of a and I think she said this in her amended 
complaint or somebody did -- in the form of now I'm exposed 
to a deficiency judgment or the short sale didn't go 
through and I'm exposed to a bank loan on the second, 
whatever, that I wouldn't have had Mr. Kantor not been 
seeking a modification. 
Both sides are claiming that there's a breach 
of contract over the sale of the house. 
MR. LUDWIG: Right. 
THE COURT: But if I deny your motion for 
summary judgment on the issue of causation -- because 
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that's going to be, I think, Mr. Williams' argument. Well 
she didn't cause a breach of the sale argument. What it 
seems to me you're after is, no, judge, we want an 
adjudication or an order from the Court saying she 
breached. That's what caused us to have to come to court 
to get her signature and our damages are for attorney's 
fees. Is that -- am I right? 
MR. LUDWIG: That's correct, Your Honor. She 
agreed in that contract that she would sign any documents 
immediately, and she didn't. 
The whole issue about whether or not Mr. Kantor 
has used reasonable efforts to get the sale of this 
property is a whole separate matter that we have very 
strong defenses to, and that's going to potentially be 
included in this motion for leave to amend the complaint, 
but it's separate from this breach of the agreement to sign 
these documents. We were forced to come forward, because 
we had a deal pending, and force her to sign the deal in a 
timely fashion, and it's those fees incurred in having to 
do that that are the damages. If this Court follows up and 
awards fees, that part of the case is done because there 
aren't additional damages. It's the fees. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's something I did not 
understand until just now. Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. LUDWIG: And I would love to give you a 
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little history of this house sale. It mi be beneficial 
to you to see where we are today, but maybe that's another 
day, because it's what's going on. It doesn't really 
impact my motion for summary judgment, but maybe when I 
have a chance to reply, depending on what Mr. Williams 
says, I'll have to address that. But, nevertheless, that's 
an issue for down the road if the motion for leave to amend 
the complaint on this one item is permitted today. 
I'll leave this issue if the Court is ready to 
leave the breach of contract claim. 
THE COURT: Yes, I am. 
MR. LUDWIG: Your Honor, I want to talk about 
the fraud allegation now that was in the counterclaim 
because that is significant, it was filed in the county 
recorder's office right here in a small community against 
somebody who does business, and it needs to end today. 
That's what summary judgments are for, so an individual 
doesn't have to defend frivolous allegations at trial. 
It's the perfect situation, and I would like to go through 
it really quickly. 
And you've read the briefs on it and referred 
to the depositions, but ten months after the divorce case 
was filed, we took Ms. Kantor's deposition under oath, and 
the Court has read the pertinent parts, but she could not 
point to one penny that she had not received pursuant to 
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this divorce settlement, nor could she to one 
document that supported her =raud claim or one piece of 
information or statement or occurrence that supported a 
fraud claim. Instead, what did she do? She said, "My 
attorney made me do it." She blamed Ed Simon for the 
allegation, and it's in the transcript. 
And as Exhibit 3 to her deposition, she had an 
email that she sent to a family friend, Marshall Bennett, 
and in that she said, "I need to tell you--" I'm 
summarizing, but it's actually pretty close to what I'm 
saying here. "I need to tell you that I'm sorry I've made 
this allegation of fraud against Bob. It's not true." And 
my -- this is where she said, "My attorney made me do it," 
in effect. 
So there is nothing, and there hasn't been 
anything. 
Now, we've put off the summary judgment as the 
Court remembered because Sondra wasn't -- she changed 
attorneys, let's just leave it at that, and a very talented 
attorney, and he hasn't been able to come up with one iota. 
They've taken this opportunity, it's been several months, 
and there was a deposition, the third deposition of Bob 
Kantor by the way, and not one piece of information 
supports the elements of a fraud case. 
If you look at Ms. Kantor's deposition -- or 
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her affidavit she filed in opposition to this motion for 
surrunary judgment on the fraud case, she doesn't even talk 
about it. She talks about some mileage issues and things 
like that. 
So calling it something different, inducement 
for fraud, the elements are all the same, Your Honor, and 
there's been nothing to support that there's been fraud in 
this matter and this part needs to end. Mr. Kantor 
shouldn't have to continue to defend these allegations when 
here we are at the end of June and this was a divorce from 
April of 2012, and these continued paranoias and 
allegations and things are being made, but there's nothing 
in the record, absolutely nothing, that would support a 
fraud claim. 
This is not a day when you throw that final 
rabbit out of the hat and try to file leave to amend the 
complaint and allege fraud. On summary judgment you have 
to defend with refuted factual information. The 
allegations here don't exist, and some motion for leave to 
allege fraud in a different fashion where the elements are 
the same isn't going to cut it. 
And even if the Court said, well, they called 
it inducement instead, there's no factual information that 
meets the elements of the allegation of fraud. So it's 
time to end that allegation. 
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The other two I'll ust touch on real kly, 
Your Honor. One is the miles. The miles were a part of 
the counterclaim. We've asked for summary judgment on 
that. The miles issue were handled in that -- was handled 
in that subsequent agreement on September 26th. 
And the payment of debts, in the counterclaim 
it was alleged that Mr. Kantor had failed to pay A, B, C, 
E, and F, which were debts -- well, at the deposition A, E, 
and F were withdrawn saying that was mistake, that was 
Ms. Kantor's deposition, so that Band C, which were credit 
card obligations, were alleged to not be paid. Mr. Kantor 
has paid those. 
I just see a recent affidavit saying, well, the 
April payment hasn't been made. So I guess up through 
April and that allegation, the Court has to decide how it 
wants to handle it. We would refute that it hasn't been 
paid, but we haven't had an opportunity to do that. 
But the Property Settlement Agreement says, 
Mr. Kantor, you're going to pay these debts. It doesn't 
say in what fashion. So if there's some issue regarding 
enforcement, that a contempt proceeding is necessary for 
failure to pay an obligation, they can register this with 
Judge Israel, the property settlement allows that, and they 
can go over and say we want to hold him in contempt because 
he's not complying with the Property Settlement Agreement 
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in ome fashion. We disagree that's occurring. And in 
Parag 28 of the PSA it talks about in the event a 
refinance occurs of these debts that Mr. Kantor is paying, 
then Ms. Kantor will cooperate. 
! So there are four items here that summary 
judg~ent should be granted, Your Honor, with regard to the 
motibn for leave because a lot of this argument pertains to 
r 
that'. I understand the allegation that Mr. Kantor has 
failed to sell the house within a reasonable period of 
We understand, and if the Court allows that count to 
go f~rward along with the existing fiduciary duty count on 
l 
prov:iding documentation, we will contest both of those, but 
that's what this case should look like after today. 
i 
' Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ludwig. 
Mr. Williams? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
I think my colleague, Mr. Ludwig, mixed i 
together an awful lot of things that we need to separate 
analytically in order to come to a correct resolution. 
First of all, let's talk about the original 
cla~m that brought Sondra Kantor as a defendant into this 
! 
court. That was a purported breach of contract claim based 
apparently on the allegation that she had refused to sign 
an extension agreement on the very first house sale. And 
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Court will remember from the submissions, there was 
l house sale that fell out of contract. Apparently 
the bank, Bank of America, didn't order an appraisal, and 
so based on their own failure to order an appraisal, 
refuked to approve that contract, and that original fall 
deal· fell through. The whole deal fell out of the 
contract. 
It was revived again in February with a brand 
new real estate purchase and sale agreement, brand new 
documents. And so that's the 2013 sale. That got bank 
approval. And it's only because we found out during 
Mr. Kantor's deposition recently that he was always all 
along seeking a loan modification, that the bank 
subsequently canceled their approval saying we don't allow 
you to seek a loan modification and a short sale at the 
same time. 
And so the February deal is canceled due to 
what Robert Kantor, the plaintiff, is doing. The fall deal 
fell out of contract because it didn't get bank approval. 
And so the very first claim that the plaintiff brought 
regards a nullity, a contract that has no legal 
significance anymore. 
Now, first, we -- Mr. Ludwig kept saying over 
and over this is unrefuted, but that's not correct. If you 
look at Exhibit A to Sondra Kantor's affidavit, that is 
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s the document in which she's outl her 
posi ion, and nowhere in that document does she say I 
refuse to sign this extension unless you give me money. 
Nowhere is anything like that said or implied. She says I 
understand we need to do this; I also want you to do this. 
Now, I don't think as a matter of law this 
Court can find that that constitutes a breach. I think 
there are at least genuine issues of material fact as to 
what's going on, and it's our opinion, Your Honor, that 
rather than the version of reality that you just heard from 
Mr. Ludwig, what in fact happened was the plaintiff filed 
this case ,precipitously based solely on Exhibit A in an 
effort -- in a power play, an effort to make this claim and 
then hold attorney fees over the head of Sondra Kantor. 
So, first of all, it's our position there was 
no refusal to sign. She did sign. And there was no 
breach. At the very least, there's a factual inquiry we 
have to complete on a full record as to what the parties 
were saying and doing and meaning. 
Secondly, I don't think it's correct that a 
party can claim a breach of contract and then skip the 
element of damages unless they have a contract that says 
they can, and the plaintiff doesn't point to any specific 
language in the Property Settlement Agreement or the 
parties' subsequent agreement that allows them to skip the 
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element of and go straight to attorney fees and say, 
well, that's our damage, because as the Court is aware 
you've got to make a complete claim. You've got to make a 
complete claim in order to prevail and then be awarded 
attorney's fees. And so I don't think the plaintiff can 
get over that problem, either, and jump directly to 
attorney fees and say, well, that's our damages because we 
had 'to file suit we thought. 
And as the Court is aware from the other things 
we raised, and I won't go into great length, we believe 
there are some other legal defenses to the breach of 
contract claim. 
The second agreement in February superseded 
that earlier agreement. We don't think that plaintiff can 
bring a breach of contract claim on the fall agreement when 
the parties entered into a brand new one in February, and 
there's no allegation that there were any delays or 
refusals to sign any necessary documents in the 2013 spring 
agreement. And so the whole -- in my analysis, Your Honor, 
the whole fall agreement and any allegations of breach are 
moot at this point because the only operative agreement was 
the subsequent superseding spring agreement. 
Finally, we think that there is a relationship 
between the two deals because we think that the actions of 
Mr. Kantor in causing the 2013 deal not to go forward 
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raises an estoppel defense, and that is how can he claim a 
breach on Sondra Kantor's in an alleged delay in 
obtaining her signature on a deal that fell through anyway, 
not because of anything she did, but solely because of the 
bank's actions. It fell out of contract, no longer 
operative. But then in a February subsequent agreement it 
gets bank approval, it's headed downstream to close, and 
then suddenly the bank finds out that all along Mr. Kantor, 
according to his own testimony, all along he's been seeking 
a loan modification, which the Property Settlement 
Agreement does not allow him to do. And because of that, 
the bank says, whoops, you can't pursue a short sale and a 
loan modification at the same time, so we do not approve 
this short sale. 
THE COURT: The Property Settlement Agreement 
does not allow him to pursue a loan modification? 
MR. WILLIAMS: In no way, shape or form. 
THE COURT: Does it say -- are you getting to 
that conclusion because you're saying it doesn't say that 
he is allowed to seek a loan modification agreement or are 
you saying it prohibits? 
MR. WILLIAMS: There is not specific language 
prohibiting loan modification, but the only language that 
exists is language that requires the house to be sold as 
soon as reasonably possible. And so I think the clear 
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cation is nowhere is he empowered by the Property 
Settlement Agreement to seek a loan modification, instead 
he must do a sale as w,as reasonably possible and a sale 
schedule. A sale is approved'by the bank, it's ready to go 
forward. 
THE COURT: So how is she harmed if Mr. Kantor 
pursues a loan modification agreement and the bank says we 
won't do a short sale? 
I mean, I think part of your claim assumes that 
he knows that by pursuing a loan modification agreement, 
he's, quote, unquote, doing something wrong. And I guess 
my question is, let's set that aside for a moment. Let's 
assume that he knows that that's wrong or that that's going 
to torpedo the short sale. But just in the abstract, why 
is it -- why would he be causing her damages if he pursued 
a loan modification where he went to the bank and said, 
look, short sale, loan modification, what's the difference, 
you're underwater any way you cut it, let's forget the 
second and I'll just pay the first and why don't we just 
modify the loan instead of me trying to find some other 
buyer to do that. How does that cause her damages? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Because under a loan 
modification she is still subject to exposure for the 
entire loan amount should Mr. Kantor be unable -- which is 
part of this whole proceeding in the magistrate court, 
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should he be unable to pay his bills. 
THE COURT: Why would -- how do you know that? 
I'm saying -- you're saying, well, the result of a loan 
modification is she's still on the hook for the -- let's 
call it the second deed of trust. How do you know that? 
Why ~ouldn't he pursue a loan modification where he says to 
the bank let's skip the second deed of trust, you're 
already underwater, no different than a short sale. If we 
do a short sale, you're out that money. What's the 
difference? I'll pay the first at this level. Similar if 
somebody goes to the bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy 
court says you're under-secured at the bank, they get to 
modify the loan. Why does that harm the other party? I 
mean, why does it -- it doesn't necessarily result in her 
being on the hook for the second, does it? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, the second is no 
longer at issue. If you look at what's going on in the 
February sale, by the time the February sale is rocking 
along, the second is already gone. All we have in the 
second transaction to deal with is Bank of America's, first. 
So there's the original underlying obligation 
of $3.4 million on the house and that -- Sondra Kantor is 
still a co-signer on that original indebtedness. What the 
plaintiff has done has caused her to continue to be in 
jeopardy for that deficiency when there was a short sale 
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that had been approved, and they would have had 
acco to the documents that we cited to the Court, the 
bank had approved it with zero deficiency to either party. 
So we had a deal where there's zero deficiency, 
it's torpedoed by the actions of Mr. Kantor, and then we 
have a remaining liability on the part of Ms. Kantor. And 
a liability is a liability regardless of what may happen in 
the future. And who knows what a bankruptcy proceeding may 
do, but that requires Ms. Kantor to be part of the 
bankruptcy proceeding. And so it remains a liability and 
that is a damage. 
THE COURT: Is it? That's a big question in my 
mind. A remaining liability that you always had and that 
you didn't get relieved of, how does that cause you 
damages? You were on the hook. You're still on the hook. 
MR. WILLIAMS: You have to carry it on any 
financial information that you provide to anyone. It is 
damage and -- a potential exposure is damage. You have to 
lay it to the world, yes, I'm still subject to this 
potential liability. 
THE COURT: I agree, but her position never 
changed. She was always on the hook for that. So anything 
he did, it might not have relieved -- he might not have 
succeeded in relieving her of reliability -- or of 
liability, but it didn't cause her damages because she 
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was -- her position never changed. She's on the hook for 
that debt and is still on the hook. 
See, I guess that's my point. Causation, 
whatever changed? 
MR. WILLIAMS: What changed is it was his 
actions in breach of the Property Settlement Agreement that 
caused the short sale not to occur, which would have 
relieved this liability. 
THE COORT: Okay. Okay. All right. 
MR. WILLIAMS: And so that really -- we just 
combined, I think, the motion to amend along with the 
summary judgment, also. 
But I tried to make clear that none of this 
this is not an unrefuted breach on the part of Sondra 
Kantor. It's not nearly as simple as Mr. Ludwig wants to 
pretend. And unless the Court has other questions about 
the house as it relates to either summary judgment or the 
motion to amend, I can turn to some other issues. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. 
Now, if the Court grants our motion for leave 
to amend, which I think it should do, obviously, at this 
stage of the proceedings, we're well within the time frame. 
These allegations that are set forth in our proposed 
amended complaint resulted from the deposition this Court 
27 
522 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
allowed us take pursuant to Rule 56(f) and they did ~ot 
exis to our knowledge at the time that the original 
counterclaim was filed. So I think the Court should, as a 
general principle, be granting this kind of leave to amend. 
And if it does, the fraud allegations change entirely, and 
the things that Mr. Ludwig kind of mishmashed together are 
quite distinct. 
The original counterclaim on fraud was based on 
entities that Mr. Kantor had set up, and the allegation was 
that they're so confusing and so difficult to follow that 
there was fraud involved. Once this Court grants our 
motion for leave to amend, those allegations become moot, 
and I don't think there's any further action required by 
the Court. 
Instead, the allegations specific to fraud in 
the counterclaim in the amended complaint have entirely to 
do with the execution of the Property Settlement Agreement 
and what we have subsequently found out about what 
Mr. Kantor was thinking and doing. As we said, the 
Property Settlement Agreement required the house -- the 
parties to sell the house, not go seek loan modifications 
but sell the house as soon as reasonably possible. They 
had buyers in hand. 
We found out that Mr. Kantor all along, 
according to his deposition testimony, all along had been 
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see a loan modification. It's our contention that that 
represents a present intent at the ~ime the Prope 
Settlement Agreement was signed, a present intent not to 
fulfill the obligation as to the sale of the house as soon 
as reasonably possible. 
THE COURT: Now, do you have any evidence that 
he knew if he pursued a loan modification, that would 
torpedo any effort to complete a short sale? 
MR. WILLIAMS: We don't, but the distinction I 
would draw, Your Honor, is he may not have known about what 
all the subsequent effects of that present intent not to 
fulfill the Property Settlement Agreement provision might 
have down the road, but he, nevertheless, still had the 
present intent not to fulfill that specific provision with 
regard to the sale of the house as soon as reasonably 
possible. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WILLIAMS: And so that's the way I think it 
pieces together. And so -- but the point, I think, here 
today is that as far as the summary judgment motion is 
concerned, the points about the entities and the existing 
counterclaims as originally stated are moot. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Now, with regard to the credit 
cards, as we pointed out to the Court, I don't think the 
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plaintiff can say, look we can never be in breach of the 
rty Settlement Agreement because theres no time frame 
for us to pay off these things. And that's basically what 
they're asking this Court to rule, that because there's no 
specific time frame in the Property Settlement Agreement 
for the credit card debt to be paid by Mr. Kantor, that, 
well, then he can never be in breach, and he can keep 
paying for 30, 38, years at the current minimum payment 
schedule to get these things paid off. And as we pointed 
out, Mr. Kantor will be about 108 years old at that time, 
and that can't possibly be considered reasonable. 
In Idaho, as in every state, when there's a 
silent term as to the period of time or the term in which 
performance is required, a reasonable time is implied. And 
I think that there will be a genuine issue of material fact 
as to what that material time frame should be given what 
the parties intended at the time of signing the Property 
Settlement Agreement as well as any sense of reasonableness 
as applied by this Court. 
The air miles, Your Honor, we've set forth 
there was a failure on the plaintiff's part to do what he 
was obligated to do and cooperate reasonably in 
Ms. Kantor's use of those miles so as to defeat her ability 
to enjoy that benefit under the Property Settlement 
Agreement and the parties' subsequent agreement. So there 
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has been a breach. Plaintiff is not entitled to summary 
j ton that claim. 
And so I probably just did exactly whai I 
accused Mr. Ludwig of doing and I talked about both motions 
at the same time, but I tried to keep them at least 
distinct to keep the standards that this Court should 
consider distinct. 
THE COURT: I'm happy to consider them at the 
same time. They run together. 
Any other comments you want to make? 
MR. WILLIAMS: I don't believe so, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Williams. 
Mr. Ludwig? 
MR. LUDWIG: Just a brief reply, Your Honor. 
I would refer you to Page 33, Line 7, through 
Page 36, Line 5, of Ms. Kantor's deposition testimony 
attached to my affidavit where she clearly says both times 
she held up signing an agreement to sell the property was 
as a result of her trying to gain leverage for something. 
The second time, time was out, it was time to get it done, 
so that's why the action was filed. 
And just a real quick history, Mr. Kantor's 
deposition, Mr. Williams through the whole thing didn't 
point to anything in particular but is trying to find 
something and still hasn't ciced anything in that 
31 
526 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
deposition that benefits. 
What happened subsequent to the divorce was 
there was a 3.4 million this is all in the record --
$3.4 million first to B of A. Fortunately, B of A was the 
second, also. And we all know how goofy B of A has been. 
Well, after the divorce, Mr. Kantor rolled up his sleeves, 
facing huge liability, and convinced B of A to release the 
second entirely. That's in the record, $1.1 million, poof, 
of liability. And we know seconds don't go away. 
THE COURT: Was that done? That did, in fact, 
happen? 
MR. LUDWIG: Yes. I know, it's amazing, but he 
did this subsequent to the divorce, and that saved her 
$550,000 of potential liability. 
Now 
THE COURT: Wait, wait. 
That's a fact I was not -- do you agree that 
happened? I think you made a reference to that, and I 
didn't know what that referred to. 
MR. WILLIAMS: It is our understanding that the 
second -- the deed under -- the obligation under the second 
deed of trust has been forgiven. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm taking that to the bank, 
Mr. Williams, so when you say it's your understanding, 
you're saying we agree with Mr. Ludwig that the second 
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the second deed of trust is gone it's ext shed, B of A 
has fo it or walked away from it. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, all we can do is 
look at the documents that have been provided to us by the 
plaintiffs, and that's what they seem to indicate. 
THE COURT: Okay. And so the only argument 
here is a refinance or a short sale on the first, the 3.4 
million? 
MR. LUDWIG: The only -- by the way, all of 
this information is unrefuted in the deposition of Bob 
Kantor over 10 months post-litigation starting, and even 
longer post-divorce, and there's nothing in the record that 
says anything other than Bob Kantor's representation the 
second is gone and that he negotiated with B of A to 
release that. 
And I want to address what's happened since, 
but, Judge, the issue that was argued by Mr. Williams was 
this subsequent issue he's trying to amend the complaint on 
has nothing to do with this breach that started this 
litigation, and that is, has Bob Kantor violated the 
provision of 5.01 of the PSA that said the real property 
shall be sold as soon as reasonably possible. 
That's different than our breach here where she 
was supposed to sign documents immediately. And I cited 
you the deposition transcript where you'll see she twice 
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says I was trying to use leverage 1 that's why I didn't sign 
documents. 
So back to this B of A. So these are 
different. He's trying to mesh them together. They're 
different. And the record will have all this information. 
It's not refuted by anything. 
The $3.4 million, Mr. Kantor was trying to 
do -- his defense is he's trying to do everything he can to 
get them out of liability. Okay. That's what you're going 
to see down the road. And he had a short sale that was 
re-generated in I think February, I can't remember, I think 
that's what Mr. Williams said, that might be about right, 
and he had a loan mod going. And you do anything --
THE COURT: How much was the short sale for? 
MR. LUDWIG: Two point four million. 
THE COURT: And the obligation was 3.4? 
MR. LUDWIG: Three point four. 
THE COURT: Okay. I just -- in my view of the 
facts, I somehow thought that the short sale -- the whole 
intent was to just get rid of the second. Okay. I see 
that's different. The short sale also ate into the first 
deed of trust obligation. 
MR. LUDWIG: That's the goal. And as those two 
were going along -- and Mr. Kantor has done all of this, 
110 percent of all of this. 
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So along the way, the right arm of B of A 
discovered, and its in the deposition transcript, ~hat the 
left arm was a short sale. There's a loan mod, and they 
didn't know. And so when he informed the loan mod person 
that he's working with that there's a short sale, too -- he 
probably shouldn't have done that if he would have known 
that B of A would have had a policy against that -- they 
canceled the short sale. 
And that was a short sale that was approved 
with conditions. Don't get the belief, Judge, that B of A 
couldn't have woke up one morning and somebody say we're 
not interested in a short sale anymore. 
So he's been trying to mitigate this by virtue 
of a loan mod, in fact, reasonably believes that he's going 
to get a substantial reduction in the $3.4 million from B 
of A. They've had all these class actions the Court I'm 
sure is aware of, and they're saying we think we might get 
a $2 million reduction on that mortgage potentially. 
So this cause of action --
THE COURT: By virtue of the loan modification? 
MR. LUDWIG: By virtue of the loan mod and 
bringing this thing down to less than $2 million, and the 
parties ultimately will make some money on this house, 
believe it or not. 
So that's aside. That's for the future. And 
35 
530 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
this is their amended complaint. They want to allege that 
he's breached 5.01 of the PSA that he hasn't sold the 
property within a reasonable time period. That's an 
amended counterclaim. There's no factual information to 
support it. But in an amended counterclaim allegation you 
don't have to have facts to support your allegation. 
To defend a summary judgment -- now to flip 
hats over to this fraud claim -- you do, and they haven't 
cited anything that refutes the fact that she received 
every penny from the divorce. They have no documentation 
to support the fraud. There's no information to support 
the fraud, there's nothing, and her statement under oath 
that there's been no fraud in February. So nothing has 
happened since then, either. Anyway, that fraud claim 
needs to be dismissed, Your Honor. 
The miles, the credit card, he's complied with 
the document that's involved in this matter and the breach 
of contract claim. And then if the Court is going to allow 
them to allege a breach of the Property Settlement 
Agreement regarding the sale of the house within a 
reasonable period of time, nothing we can do about that 
right now probably because that's not somethi0g that's 
before the Court in a factual scenario. 
THE COURT: What's not before the Court on a 
factual scenario? 
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MR. LUDWIG: This whole discussion about the 
breach of the Prope Settlement Agreement by Mr. Kantor 
failing to sell the house within a reasonable period of 
time. They've asked to amend their complaint to allow that 
to be alleged. That's a different standard than a defense 
of a summary judgment, obviously. 
THE COURT: Okay. You're saying, yeah, maybe 
they can do that, I can't get that out at this time. 
MR. LUDWIG: Right. That's down the road, and 
it's separate than the breach that you'll read about in the 
deposition transcript that I cited to you. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LUDWIG: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Any other comments, Mr. Williams? 
I know you have motions in and Mr. Ludwig has motions in, 
and I don't want to --
MR. WILLIAMS: Just very briefly. 
Ms. Kantor wanted me to make sure the Court 
understood that despite the characterization of Mr. Ludwig, 
if we really do grant all inferences to the defense as we 
must do -- this wasn't a leverage play, this wasn't 
blackmail, I'm.talking about the original count for breach 
of contract that initiated this proceeding by plaintiff 
this Court can't find, if it applies the standard 
correctly, that this was leverage or blackmail or anything 
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else like that if you look at the exact language of Exhibit 
A to Sondra Kantor's affidavit, which is what they 
complained about and came rushing to court. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Is there -- this is a question for you, 
Mr. Williams. One of the allegations here is that he has 
failed to provide her a password for the Exclusive Resorts, 
and where can you point to that she has sworn under oath 
that he would provide her a password? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, my understanding is 
that issue is not in dispute between the parties anymore. 
THE COURT: Okay. So I'll grant summary 
judgment -- or that will be removed from --
MR. WILLIAMS: And I don't believe it appears 
in my amended complaint. 
THE COURT: Okay. And whether it does or 
doesn't, I want to deal with it so that it won't -- I want 
to kill it. I want to make sure it's not going to rise 
again. 
So I'll grant summary judgment on that issue 
or the order -- I'm going to ask you to prepare an order 
here, Mr. Ludwig, and so I'm going to want it to say that 
the failure to provide a password is no longer in dispute, 
that allegation or that claim. 
Okay. Now, I wrote out -- I've got several 
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pages here I'm going to go through with regard to my 
ruling and some of this might have been twisted al ttle 
bit today by some things that maybe are in the record. I 
didn't read Mr. Kantor's deposition during the course of 
these proceedings, but some of these rulings might be 
twisted, and I'll address them when I get to them. And 
they might be twisted because of these, like I say, 
additional things that r- found out today. I didn't know 
that the second deed of trust had been taken care of, and I 
thought that was the primary thrust of the short sale or 
the loan modification. 
First of all, as to -- the other thing that I 
didn't know, I guess, was that there is still an existing 
fraud claim. I thought the fraud claim was -- or the 
motion was directed more -- from Mr. Kantor's side was 
directed more at don't let them file this amended claim for 
fraud in the amended counterclaim. I didn't know we were 
still directed at the initial fraud claim. 
The initial fraud claim, if it is still alive, 
I would grant summary judgment on that, if there is still 
one pending in the existing pleadings, because Ms. Kantor 
has admitted that she has no basis for it. She has written 
letters to the -- I don't know whether he was a CPA or a 
friend, maybe Mr. Bennett, if that was his name, and said I 
apologize. And I tend to agree with Mr. Ludwig that her 
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comments were, well, it was at the lawyer's suggestion, but 
I really don't have any basis for fraud. So I'll 
that. And I may cover that in more detail as we go here. 
A third thing that I would say that I have 
learned today is that there is a different claim for 
damages -- or a different claim, excuse me, by Mr. Ludwig 
for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, and I 
would characterize this as one facet of the breach of 
contract claim because he says we're not after damages for 
causing a breach of a short sale agreement or for causing a 
breach of the Property Settlement Agreement except for the 
obligation that Ms. Kantor had an obligation to sign. 
I guess what you're saying is we're not suing 
for breach of contract damages, you're saying what we're 
suing for is attorney's fees for not signing. Am I correct 
there? 
MR. LUDWIG: Your Honor, it was a breach of 
contract by failing to sign. The damages are attorney's 
fees, and there's a provision in the PSA that allows for 
fees. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's what I'm getting at. 
There's no independent, quote, unquote, breach of contract 
damages aside from a claim for attorney's fees; correct? 
MR. LUDWIG: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I didn't understand that 
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today. 
So, with that in mind, the question is not so 
much whether Ms. -- whether Sondra Kantor breached the 
Property Settlement Agreement by refusing to sign and then 
caused damages in the sense that the short sale wouldn't go 
through or it delayed it. It isn't breach of contract 
damages that are being sought. It is an award of 
attorney's fees that are being sought for requiring 
Mr. Kantor to come to court to procure her signature. That 
is a claim that has to be made to the Court. That will not 
go to the jury. That is an attorney's fees issue. That 
issue depends on who is a prevailing party. Mr. Kantor may 
or may not be a prevailing party, but the -- but a claim 
for contract breach of damages and an award of attorney's 
fees are two different things and they proceed in two 
different directions. 
So, refusing to sign, I would say that that is 
what provoked the claim by Mr. Kantor. She declined to 
sign for whatever reasons, which provoked a filing by 
Mr. Kantor to force her signature. 
Now, who is or who is not a prevailing party is 
an open issue, but there is no reason for that breach of 
contract claim to continue. The way it looks to me is she 
refused to sign, there was an extension agreement with the 
Augusts in order to obtain short sale approval, which she 
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did sign, then Bank of America canceled because there was 
no appraisal. I think that's an undisputed fact. 
February 13 there was another purchase and sale 
agreement with the Augusts. And on March yes, March 
29th, 2013, Bank of America approved a short sale. Just a 
few days later, on April 4th, 2013, Bank of America 
disapproved a short sale because Mr. Kantor was seeking a 
modification. 
Mr. Williams has admitted that he has no 
evidence that Mr. Kantor knew -- and this is going to come 
in under the fraud claim Mr. Williams has admitted that 
he has no evidence that Mr. Kantor knew at the time he was 
seeking a loan modification that that was a violation of 
Bank of America's policies. In order to proceed with a 
fraud claim, he has to know and intend to torpedo a sale of 
the house by knowledge. He has to know that if I seek a 
short sale and I seek a loan modification at the same time, 
one will cancel the other and I am, therefore, torpedoing 
or preventing myself from doing what I have promised to do. 
That's not what happened. There is no evidence 
that he knew by pursuing a loan modification he would be 
torpedoing a short sale. And I'm going to get to that. 
So, I am not going to rule that and this is 
another facet of the breach of contract. I am not going to 
rule that she, because of the issue of causation, that 
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I 
Ms. Kantor breached the contract for purposes of general 
contract damages. I want to be very clear. I'm not going 
to rule that she breached the contract for purposes of 
general contract damages because there is an issue of 
causation. She didn't sign that document right away, but 
it didn't cause any harm except for it provoked a claim for 
attorney's fees. 
So plaintiff's claim -- I will deny the motion 
for summary judgment insofar as it seeks any contract 
damages because there's an issue of fact as to whether 
anything she did, quote, unquote, caused a breach of the 
contract. There's an issue of causation. There's an issue 
of materiality by not signing. It didn't harm anything. 
That contract fell apart because there wasn't an appraisal. 
There was a subsequent purchase and sale agreement. 
So her not signing did not cause the 
contract and I want that underlined, did not cause 
contract damages. It did provoke a claim for fees, I'll 
rule on that, but that's a judge issue, it's not a jury 
issue, so this issue won't go to the jury. That's an issue 
for the Court to determine who the prevailing party is and 
whether someone gets fees under a contract, under the 
divorce contract, or by statute or for some other reason. 
So, I will rule that she may have provoked a 
claim for ~ees, and plaintiff can apply for fees -- you're 
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the ntiff, Mr. Kantor? 
MR. KANTOR: Yes. 
MR. LUDWIG: Yes. 
THE COURT: That Mr. Kantor can apply for fees, 
but whether he gets them we'll see. He may or may not be 
the prevailing party. There may be a number of arguments 
on that point. But there is an issue of fact over whether 
her refusal to sign caused any breach of contract damages. 
The second part of the motion is Robert seeks 
surrunary judgment against Sondra on Count One of the 
existing counterclaim, and in that counterclaim she alleges 
breach of the Property Settlement Agreement and breach of 
the second contract between the parties in three 
particulars; that she has been damaged -- this is (A), that 
she has been damaged by failure of Robert to pay Exhibits 
A, B, C, E, and F. Dis intentionally omitted here. Five 
things, A, B, C, E, and F, in the amount of $49,731. 
That's the debt on the credit cards. 
(B), she alleges under Paragraph 11.02 under 
the Property Settlement Agreement that Robert was to 
provide her with the password to Exclusive Resorts. That 
has been taken care of. 
And paragraph excuse me, Part (C), she 
alleges that he was required to transfer half of the 
airline miles to her and failed to do so. That's in 
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Para 21. 
Just a couple points I want to address. Her --
or neither parties' rights -- and that's one of the things 
that I saw in Mr. Ludwig's briefs a couple times is that 
the rights are fixed as of the filing of the complaint. 
And now maybe I understand your claim a little bit better. 
You're saying the requirement that she had to sign was 
fixed at the time of the complaint. 
I would rule -- I'll rule on that as a matter 
of law that the time for her -- or that the obligation for 
her to sign in order to sell the property did exist and it 
existed as a matter of law at the time Mr. Kantor filed to 
force her signature. 
Another sidecar issue here, unclean hands, 
whether that's an equitable defense. That's an equitable 
defense to an equitable claim. That will not work on a 
claim for money damages. 
Third observation here is that the answer and 
counterclaim were not verified. She alleges -- and I think 
this is -- this has to do with the password information, 
but it might also have to do with the airline miles, that 
those allegations are not under oath. 
With regard to that Part (C), the airline 
miles, the allegations are not sworn to that Mr. Kantor was 
required to transfer half of the airline miles to her and 
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that he failed to do so. Her answer under oath in the 
deposition is that he has no such obligation. Mr. Ludwig 
asked her specifically where does it say he has to do that, 
and she says I can't point to a part. There isn't any part 
of that where he is obligated to do that. 
Then the allegation in her affidavit switched 
and says he agreed to cooperate with me in the use of, 
which is much different than he has an obligation to 
transfer these miles to me. She says in her deposition he 
agreed to cooperate with me in the use of $250,000 award 
points, and she says, quote, he placed unreasonable 
restrictions, close quote, on her ability to use those. To 
me, that's a conclusion. That won't fly. 
And she says that he refused to assist me in 
making travel arrangements. To me, that's not in the 
contract. He has not agreed to assist her in making travel 
arrangements. 
So Parts (B) and (C), the Exclusive Resorts and 
the airline miles, I'll grant summary judgment on both of 
those facets of your breach of contract claim -- or I'll 
grant summary judgment to Mr. Kantor on both of those 
facets of the breach of contract claim asserted against him 
is what I mean. 
The failure to pay A, B, C, E, and F; A, E, and 
F admittedly should not be in there. Band Care the 
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credit card debts to Visa, and -- which is apparently 
18,000, and approximate $40,-000 to American Express. 
The Property Settlement Agreement says, quote, 
Robert shall pay the following debts, close quote. It 
doesn't say when. 
The -- there is a rule of law in Idaho, the 
courts have -- or it's an observation, I guess, of the 
appellate courts that they make from time to time, is that 
courts cannot make better contracts for parties than they 
make for themselves. 
There is no allegation of default. There is no 
allegation that the creditors have pursued Sondra. There 
is no allegation that Sondra has paid these debts in order 
to keep the creditors from coming after her or in order to 
enhance her credit. 
My ruling will be that she is not entitled to a 
money judgment, certainly, against Mr. Kantor for these 
credit card debts unless she pays them. She does seek in 
the claim, I think filed by Mr. Simon, she seeks a money 
judgment against Mr. Kantor for $49,000, and she's 
certainly not entitled to a money judgment against him. 
Theoretically, if she got a judgment against him, he would 
owe her $49,000 that she could do whatever she wanted with 
that still doesn't apply to the credit card debts. That's 
not really what she's after. But she's not entitled to a 
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money judgment against him for those unless she discharges 
those debts or pays them. 
What she really wants from reading her 
deposition is a, quote, determination or agreement as to 
when these should be paid in full, close quote. That would 
require the Court to impose a new term into their contract, 
into the Kantors' contract, the Property Settlement 
Agreement, that does not exist. I cannot do that. 
As to the allegation that it affects her 
credit, I'm sure it does. I'm sure it affects his credit 
equally. That is not a basis for me to impose a new 
contract term into the Property Settlement Agreement. 
And if it, quote, affects her credit, close 
quote, even if that was a basis to alter the Property 
Settlement Agreement, how do we know her credit was not 
affected by the existing $4.5 million debt on the house 
with a loan value -- with a loan value that might be less 
than the excuse me, a loan amount that might be less 
than the house value. Or how do we know her credit is not 
affected simply by the size of these credit card amounts, 
not necessarily how or why they are being paid. There is 
no allegation that I have seen that he is in default and 
the creditors are coming after her for those debts. 
The size of these debts was existing at the 
time of the Property Settlement Agreement. Her argument is 
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that I should make Robert reduce the size of the debts or 
make those debts go away sooner than she bargained for. 
That is not my obligation as a judge to change the contract 
of the parties. She did not bargain for that, nor did she 
get that in the Property Settlement Agreement. 
In my view what she got out of the Property 
Settlement Agreement was a promise from Mr. Kantor to 
and this is my term, quote, keep those creditors away from 
me, you pay them. And although she might not like how he's 
paying them, unless or until it affects her in a new or 
different way than what it might have affected her simply 
by their existence at ~he time they signed the Property 
Settlement Agreement, she has no complaint against 
Mr. Kantor. 
In other words, these debts existed at the time 
of the divorce. If the refusal or some effect of her 
credit occurred because of something Mr. Kantor has done or 
failed to do with regard to these debts, that might be a 
remedy that's envisioned by the Property Settlement 
Agreement and that might give her some claim. If 
Mr. Kantor, for example, defaulted. If she could show, for 
example, that something new has happened since we signed 
this Property Settlement Agreement, something new has 
happened with regard to these credit card debts, therefore, 
I have a claim, that might state a claim. But simply by 
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saying my credit is not good because he is not paying these 
sooner doesn't give her any cause for -- no cause of action 
against Mr. Kantor. 
She is trying to impress upon a contract, also, 
that she is not a party to. She is trying to impress new 
conditions on that contract. That is the contract between 
Mr. Kantor and Visa and Mr. Kantor and/or American Express. 
She is trying to impress now a condition that he only has a 
reasonable time to pay those. That is not a condition of 
Mr. Kantor's contracts with Visa or American Express. She 
is trying to imply that into her contract, the Property 
Settlement Agreement, with Mr. Kantor. 
This is not an unexecuted or unfulfilled 
contract between Sondra and Robert that she is trying to 
impress with a new time for payment, meaning if Sondra and 
Robert had an agreement to, say, for example, buy or sell a 
Chevy between them, and the agreement was I'll give you 
$5,000 for that car, and the other side said done, and the 
contract didn't specify a time for delivery, then the law 
would imply -- and I'm with you there, Mr. Williams -- a 
reasonable time for performance, and the Court would say as 
between you two, I can do that. I can say, yes, you have a 
reasonable time, you have to deliver the car or you have to 
tender payment. Somebody has to close up this deal. 
That is not what this allegation is in their 
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contract. Here she is t to say they have - this is a 
third party she is point to and say they have a 
closed-up deal, but I want to imply new conditions on that 
contract either between Mr. Kantor and Visa and American 
Express or I want to imply a new condition in our contract, 
in our Property Settlement Agreement, which is also a 
closed, completed contract. 
So this isn't a case where a Court gets in and 
says this is an unexecuted contract and it needs to get 
closed up within a reasonable time. These are all fully 
executed contracts where the new condition is corning along. 
Being sought to be impressed is now I want a reasonable 
time impressed upon what I envision to be closed-up, 
completed, executed contracts. That's another -- that's a 
facet of these that distinguishes them from those contracts 
where courts get to imply a reasonable time for 
performance. 
The property settlement is complete. 
Mr. Kantor is complying. Now, he might not be complying as 
quickly as Ms. Kantor would like, but there is no act 
needed to complete any of these contracts. This is a 
series of events by which Mr. Kantor performs, and they can 
be performed over a long period of time. There's no bar to 
that and no one bargained for anything different. What she 
bargained for, in my view, was a performance by Mr. Kantor 
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those creditors away from her, and unless or until 
there's some showing that his failure to pay is affect 
her in a new way, something that was not present at the 
time of the Property Settlement Agreement, she has no claim. 
So I will grant summary judgment to Robert on 
the existing counterclaim Count One. 
Fraud, the amended counterclaim 'have 
already granted summary judgment on the existing fraud 
claim. I'm looking now at the proposed amended 
counterclaim, third claim for relief. 
The motion is to bar the filing of the amended 
counterclaim, the third claim for relief as to fraud, on 
the basis that any amendment is futile or fails to state a 
claim or on the basis of the clear existing facts, the 
unopposed facts, the uncontroverted facts that are already 
in the record. The claim from Mr. Kantor's perspective is 
this fraud claim, even if you allow a filing, we'll be 
right back here. This claim won't fly. 
The allegation in the counterclaim is that 
Robert made, quote, certain representations as to his 
intent regarding the sale, that Sondra relied on his 
representations and intent, that he had no present intent 
to sell, and that she was induced to go forward with the 
marriage settlement agreement, the fraud -- excuse me, the 
Property Settlement Agreement, and conclude the marriage. 
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No. l, fraud must be pled with particulari 
There is no false statement alleged with regard to 
Paragraph 63, just that he intended to conduct his 
activities outside of Rokan Partners. That fails to state 
a claim with regard to Rokan Partners. She doesn't say he 
made a false statement or representation to me, which is 
the very essence, in my view, of fraud or 
misrepresentation. There has to be a false statement. 
What she is saying is that he intended to 
conduct his activities after we signed this Property 
Settlement Agreement in a way that's going to benefit him 
and not me, and that doesn't constitute a basis of fraud. 
~here has to be a false statement or representation. 
No. 2, there has to be a false statement or 
representation that induces reliance. It fails to state a 
claim the proposed amended counterclaim fails to state a 
claim or be pled with particularity with regard to the 
allegation regarding his intent to sell the Golden Eagle 
property. Fraud has to exist at the time of entry into the 
Property Settlement Agreement. You can't show fraud and 
Mr. Williams alluded to this -- you can't show fraud simply 
by later conduct or because things didn't work out. 
In other words, Sondra has to plead and prove 
that at the time Robert entered into the property 
settlement he had an intent to deceive her, and he had to 
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know then that at a minimum he could not pursue a 
modification and a short sale at the same time and that 
this deception caused her damages. 
I have already made the determination that he 
did not know or there is no evidence that he knew that 
pursuing a modification and a short sale at the same time 
would result in a denial of the allowance of a short sale 
by Bank of America. 
There is a -- there is no evidence that his 
intent to pursue a modification caused her any damages, 
either. She signed the property settlement and got out of 
the marriage. Did it cause her any damages? How is she in 
a worse position? 
The fraud in the inducement, the claim that I 
was induced to enter a contract because of a fraudulent 
statement or misrepresentation doesn't generally give rise 
to a claim for damages. What it gives rise to is an 
undoing of a contract. I would not have entered this 
contract but for that statement I relied on, which was 
false; I want out of this ·deal. Fraud in the inducement 
would mean that the whole Property Settlement Agreement 
would be undone. It wouldn't necessarily give rise to 
damages. That's really -- that's just an observation on my 
part. 
But the allegation is that his alleged 
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de ion and his intent to sell caused her to sign the 
y Settlement Agreement And, again, usually the 
remedy for that is not that you get to claim money damages, 
but that you get to undo the contract and start over, and 
that -- I don't see that that's pled as a remedy. 
know that anyone wants that. 
I don't 
But there is no evidence that Mr. Kantor's 
intent to pursue a modification caused her any damages. At 
worst, she signed the Property Settlement Agreement and got 
out of the marriage. Did it cause her any damages? I 
don't see how she was in a worse position. As a matter of 
fact, now I learn today that Mr. Kantor apparently 
negotiated the second deed of trust -- negotiated Bank of 
America to simply eat that. So it is very difficult to see 
how she is in a worse position by Mr. Kantor, quote, 
unquote, not having intent to sell the property. 
How did the bank's refusal to go through with 
the short sale harm her? And that's the question I raised 
with Mr. Williams. She was exposed to the second deed of 
trust apparently at the time of the Property Settlement 
Agreement and she was exposed to the first deed of trust in 
the event the property was insufficient to cover the first 
deed of trust, and that never changed. There is not a 
possibility with regard to the bank and the Golden Eagle 
property. The Kantors' interests were joined. They were 
55 
550 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
12 
1 ~ 
.L.) 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
aligned 
both fail 
They are in the same boat. They both succeed or 
any refusal -- or excuse me, any inability of 
Mr. Kantor to sell, and that cuts into her fraud claim, also. 
It is virtually impossible with regard to 
selling the property for Mr. Kantor to harm Mrs. Kantor 
without harming himself. So it is extraordinarily 
difficult for me to see, in looking at whether this states 
a claim, how Mr. Kantor could have harmed her if he tried 
to, 1, avoid a short sale; or, 2, if he tried to negotiate, 
even secretly, a loan modification. 
of those things. 
He could not do either 
If he was successful -- let me put it this way. 
It had to benefit Mr. Kantor. He could not do either of 
those things successfully without benefiting her. So, in 
my view, it fails to state a claim. Again, if it's fraud 
in the inception, you get the contract undone, and the 
parties would be going back to Square 1. 
Finally, she is saying in her new proposed 
counterclaim that he had no intention to do what he agreed 
to do and factually that he tried to do. In fact, he sued 
her to get her contract -- or, excuse me, to get her to 
sign her contract to perform her end of the same contract. 
So the facts belie any assertion that Mr. Kantor was not 
interested in selling. 
The facts, in fact, looking the other way point 
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to Mr. Kantor t to sell the prope ' fil suit 
against Ms. Kantor t to get her signature in order to 
sell the property. The facts belie her assertions of 
fraud. 
Again, fraud has to be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence. It has to be alleged with 
particularity. And the evidence shows to the contrary of 
what's alleged. It shows, in fact, he made every effort to 
sell and that a non-sale was not in his interest. 
A modification might also have been in his 
interest, but that modification had to be and, in fact, 
would have been in her interest as well if he succeeded. 
So there is just no way that Robert's pursuit of a 
modification could be fraudulent as to her. The facts show 
his intent was to go through with the sale as he promised 
to do. 
of fraud. 
I'm going to deny the motion to amend the claim 
If filed, it would simply be dismissed again. 
I'm going to deny the motion to amend the claim of fraud as 
to the proposed amended counterclaim. 
I hope I've covered it. 
Do either of you have any questions? Is there 
anything I left uncovered? 
MR. LUDWIG: I think the last allegation in the 
amended counterclaim regarding breach of Paragraph 5.01 as 
57 
552 
1 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
to whether Mr Kantor had failed to use a reasonab e - or 
sel within a reasonable time, I don't know whether that's 
still alive or not, Mr. Williams can answer that, because 
the Court hadn't addressed that. 
THE COURT: Well, I thought that was the last 
thing you said when you sat down was, no, I concede, they 
can file that. 
MR. LUDWIG: Okay. Right. I apologize. I 
didn't hear that, but I can assume that the Court would 
grant that part of the motion to amend. 
THE COURT: He can make that claim and we'll go 
from there. 
A reasonable time is a jury question. It's a 
question of fact ordinarily. It's not something that's 
susceptible to summary judgment ordinari I mean, that 
doesn't mean you can't get here on summary judgment, but 
that's not one I'm prepared to address at this point. 
MR. LUDWIG: Okay. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Judge, just one point of 
clarification that may matter, it may not matter. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. WILLIAMS: The -- well, first, if I can 
inquire, so the Court is allowing the amended answer and 
counterclaim except as to fraud? 
THE COURT: Yes. That's what your motion was; 
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am I correct? 
MR. LUDWIG: His motion was pertaining to the 
fraud, which wasn't granted, and the contract claim, which 
was. 
Is there another third part to that? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Well, the reason I ask, Your 
Honor, is as I understood what the Court was explaining as 
to its finding on the air miles, for instance, it was 
relying on the language of the Property Settlement 
Agreement. 
The amended complaint includes a claim for 
breach of contract regarding the air miles, but it doesn't 
relate to the Property Settlement Agreement. It relates to 
the parties' subsequent agreement, which changed 
Mr. Kantor's obligations with regard to the air miles. 
THE COURT: Okay. What I've said with regard 
to the air miles is going to stick insofar as what I've 
looked at. She said in her deposition he had no obligation 
to transfer the miles to her. Whether there's a good faith 
obligation or fair dealing requirement that he assist in 
that, if that's your claim, that he hasn't assisted in 
my -- or he's frustrated my ability to use them, I'll let 
that stand. 
Is that what you're --
MR. WILLIAMS: Well, yeah, because the new 
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claim related to the S r 26th agreement which s 
several times in the record but also at the beginning of 
the case, Exhibit D to Mr. Kantor's affidavit in support of 
motion for temporary restraining order. That agreement --
there had already been a dispute over these air miles, and 
the parties tried to work it out through this -- or tried 
at least to modify it in this September 26, 2012, 
subsequent agreement. 
THE COURT: Let me put it this way. Paragraph 
49 of your amended answer and counterclaim says, "Contrary 
to the agreement, counterdefendant has placed unreasonable 
restrictions on the ability of counterplaintiff to utilize 
these award points." 
That will stand. You can file that. We'll 
take that up at a time later time. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. But insofar as I have ruled 
on things like some of these points, I'm not going to 
change my rulings. 
MR. LUDWIG: I understand the difference, Your 
Honor --
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LUDWIG: between the summary judgment on 
the miles allegation in the counterclaim and the new --
THE COURT: If you need to, you can get a 
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transc or review what I've said. I hope that it's 
clear. S y, if you need to, you can keep it short and 
say the Court granted A motion or B motion for the reasons 
stated by the Court on the record, and then I'll leave it 
to you two to keep in mind what that was. 
MR. LUDWIG: All right. Thank you. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. LUDWIG: That's it. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I don't believe so. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
We'll be in recess. 
(WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded at 
12:52 p.m.) 
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REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 
I, SUSAN P. ISRAEL, CSR #244, Official Court 
Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing transcript, consisting of 
Pages 1 to 61, inclusive, is a true and accurate record of 
the proceedings had. on the date and at the time indicated 
therein as stenographically reported by me to the best of 
my ability and contains all of the material requested. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
this 25th day of July, 2013. 
SUSAN P. ISRAEL, CSR NO. 244 
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Jolynn Drage, Cieri< District 
Court BlairJ51~ty, ldah£.__ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Case No. CV-2012-734 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
VS. 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/ 
COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
LEA VE TO AMEND 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
The Court, having before it Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for Leave to Amend its 
Answer and Counterclaim, having considered the briefs and submissions of the parties and 
having heard oral argument on June 24, 2013, and for the reasons explained by the Court on the 
record at hearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for Leave to 
Amend is granted, with the exception of the Third Claim for Relief of Defendant/ 
Counterclaimant's proposed Counterclaim for fraud. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO AMEND - Page l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1- day of n,Aq , 2013, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served upon opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Scot M. Ludwig 
Daniel A. Miller 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP 
209 Main Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Daniel E. Williams 
Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP 
121 N. 9th Street, Suite 300 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Via Facsimile: 208-387-1999 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via Hand Delivery 
Via Facsimile: 208-345-7894 
Via U.S. Mail 
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND - Page 2 
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AUG O 9 2013 
Boise, ID 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208)345-7894 
danw(@,thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine Coun Idaho 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
Case No. CV-2012-734 
AMENDED ANSWER 
AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Defendant, by and through her attorney of record, for her Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim, answers Plaintiffs Complaint as follows: 
1. Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiffs Complaint not 
specifically admitted herein. 
2. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs I, and 3-6, of Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 1 
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3. the allegations 9, 10, l, l I3, 5, I 
8 
4. Defendant admits that the parties acquired a home at 265 Golden Eagle Drive, that 
Bank of America has secured liens against said property, that the underlying indebtedness is in 
default, that the property has been on the market, that there have been contract offers to purchase, 
but is without sufficient knowledge as to the balance of the allegations set forth in paragraph 2 of 
Plaintiffs Complaint, and therefore denies the same. 
5. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge as to the allegations set forth in 
paragraph 7 and therefore denies the same. 
6. Defendant admits that said property was under contract with prospective buyers as 
alleged in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint, but the specific sale referenced in paragraph 8 
was not approved by Bank of America. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted against 
Defendant. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That, by reason of the conduct of Plaintiff, his agents and/or employees, Plaintiff has 
failed to mitigate damages. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That, by reason of the conduct of Plaintiff, his agents and/or employees, Plaintiff is 
estopped to complain of any of the acts or omissions on the part of Defendant. 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 2 
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FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
reason his agents 
waived any rights or claims against Defendant. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That, by reason of the conduct of Plaintiff, his claims are barred by the doctrines oflaches 
and "unclean hands." 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That, by reason of the conduct of Plaintiff, his claims are barred by misrepresentation and 
fraud. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiff's claims are barred in whole or in part by novation. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiff's claims are barred in whole or in part by accord and satisfaction. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That Plaintiff has not suffered any economic loss or other damages by reason of any 
conduct on the part of Defendant. 
JURY DEMAND 
Defendant demands a trial by jury on all appropriate issues. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff take nothing by reason of his Complaint; 
2. That Defendant have judgment for costs of suit incurred herein; 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 3 
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be 
2I, as 
Settlement Agreement (if28.03); 
pursuant 
as on of the 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Defendant/Counterclaimant Sondra Louise Kantor, by and through her attorney of record, 
for her Counterclaim against Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Robert Aron Kantor, hereby complains 
and alleges as follows: 
1. All jurisdictional requirements for filing in the District Court are satisfied. 
2. That, at all relevant times, the parties both have been residents of Blaine County, 
Idaho. 
3. That the parties own multiple parcels ofreal property within Blaine County, 
Idaho, including without limitation by specification, parcels as set forth in the attached Schedule 
of Real Estate attached hereto and incorporated by reference as "Exhibit A." 
4. That those parcels ofreaLproperty in Blaine County, Idaho, as set forth in "Exhibit 
A" are owned, either in whole or part, by the parties herein, and held in a variety of different 
entities, including without limitation by specification, and upon information and belief the 
following: individually as tenants in common, limited liability companies, corporations, joint 
ventures, general and limited partnerships, and trusts. 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 4 
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5. That 
of 
located in Blaine County, Idaho, as set forth in "Exhibit A". 
directly 
parcel 
6. That the Counterdefendant herein was integrally involved in, structured, formed, 
operated, and participated in the management of each and every entity which owns and operates 
the parcels of real property listed in "Exhibit A" herein. 
7. That the Counterdefendant has a law degree, a tax background, and has an 
extensive background and experience in real estate development, sales, operation, and 
management. 
8. That the Counterdefendant has intrinsic knowledge of the operation, management, 
cash flow, expenses, balance sheets, general ledgers, profit and loss statements, net earnings 
and/or losses of each parcel of real property listed in "Exhibit A." 
9. That, on or about April 24, 2012, the parties hereto entered into a Property 
Settlement Agreement ("PSA" Exhibit B to Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of TRO), which 
agreement sets forth the rights and obligations of the parties hereto in respect to all real property 
and the entities holding title to the same. 
10. That the parties hereto have an interest in numerous business enterprises, some of 
which have an ownership interest in the real property as set forth in Exhibit A, and those entities 
include, without limitation by specification the following: KF, LLC; Rokan Partners; Century 
Trust; Rokan Corporation; Rokan Ventures; Rokan Park Group; Rokan Property Services MIP, 
LLC; Kantor Family, LLC (CO); Sage Cliff, LLC; HK Marine, LLC, Eastman Investors, LP; RV 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 5 
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L, ·RV 
1. That all of the incorporations, formations, preparations, and negotiations of all 
entities in which the parties herein have an ownership interest, and all agreements between 
numerous known and unknown entities is within the actual knowledge of the Counterdefendant 
12. That all of the entities were created by the Counterdefendant, or upon his 
instructions and request, and inclusion, including Rokan Partners, which is a major holder andior 
operator of the parties real estate holdings, and business entities. 
13. That Rokan Partners is managed by Rokan Corporation, that the Counterdefendant 
is the President of Rokan Corporation (12.11 PSA), and that Rokan Partners and/or the 
Counterdefendant is integrally involved in the management, and operation of all of the entities 
that have some ownership interest in the parcels of real property set forth in Exhibit A, as well as 
the other business interests identified in the "PSA." 
14. That in accordance with the "PSA" (12.11) Counterclaimant was to be paid the 
first $6,000.00 available, with the next $6,000.00 available to the Counterdefcndant, and 
thereafter the next $4,000.00 available was to be paid to the Counterclaimant and 
Countcrdefendant respectively. 
15. That in accordance with the "PSA" (if2. l 5) Counterclaimant is to be provided with 
all "reports, monthly ledgers, or general ledgers of Rokan Partners." 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 6 
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16. 
not same as 
the parties' "PSA." 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Contract/Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
17. Counterclaimant incorporates paragraphs 1 through 16 above. 
I 8. That the parties entered into the Property Settlement Agreement or PSA 
referenced above for valuable consideration and the PSA set forth the rights, duties and 
obligations of the parties. 
265 Golden Eagle Drive 
19. As set forth in Defendant's Amended Answer above, pursuant to the PSA the 
parties' property at 265 Golden Eagle Drive in Blaine County, Idaho, was to be "sold as soon as 
reasonably possible" (if5.01). 
20. In September, 2012, the parties entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement 
(Exhibit C to Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of TRO) with prospective buyers ("the Augusts") 
for a short-sale transaction with a purchase price of $2.4 million. 
21. The September, 2012, short-sale agreement between the parties and the Augusts 
was contingent on approval by Bank of America, as the lender to the parties. 
22. In October, 2012, the parties entered into an extension agreement with the 
Augusts, which, inter alia, provided more time for the parties to obtain "written short sale lender 
approval." 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 7 
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it would 
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24. In February, 2013, the parties entered into another Purchase and Sale Agreement 
with the Augusts (Exhibit B attached hereto) with a closing date of June 15, 2013 or sooner. The 
purchase price was $2.4 million. Short-sale approval by the lender was also required. According 
to an Addendum to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the purchase price was raised to 
$2,402,700.00 (Exhibit C attached hereto). 
25. On or about March 29, 2013, Bank of America notified the parties that the 
February short-sale transaction with the Augusts was approved, based on certain conditions 
including a sales price of $2,402,700.00 (Exhibit D attached hereto). Bank of America indicated 
that the estimated amount of the parties' deficiency was $1,438,263.41, but that entire amount 
would be waived and the "estimated amount of this deficiency you will be responsible for is 
$0.00." 
26. On April 4, 2013, however, Bank of America notified the parties' agent that the 
previously approved short-sale transaction with the Augusts was declined, for the reason that 
"Homeowner Wants Modification" (Exhibit E attached hereto). 
27. Bank of America indicated that it would not simultaneously pursue a short sale 
and a loan modification. 
28. All along, despite the language of the PSA requiring the house to be sold, 
Counterdefendant had been attempting to obtain a loan modification from Bank of America, 
which would allow him to retain ownership of the property. 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, P. 8 
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not pursue a loan 
a sale f'ASntllrllJF>/'i to 
and continues to seek a loan modification. 
30. Counterdefendant's efforts to pursue a loan modification, which caused Bank of 
America to cancel the previously approved short-sale to the Augusts, constitute a breach of the 
PSA's requirement that the property be sold. 
31. As a direct and proximate result of Counterdefendant' s breach, Counterclaimant is 
left exposed to the deficiency estimated by Bank of America to be $1,438,263.41 and is damaged 
in a similar way as to that alleged by Plaintiff/Counterdefendant in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 
and 20 of his original Complaint in this action. 
Rokan Ventures 
32. Counterclaimant incorporates paragraphs 1 through 31 above. 
33. When the PSA was entered into, Rokan Partners was the principal entity by which 
Counterclaimant would realize any benefit from her community interest in the parties' business 
activities during their marriage through her 44% ownership in Rokan Partners. 
34. When the PSA was entered into, Rokan Partners owned 25% of another entity 
called Rokan Ventures. 
3 5. The PSA required of Counterdefendant that "[ a ]ny new commercial real estate 
syndications or other commercial real estate activities that Robert intends to, or does, become 
involved in shall be done in Rokan Ventures" (f/16.02). 
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36. 
estate 
37. On or about January I, 2013, Counterdefendant caused Rokan Partner's interest in 
Rokan Ventures to be sold for $41,675.48 in cash, along with other consideration. 
38. Counterdefendant continues to pursue commercial real estate activities for 
compensation, but together with the sale ofRokan Partner's interest in Rokan Ventures, he does 
so in such a way as to defeat the purposes of paragraph 16.02 of the PSA. Counterdefendant's 
conduct includes, but is not limited to characterizing his ongoing commercial real estate activities 
as personal consulting, for which Rokan Partners receives no benefit. 
39. Counterdefendant's conduct constitutes a breach of the PSA and/or a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
40. As a direct and proximate result of Counterdefendant' s breaches, Counterclaimant 
is damaged in amounts to be proven at trial. 
Credit Cards 
41. Counterclaimant incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40 above. 
42. Pursuant to the parties' PSA, Counterdefendant was assigned debts representing 
two credit cards that were in Counterclaimant's name: a Bank of America Visa with a balance of 
$18,000 and a Bank of America AmEx with a balance of$40,000. 
43. Since the PSA was entere? into, Counterdefendant has made only minimum 
interest payments on the two debts and did not provide even that payment for April, 2013. 
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44 PSA as to Counterdefendant is . may 
to pay full, a 
45. Counterdefendant has breached the PSA by not paying these credit card debts 
within a reasonable time, by not providing the April, 2013 payment and by not providing any 
assurances of when these debts might reasonably be paid in full. In the alternative, 
Counterdefendant's actions and omissions constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
46. As a direct result of Counterdefendant's actions and omissions, Counterclaimant 
has been damaged in her credit and remains liable for the current total amounts on both credit 
card debts. As a further direct result, she is unable to use these credit cards and unable to obtain 
other forms of credit, including but not limited to other credit cards, store credit accounts or lines 
of credit 
Air Miles 
4 7. Counterclaimant incorporates paragraphs 1 through 46 above. 
48. Pursuant to a subsequent agreement between the parties after entering the PSA 
(Exhibit D to Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support ofTRO), Counterdefendant was required to 
cooperate with Counterclaimant in the use of 250,000 points from a Wells Fargo account in 
Counterdefendant's name(, 3). 
49. Contrary to the agreement, Counterdefendant has placed unreasonable restrictions 
on the ability of Counterplaintiff to utilize these award points in breach of the agreement and the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
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50. 
uses 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty/Accounting) 
5 I. Counterclaimant incorporates paragraphs 1 through 50 above. 
assets. 
52. That, based upon the operation and management of Rokan Partners and the other 
entities set forth in the parties' PSA, there exists a fidiciary relationship between 
Counterclaimant and Counterdefendant. 
53. That Counterdefendant's fiduciary duty includes the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, to hold as trustee any property, profit or benefit derived by Counterdefendant, and to 
account to the company and its members, as set forth in, inter alia, Sections 30-6-409 and 30-6-
410, Idaho Code. 
54. That Counterdefendant also has a duty based upon the parties' PSA to disclose to 
Counterdefendant the finances of their jointly held assets, including but not limited to the cash 
flow, expenses, balance sheets, general ledgers, profit and loss statements, net earning and/or 
losses, tax returns, and such other financial information, which will verify the.disbursements, or 
lack thereof, to Counterclaimant and the financial status of the various entities. 
55. That Counterclaimant is entitled to a reasonable accounting from Rokan Partners, 
and all of the entities set forth in the PSA. 
56. That Counterdefendant has access to all financial information of the entities set 
forth in the PSA. 
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many accounts 
are at 
direction, supervision and control of Counterdefendant. 
58. That, based on the foregoing, Counterdefendant should be required to account to 
Counterclaimant and provide all relevant information. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Fraud in the inducement) 
(Denied by order of the Court dated August 8, 2013) 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
59. Defendant/Counterclaimant has been required to retain legal counsel to prosecute 
her claims and is entitled to recover her reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred in this 
matter pursuant to Rule 54, I.R.C.P., as well as Sections 12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Code, as well 
as on the basis of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement (ri28.03). 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Counterclaimant prays for judgment on all counts as follows: 
I. For an Order compelling Counterdefendant to provide a full and complete 
accounting; 
2. For injunctive relief from this Court requiring Counterdefendant to abandon his 
ongoing efforts to pursue a loan modification with Bank of America and take all 
necessary steps to close on the previously approved short-sale with the Augusts, 
as well as any further appropriate injunctive relief; 
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4. For costs of suit and reasonable attorneys fees, based on the provisions stated 
above; 
5. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
JURY DEMAND 
Counterclaimant..t-ands a trial by jury on all appropriate issues. 
DATED this~ day of August, 2 3. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
on this 0, ~y of August, 3, a true correct 
"l","'"'f', instrument was served upon opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Scot M. Ludwig v<. Hand Delivery 
Daniel A. Miller Via Facsimile: 208-387-1999 
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP Via U.S. Mail 
209 Main Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
\ 
Daniel E. Williams 
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I 
Boise, ID 83701-1776 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw(althornaswilliamslaw.corn 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Counterclaimant 
ORIGINAL 
AUG O 9 2013 
JoLynn Drags, Clerlc District 
Court Blaine Coun Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Counterdef endant, ) Case No. CV- 2012-734 
) 
VS. ) 
) 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, ) 
) 
DEFENDANT /COUNTER CLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
Defendant/Counterclairnant. ) 
Defendant/Counterclairnant Sondra Louise Kantor, by and through her counsel of record, 
pursuant to Rule 65( e ), l.R.C.P ., hereby moves this Court for its order enjoining Plaintiff/ 
Counterdefendant from taking any further actions with regard to a loan modification on the 
parties' real property located in Blaine County, Idaho, and to require him to cooperate fully in 
consummating an already-agreed short-sale by the end of 2013. 
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Motion, Sondra Kantor on 
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Affidavit of Daniel Williams in Support of 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, all filed concurrently. 
()~ 
DATED this .:::.L day of August, 2013. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
C~~CAT~E OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1_ day of , 2013, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument was served upon opposing c nsel as indicated below: 
Scot M. Ludwig ~ Hand Delivery 
Daniel A. Miller Via Facsimile: 208-387-1999 
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP Via U.S. Mail 
209 Main Streeet 
Boise, ID 83702 
Daniel E. Williams 
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ORIGINAL 
Boise, ID 83701-1776 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
FILED ~·:: u.~. ~ 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Counterclaimant 
AUG O 9 2013 
JoLynn D~ge, Cieri. District 
Court Blaine Countv. Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT; ARON Ki\NTOR, ) 
l ) J Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, ) Case No. CV- 2012-734 
) 
vs. ) 
t.... 
) 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, ) 
DEFENDANT /COUNTER CLAIMANT'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
By her Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Sondra Kantor asks this Court to require 
Robert Kantor to perform a contractual obligation he freely agreed to. During the parties' 
divorce proceedings, Mr. Kantor agreed that their substantial residence in Blaine County would 
"be sold as soon as reasonably possible." Such a sale was negotiated, scheduled to close and 
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resulting almost $1.5 with no 
tax cor1sec:me:nci::s 
continued to seek a loan modification that would allow him to remain in the house and sell it at 
some future, undetermined date. While Mr. Kantor remains in the house and fails to make any 
payments, the deficiency owed by Sondra Kantor jointly and severally continues to grow. For 
several reasons outlined below, she is entitled to injunctive relief from this Court to compel 
Robert Kantor to fulfill his obligations. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
On or about April 25, 2012, the parties entered into a Property Settlement Agreement1 
("PSA") as part of their divorce proceedings. Among other things, the PSA provided that the 
parties' property at 265 Golden Eagle Drive in Blaine County, Idaho ("the Golden Eagle 
property"), was to be "sold as soon as reasonably possible"(, 5.01). In September, 2012 the 
parties entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with prospective buyers ("the Augusts") for a 
short-sale transaction with a purchase price of $2.4 million (Robert Kantor Affidavit: Exhibit C). 
In October, 2012, the parties entered into an extension agreement with the Augusts, which 
provided more time for the parties to obtain "written short sale lender approval."2 In November, 
2012, however, the parties' lender, Bank of America "cancelled" the short-sale with the Augusts, 
based on the lack of an appraisal (Robert Kantor Deposition: Exhibit A) and the September 
Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Robert Kantor of October 11, 2012. 
2 Exhibit C to the Deposition of Robert Aron Kantor of May 15, 2013 ("Robert 
Kantor Deposition"), which is attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Daniel E. Williams in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of June 11, 2013. 
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and Sale Agreement expired. 
13, a new 
with the Augusts (Robert Kantor Deposition: Exhibit D). According to an Addendum to this 
Purchase and Sale Agreement with the Augusts, the sales price was $2,402,700.00 (Robert 
Kantor Deposition: Exhibit G). On or about March 29, 2013, Bank of America notified the 
parties that the short-sale set forth in the February Purchase and Sale Agreement was approved 
(Robert Kantor Deposition: Exhibit E). Bank of America indicated that the estimated amount of 
the parties' deficiency was $1,438,263.4'1, but that the entire amount would be waived: the 
"estimated amount of this deficiency you will be responsible for is $0.00." Id. 
Previously, a second Home Equity indebtedness of approximately $1,000,000.00 secured 
by the Golden Eagle property, also with Bank of America, had been forgiven. At the last hearing 
in this matter, Mr. Kantor's counsel tried to assert that Mr. Kantor was somehow responsible for 
this development: 
Well, after the divorce, Mr. Kantor rolled up his sleeves, 
facing huge liability, and convinced B of A to release the 
second entirely. That's in the record, $1.l million, poof, 
of liability. And we know seconds don't go away. 
THE COURT: Was that done? That did, in fact, 
happen? 
MR. LUDWIG: Yes. I know, it's amazing, but he 
did this subsequent to the divorce, and that saved her 
$550,000 of potential liability.3 
3 See, Transcript of Hearing held June 24, 2013, p. 32, 11. 6-14, attached as Exhibit 
A to the Affidavit of Daniel E. Williams in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed 
concurrently. 
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according to the relevant form letter provided to Robert and Sondra Kantor by Bank of America,4 
was that the Home Equity loan qualified "for participation in a principal forgiveness program 
offered as a result of the Department of Justice and State Attorneys General national settlement 
with major mortgage servicers, including Bank of America, N.A." Acceptance of this 
forgiveness was automatic. Id. 
Thus, because of the forgiveness of the second Horne Equity debt of $1,000,000.00, 
together with Bank of America's approval of the short-sale without seeking any deficiency, the 
transaction with the Augusts would fulfill the PSA's requirement that the Golden Eagle property 
be sold as soon as reasonably possible and assure zero continuing exposure to the Kantors for a 
deficiency. 
On or about April 4, 2013, however, Bank of America notified the parties' agent that the 
previously approved February short-sale transaction with the Augusts was declined, for the 
reason that "Homeowner Wants Modification" (Robert Kantor Deposition: ,Exhibit F). Despite 
the clear language of the PSA that the property would be "sold as soon as reasonably possible," 
Plaintiff Robert Kantor had been attempting all along to obtain a loan modification from Bank of 
America, which would allow him to retain possession of the property (Robert Kantor Deposition: 
Exhibit A and p. 20, LL 5-7). Bank of America indicated that it would not allow a borrower to 
4 Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Sondra Kantor in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, filed concurrently. Subsequent references to this pleading are cited to "Sondra 
Kantor Affidavit" by paragraph or exhibit number. 
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simultaneously a short-sale and a loan modification Kantor Exhibit A 
p. to as a any to 
continue to reside at the Golden Eagle property for one year prior to any subsequent, potential 
sale.5 
Despite learning this information, Mr. Kantor continues to seek a loan modification and 
has caused a closing on the approved short-sale with the Augusts not to occur. According to the 
Augusts' agent, as of July I 8, 2013, the Augusts were still willing to complete the transaction 
within the next 90 days, but sought written confirmation from Mr. Kantor that his loan 
modification efforts were terminated and that "all efforts will now be refocused on short selling 
the property to [the Augusts]."6 To Sondra Kantor's knowledge, Mr. Kantor failed to provide 
such written confirmation by the requested date of August 1, 2013.7 
According to Sondra Kantor's credit report from Equifax as of 7/30/13,8 the balance due 
on Golden Eagle property is $3,345,100.00. Monthly payments are $14,007.00. The amount 
past due is $308,109.00. Obviously, each month that goes by, while Mr. Kantor continues to 
reside at the Golden Eagle property without making monthly payments, Sondra Kantor' s joint 
and several exposure for the deficiency increases. 
Affidavit of Daniel Williams. ,i 2. 
Sondra Kantor Affidavit, Exhibit B. 
Sondra Kantor Affidavit, ,i 2. 
Sondra Kantor Affidavit, Exhibit C. 
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ARGUMENT 
Sondra Kantor is entitled to Injunctive Relief to 
timely short-sale of the Golden Eagle property. 
to 
According to Rule 65( e ), a preliminary injunction may be granted under certain 
circumstances, inter alia: 
( 1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the 
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period 
or perpetually. 
*** 
(3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens, 
or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of 
the plaintift's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the 
judgment ineffectual. 
Sondra Kantor makes the requisite showing to obtain such injunctive relief under Rule 65(e). 
1. The standard under Rule 65(e). 
Real property and real property transactions are often the subject of preliminary injunctive 
relief. See, generally, Jacklin Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV, Inc., 151 Idaho 242 (2011); Walker v. 
Boozer, 140 Idaho 451 (Idaho 2004). "Whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is a 
matter for the discretion of the trial court." Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451,454 (2004), 
quoting, Brady v. City of Homedale, 130 Idaho 569, 572, 944 P.2d 704, 707 (1997). They key is 
whether a party is doing or threatening to do some act in violation of the plaintiffs rights tending 
to render an eventual judgment ineffectual under Rule 65(e)(3). 
An injunction will issue to temporarily restrain an act which will result in great damage to 
the plaintiff although the injury is not irreparable, and although other remedies by way of 
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the mere existence of a legal remedy is not of itself a sufficient ground for 
refusing an injunction. For the existence of a legal remedy to bar the denial of 
injunctive relief, it must appear that the legal remedy is as practical and efficient 
to secure the ends of justice and its prompt administration as injunctive relief. 
Sams v. Goff 208 W. Va. 315 (W. Va. 1999). 
In considering whether an eventual legal remedy might be sufficient, courts do not 
suddenly become blind to the real-world situation of the parties. The Seventh Circuit, for 
example, explained its decision to vacate a district court's refusal to issue injunctive relief and to 
remand "with instructions to craft appropriate equitable relief with dispatch" as follows: 
The court's final reason fails to take account of the limits on Robinson's wealth. 
The judge wrote that, if Robinson fails to honor his contractual obligations, 'the 
damage could be very large, given ttie nature of the industry involved and the 
length of the revenue-generating relationship with customers' but could be 
calculated, so that a financial remedy would be adequate. Ability to calculate 
damages does not make that remedy adequate, however, if the plaintiff cannot 
collect the award. A judgment-proof defendant is not deterred by the threat of 
money damages, so some other remedy (such as the contempt power) may be 
essential. Nothing in the record suggests that Robinson would be good for "very 
large" damages. 
Lakeview Tech., Inc. v. Robinson, 446 F.3d 655, 657-658 (7th Cir. 2006). 
Similarly, in Aviara Parkway Farms, Inc. v. Agropecuaria La Finca, S.P.R. de R.L., 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7173 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009), the district court explained its preliminary 
injunction: 
The court's preliminary findings also indicate legal remedies would be inadequate 
to Plaintiffs and they would suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief. 
First, Finca's allegedly tenuous financial position and status as a Mexican 
organization may thwart any attempts to recover a potential monetary award. See 
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' . 
Inc. v. Robinson, 446 F.3d (7th 2006) 
judgment-proof defendant is not deterred by the threat money damages, so 
some (such as the contempt power) may be essential. addition, 
even where goods appear fungible, injunctive relief is appropriate where monetary 
damages are uncertain. See Ross-Simons ofWanvick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 
F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1996) (where a plaintiff suffers ''substantial injury that is not 
accurately measurable or adequately compensable by money damages, irreparable 
harm is a natural sequel'). 
2. Sondra Kantor has a con~ractual right, which is threatened by Mr. Kantor's 
ongoing conduct, and an eventual legal remedy is inadequate. 
Here, under the parties' PSA, Sondra Kantor has a contractual right that the Golden Eagle 
property be "sold as soon as reasonably possible." That right is fulfilled by the bank-approved 
short-sale to the Augusts with a zero deficiency, but her right has been and continues to be 
violated by Mr. Kantor's loan modificatiop efforts. At the last hearing, this Court opined that, 
since the interests of the parties coincide,,Mr. Kantor cannot damage Sondra Kantor without 
damaging himself. Unfortunately, that is no guarantee ofreasonable behavior. Mr. Kantor is 
free to play fast and loose with his own credit and debt obligations, but the PSA requires him not 
to do so with Sondra Kantor's. The parties' interests are not perfectly aligned, for while Mr. 
Kantor continues to live in a 12,000 square foot house without making payments to the bank, 
Sondra Kantor's exposure on the indebtedness continues and increases every passing day. Mr. 
Kantor freely bound himself in the PSA to effect a sale as soon as reasonably possible and should 
be enjoined from further efforts to procure a loan modification. 
Further, as set forth in the authority cited above, should Sondra Kantor become liable to 
Bank of America on a deficiency, Mr. Kantor does not have the means by which to pay damages 
for breach of the PSA. As the PSA itself demonstrates, the parties' marital assets consisted 
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estate ventures. 
was not awarded any substantial property, but only retained her interest in Rokan Partners, LLP 
(,r 2), plus Mr. Kantor's promise to conduct his ongoing real estate activities through Rokan 
Ventures, LLC (i! 16.2), which_was owned (until recently) by Rokan Partners. Mr. Kantor cannot 
show this Court that he has the liquid assets available to pay a large damage award for his breach 
of the PSA. Moreover, at the time of trial in January, 2014, if the Golden Eagle property has still 
not been sold, it may not be possible to calculate the extent of Sondra Kantor's eventual 
damages. This inability renders her dam.ages not "accurately measurable" or "adequately 
compensable," so as to make injunctive relief the only viable remedy available to her. 
3. The clock is ticking. 
If all of the above reasons were not enough, there is the added consideration of time. 
Passed originally in 2007, the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act, P.L. 110-42 ("the Act"), 
expires January 1, 2014. The Act amended 26 U .S.C. § 108(h)( l ), inter alia, to make mortgage 
debt forgiveness on a principal residence not count as taxable income. While Mr. Kantor 
continues to pursue a loan modification and frustrates any short-sale to the Augusts, the clock is 
running out on taking advantage of the Act. Failure to accomplish the closing of the short-sale 
by the end of the year would cost the parties dearly in extra taxes on any future debt forgiveness 
by means of either a modification or short-sale. Mr. Kantor simply may not run these enormous 
risks when he has obligated himself to cooperate in a sale as soon as reasonably possible. 
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CONCLUSION 
that this 
Robert Kantor from taking any further actions with regard to a loan modification and to 
cooperate fully in consummating the already agreed short-sale with the Augusts by the end of 
2013. a~ 
DATED thisl day of August, 2013. 
HOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, 
) 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 9-_~y of August, 2013, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served upon opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Scot M. Ludwig ~Hand Delivery 
Daniel A. Miller Via Facsimile: 208-387-1999 
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP Via U.S. Mail 
209 Main Streeet 
Boise, ID 83702 
Daniel E. Williams 
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OR\G\NAL 
Boise, ID 83701-1776 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Counterclaimant 
AUG O 9 2013 
~r,nn Dr_age, Clerk District 
vuurt Blame Coun Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, ) 
) 
VS. ) 
) 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, ) 
) 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Blaine ) 
Case No. CV- 2012-734 
AFFIDAVIT OF SONDRA 
KANTOR IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
SONDRA KANTOR, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says. 
I. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a document I received on Bank 
of America stationery regarding the forgiveness of the home equity line of credit on the Golden 
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I 2. as B is true correct copy a on 
i 
stationery dated July 18, 2013, from the Buyers' agent representinJ the Augusts' regarding the 
i ( 
short-sale of the Golden Eagle property. To my knowledge, RoberyKantor did not provide the 
i 
requested written confirmation that loan modification efforts are tenninated and that all efforts 
I 
would be refocused on short selling to Buyers. 
I 
3. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of tin Equifax credit report I 
l 
obtained online current as of 7/30/2013. 
i 
~~~~ 
Sondra Louise! Kantor 
I 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 0\ day of August, 2013. 
-- I 
! 
~\C)~ 
Notary Public lfor Idaho 
Residing at:~ ~b 
My Co~iss~: ~ :::L=-...Q:a,o.. 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
;;\4:>-
I hereby certify that on thiV_!_ day of August, 2013, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served upon opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Scot M. Ludwig 
Daniel A. Miller 
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP 
209 Main Streeet 
Boise, ID 83 702 
VVia Hand Delivery 
Via Facsimile: 208-387-1 
Via U.S. Mail 
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EXHIBIT A 
590 
Robert A Kantor 
Sondra F Kantor 
265 S GOLDEN EAGLE DRIVE 
ID 83333-0000 
Account Number: 68220136813699 
Dear Robert A Kantor and Sondra F Kantor: 
FvBa':ire li~~r~i;i,6Tf 6r·,a•:tu11···.·.· 
principal forgiveness of your 
Home Equity Account. 
We are pleased to inform you that we have approved your Home Equity account for participation in a principal 
forgiveness program offered as a result of the Department of Justice and State Attorneys General national settlement 
with major mortgage servicers, including Bank of America, N.A. 
You will receive a full forgiveness of the remaining principal balance of $999,145.33 on your Home Equity Line 
of Credit account. This means that you will no longer owe this amount, and we will also waive any outstanding fees 
and accrued interest. Please note that if we receive any payments from you before we forgive your remaining principal 
balance, we will apply them to your Home Equity account, which will reduce the actual principal balance amount we will 
forgive. 
What To Do If Your Account Is In Foreclosure 
Although your home equity loan balance is being forgiven, this doas not extinguish your 1st mortgage. If your 1st 
mortgage Is in foreclosure, this will not stop the foreclosure process and foreclosure activities will continue. Please 
continue to answer and reply to all foreclosure communications from us. If you do not understand the legal 
consequences of the foreclosure, you are also encouraged to contact an attorney or·housing counselor for assistance. 
What You Need to Know 
Your acceptance of this offer is automatic unless we hear from you. If you choose not to accept this forgiveness offer, 
please call within 30 days of the date of the letter to the number listed below. 
Please be aware that we are required to report the amount of your cancelled principal debt to the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS). Currently federal law provides for certain exceptions to tax llablllty when debt is forgiven in connection 
with a foreclosure prevention transaction. In order to know whether you qualify for one of these exceptions and what 
other tax impacts this transaction may have for you, we recommend that you contact a tax professional. Additional 
information can also be found at www.irs.gov. 
Also, once we forgive the remaining balance on your Home Equity account, we will report to the major credit bureaus 
that your account was paid and closed. Your credit score may be affected by this forgiveness. Credit scores are 
determined by your credit history and not controlled directly by Bank of America, NA beyond our commitment to 
accurately report the status of all our customers. For more information about credit scores, please go to 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/creditlcre24.shtm. 
If you have questions about this forgiveness, or would like to discuss any other options that may be available to you, 
please contact us at 1.800.496.7831. 
Home Loan Team 
Bank of America, N.A. 
MILIIABY PERSONNEL/SERVICEMEMBERS: If you or your spouse is a member of lhe military, please contact us Immediately. The federal 
Servicemambers Civil Relief Act and comparable state laws afford significant protections and benefits to .!1llil:!J2.l!! military service personnel, fnciudlng 
protections from foreclosure as wen as interest rate relief. For addilional information and to determine eligibility please contact our Milltary Assistance 
Team tolf free at 1.877 A30.6434. If you are calling from outside the U.S. please contact us at 1.817.685.6491. 
Bank of America, N.A. Is required by law to Inform you that this communlcallon Is from a debt collector. However, the purpose of !his communication is to 
!et you know about your eligibility for a debt forgiveness program. 
M«trJl,QU Nnded and adff!Stllsftted by anl'.£tEqual Housing Lender. 
{)Pro!actffl('~~beltn~UbG:lQ11'11fiL 
C3_2518-3 
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COLDUIC!LL 
BANl{eRm 
DISTINCTIVE PROPERTIES 
PO BOX 7246/191 & 333 MAIN STREET 
Ketchum, m 83340 
OFFICE (208) 622-3400 
OFFICE (208) 622-6400 
fax: (208)-622-3800 
www.coldwellbankerdistinctiveproperties.com 
July 18, 2013 
John Sofro 
Robert Kantor 
Sondra Kantor 
350 South Lincoln Avenue 
Steamboat Springs, CO 80487 
OFFICE (970) 879-88H 
FAX (970) 879-9734 
286 Bridge Street 
Vail, CO 81657 
Off!CE (970) 476-2113 
FAX (970) 476-3084 
I am writing to you today to clarify our position in the acquisition of 265 Golden Eagle 
Drive. 
It has come to my attention that Sondra is not willing to participat~ in a Loan 
Modification. Obviously, the Lender would require all parties to participate "if' the 
Lender were to modify any loan. Given this new information, it is clear that a Loan 
Modification is not an option for the Sellers. 
The Buyer would like to receive written confirmation from the Sellers and the Lender 
that the Loan Modification efforts are terminated, and that all efforts will now be 
refocused on short selling the property to Buyer. Please provide this notification by 
August 1, 2013, mailed or hand delivered to: 
Deborah Sievers 
Coldwell Banker Distinctive Properties 
PO Box7248 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
We hope that all parties are on the same page. As you know, we have been Under 
Contract for the Short Sale of 265 Golden Eagle Drive since October 2012 with little or 
no movement towards completing that sale. We believe, with this latest revelation, that 
there is no reason we should not be able to complete this transaction according to the 
terms of the contract, with in the next 90 days. 
We look forward to your immediate response and the completion of this sale. 
Sincerely, 
/ll , 1 ,I 1 s~~~
Deborah Sievers 
Each Office Is Independently Owned and Operated. 
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EqmJax Personal Solutions https://facLeconsumer.cquifax.com/fact/productViewchtml?prod_ ed .. 
l of2 
• Contact Annua!CredltReport.com 
Get Started>> Veri(v >> View Report 
Equifa'- understands the importance of keeping your infonnation secure from unauthorized 
access. All of your data, such as your SSN and Card Number, is encrypted before being transmitted to/from our 
servers. For yom sec..'llrity, this site requires the use of a 128-bit SSL compatible browser. 
Equifax Credit Report™ 
l. 
2. Account, 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Equifax Credit Report ™ for Sondra L. Kantor 
As of: 
07/30/2013 
Available until: 
08/29/2013 - Report Docs Not Update 
Confirmation #: 
3711659407 
Did you know that your free annual credit report does not include your credit score? Know 
where you stand by getting your credH score today. 
7/3~013 3:52 PM 
2 of2 
https://fact .econsumer.equifax.com/facUproduc! View. ehtml?prod _ed ... 
Order your Credit ScoreTM with this credit report/or on(v $7.95 
Mortgage accounts include first mortgages, home equity loans, and any other loans secured by real estate you O\vn. 
Open Accounts 
Account Name Account Date Balance Date Number Opened Reported 
87112:XXXX 03/27/2008 $3,345,100 05/31/201 
J_:-
·Closed Accounts 
Account Name Account Number Date Balance Date Opened Reported i&· 
BANK OF 
AMERICA l33680285XXXX 12/01/2007 $0 04/01/2008 
6822013681XXXX 10/25/2005 $i,Ol9,30l 08/31/2012 
BANK OF 
AivfERICA, 
N.A 6822900050:XXXX 01/01/2002 $0 11/01/2005 
Past Due Status·'!.· Credit Limit 
$308,019 
Past Status+ Credit Due Limit 
PAYS AS 
CHARGE-OFF $1,000,000 
PAYS AS 
AGREED $0 
Equifax offers you personal credit products that enlighten, enable and empower you. Whether you.are managing your 
credit, protecting your identity or preparing for a major purchase, Equifax offers the tools you need to make the 
smartest choices possible. For more information visit www.Equifax.com. 
Copyright Equifax 2013 
Copyright Equifax 2013 
7!3%1fll3 3:52 PM 
l of3 
Personal Soluiiorn, htlps://facteconsumcr.cquifax_com/fact/prcparcForYicw.ehtml?prod_ ... 
Contact Armua!CreditReport.rorn 
Your Annual Equifax Credit 
Get Started>> Verify >> View Report 
Equifax understands the importance of keeping your information secure from unauthorized ,,. , ·"·· 
access. All of your data, such as your SSN and Card Number, is encrypted before being transmitted to/from our 
servers. For your security, this site requires the use of a 128-bit SSL compatible browser. 
Equifax Credit ReportTM 
L 
2., 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Equifax Credit Report™ for Sondra L. Kantor 
As of: 
07/30/2013 
Available until: 
08/29/2013 - Report Does Not Update 
Confirmation #: 
3711659407 
Did you know that your free annual credit report does not in dude your credit score? Know 
where you stand by getting your credit score today. 
Order your Equifax Credit Score"r.i wilh this credit report/or only $7. 95 
7l3'mfJB 3:51 PM 
2 of3 
https:/ ifacteconsumer.eqmtax. com/fact/prepa reF or View .e html?prod _ .. 
Your~~,,, .. ~, Swmrr111Iy highlights the information in your credit file that is most important in determining your 
credit ~-.. -· .. " credit information into one summary 
Accounts 
Lenders usually take a positive view of individuals with a range of credit accounts - car loan, credit cards, mortgage, 
etc. - that have a record of timely payments. However, a high debtto credit ratio on certain types of revolving ( credit 
card) accounts and installment loans will typically have a negative impact. 
Debt to Monthly Accounts 
Open Credit Credit Pavment with a 
Accounts Balance Available',i Lmnt,,· 
$3,345,100 $0 $3,345,100 100% 14 007 I 
$0 NIA NIA NIA $0 0 
9 $45,880 $84,520 $130,400 35% $1,734 3 
0 $0 NIA NIA NIA $0 0 
Total 10 $3,390,980 $84,520 $3,475,500 98% $15,741 4 
Debt by Account Type 
Account Age 
Debt to Credit Ratio by Account Type 
Usually. it is a good idea to keep your oldest credit account open, as a high average account age generally demonstrates 
stability to lenders. Also, especially if you have been managing credit for a short time, opening many new accounts 
will lower your average account age and mayhave a negative impact. 
Length of Credit 
History 
Average Account 
Age 
Oldest Account 
Most Recent 
Account 
2013 Years, 6 Months 
15 Years, 4 Months 
Inquiries - Requests for your Credit History 
Numerous inquiries on your credit file for new credit may cause you to appear risky to lenders, so it is usually better to 
only seek new credit when you need it. Typically, lenders distinguish between inquiries for a single loan and many new 
loans in part by the length of time over which the inquiries occur" So, when rate shopping for a loan it's a good idea to 
do it within a focused period of time. 
4 
713ggW13 3:51 PM 
3 of3 
https://fact.econswner.equifa.x.c(Hn/factlprepa..1~ForVic,v.chL"1ll?prod_~ .. 
' ' 
Most Recent 
Late payments, collections and public records can have a negative impact on your credit standing. The more severe and 
recent they are, the more negative the potential impact might be. 
Copyright Equifax 2013 
Copyright Equifax 2013 
0 
3 
0 
78:lli2013 3:51 PM 
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M.LUDWIG 
DANIEL MILLER 
LUDWIG• SHOUFLER •MILLER+ JOHNSON, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
209 West Main Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone; 208-387-0400 
Facsimile: 208-387-1999 
ISB 3506 
ISB 3571 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2012-734 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
P. 2 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, ROBERT ARON KANTOR, by and through his attorneys, Scot 
M. Ludwig and Daniel A. Miller of Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP, and hereby moves this 
Court pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)-(e) for an Order entering a Preliminary 
Injunction enjoining the Defendant, her representatives and agents, from contacting Bank of America 
regarding the cunent financing on the Golden Eagle real property. 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 1 
600 
Au 9. 20i3 : 12PM .J-lAW No. 4781 P. 3 
and 
Support of the Motion 
of the Motion. 
filed no later days before time specified for the Hearing 
DA IBD thi~ day of August, 2013. 
ILLER +JOHNSON, LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thisq:~y of August, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated: 
Daniel E. Williams 
Thomas, Williams & Park LLP 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
U.S. Mail 
_ Hand Delivery 
_ Overnight Courier 
-Asimile Transmission 
/ (208)34 4 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 2 
601 
08 2/20 MON 14: 51 FAX 
I 
FILED ;:;. L~·'' 
' I 
' .T J> 
AUG 1 2 2013 
JoL.ynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blaine Countv Idaho 
_\ 
Box 
Roise, TD 83701-1776 
'ldcphonc (.208) 34:;_ 7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw(cz),Lhomaswill iamslaw .corn 
Attorneys for Defendunt/Counterdaimant 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT ()Ji' THI~ FIFTH .flJOlCIAL DI.STRICT 
OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF llLAlNE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOTI, ) 
) 
fZ)002/005 
Plain ti l"UCounlenk lend ant ) 
) 
vs. ) 
> 
SONDRA LOUTSE KANTOR, 
Case No. CV- 2012-734 
DEI1'ENDANT/COUN'l'ERCLA[MANT'S 
OBJRCTTON TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR A WARD 011' 
COSTS i\NJ> A TTORNRY FF'.F.8 
Dele.ndant/Countcrdaimant. 
Dcfcndant/Countcrc!aimant Sondrn L .K.::mtor, by and through her allomey of' record, 
pursuanl lo Rule 54(d)(1 )(B). T.R.C.P., hereby o~jccts to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Costs 
nnd Attorney l•ees. 
ARGUME~T 
Under· Rule 54(cl)(l)(ll), an award of costs and fees requires a fornl judgment or: 
other-Jina! r·esolulion of all claims of the rrnrties. 
Midway through these proceedings, Plmntiff seeks an award of costs and fees on the 
grounds that he prevailed on certain issues regarding his motion for pmiiul summary judgment. 
DEfl.iNDANT/COUNT.ERCLAIMANT'S ORJF.CTTON TO PT .ATNTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR/\ W /\RD OF COSTS AND Al TORN.LY l"JJLS, P. 1 
602 
0 8 1 / 2 MON 14, 52 FAX 
motion or Rule 54 and umnislakahle 
i!s irntion. Rule 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitkd to t:osts, 
the tnal court shall in its sour1d discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation Lo the relief' sought by the rcspccti vc parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may determine that a party Lo an action prevailed in part 
and did not prevail in part. and upon so finding muy appo1tion the costs between 
an<l among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the 
issues and daims involved in !.be action and the resultant judgment or indgmcnts 
obtained. 
(emphasis a<lded) 
As this language clearly indicates, prevailing party analysis requires a final result. 
The Idaho Supreme Comi has made the same poinl tJuiLe dearly. 
Allhough the disLricl court had jllrisdiction to award costs, including attorney fees, 
they ure awarded to the prevailing party in the action. Idaho R. Ci v. P. 
54(d)(l)(B). Where a party prevails only in part, Lhe court 'may apporlion the 
costs between and among the parties in a fair ,md equitable manner ;laer 
considering all or the is.sues and claims involved in the action and the resultant 
judgment or judgments obtained.' fd The court cannol do su al'tcr considering 
'aH of the claims involved in the ::iction and the resultant judgment or judgmenl.s 
ubtaincd' unlil all of the claims between the relevant parties have been resolved. 
All ol'Ragley.s' claims and Thomasons' counterclaims were not resolved when the 
district comt awarded Hagleys court cosl.s, including allomey lee.s, !'or prevailing 
on one of their claims. Thonrnsons huve not argued on appeal Lhal the <lislricL 
court cncd in i1warding costs before there was a prevniling pmty in the action, and 
nothing herein should be construed as holding thnt a trial court can award comt 
costs, including allorney lees, on a piecem(:al basis as each claitn between the 
parties is decide<!. 
(emphasis in original) 
lt)003/005 
Raxley 1). Th011wsm1, 14q Tdaho 799, 804 (20 l 0). Similarly, in Calcitve/1 v. Cometro, 15 l ldaho 
3 9-40 (2011 ), the Comi reaffirmed that tht language of Rule 54( <l )( 1 )(Rl empowers courts lo 
award cosls an<l fees only as "lo a !imtl judgment or to an aclion that has been completely 
adj udicatcd. '' 
DF.FF.NDANT/COl JNTERCT .AlMANT'S 0BJECT10N TO PLJ\lNTU:FS 
MOTION 1"()1{ A WARD or COSTS AND A TTORNF.Y FEES, P 2 
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~004 005 
not the an<l claims mvolvetl m have been fornlly 
or J\1 tl1(: same on 
upon which Plaintiff bases his costs and fee5 application, this Courl granted Dcfonclant's motion 
to amend her Answer and Counlerch:iirn. Plaintiff is attempting to make clain, for costs an<l fcl'.s 
on just the kind of "pk:ccmcal basis" that the Tdaho Supreme Courl has repeatedly held invalid. 1 
Defendant suhrnils that PlaintiH's motion, as well as its further pursuit, is not warranted under 
existing law and c;:in.not be supported hy a good l'ailh argument for an extension, modification, m 
reversal or existing law, pursuant to LC.§ 12-123. 
CON Cl ,UST ON 
Fur all the fr,rcgoing reasons. Defendant respectfully requests that the Court deny 
Plaintiff's motion for an award o!' costs an<l allorn1:.'.y k:cs without prc_iuclicc. 
DATF.D this J~~~f August, 2013. 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK., LLP 
Attorneys for Oefendant/Cmmlen:lai111ant 
Because this objection compleLe.ly resolves lhc issue before the Court, Defendant 
docs not 3rgue the multiple other failings of Plainli !rs submission, nulahly its foilurc to 
<li fferenliaLe lees and costs related to the issues upon wbich it has pi-evai led and others upon 
which it has not yet prevailed. 
DEFF.NDANT/COUNTERCL/\lMJ\NT'S 0DJ1::CT10N 1'0 PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES. P. 3 
604 
MON 14 52 FAX 
l hereby certify that on this { C ~of' August, 2013, a true and correct copy or the 
foregoing instrument was served upon opposi11g counsel as indicated below: 
Scot M. Ludwig 
Daniel ,t\. J\.,ii Iler 
Ludwig Shoutler Milkr Johnson, LLP 
209 Main StrGcct 
Roise, ID 83702 
__ Viu IlanJ Delivery 
~ ia l·acsimile: 208-387-1999 
Via U.S. Mail 
DEFENDANT/COUN·11.;KCLJ\lMANT'S ORJECTTON TO PIJ\!NT!FF'S 
MOTION FOR AWARD OF COSTS AND A'lTOKNEY FDES, P. 4 
~005/005 
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Fl LED ~-~--:.,,+ ......... ~ 
AUG 2 f 20t3 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Blame Countt· /!,,,.," 
,.,,..,..._,.., ...• ,, 
IN Tll.1£ l)JSTRICT counT OF THF.: FIFTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 'f HE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND ttOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINR 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Plaintiff/Countcrdefendant, 
vs. 
SONDRA ID1JTSE KANTOR, 
Dcfendant/Cou11terclaimant. 
Ca$c No. CV-20 J 2-7J4 
ORDRR DRNVTNG PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR A WARD OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FRRS 
The Court, having before it PlainLitrs Motion for Award ,)f Cost~ and Attorney i·ccs filed 
July 17, 2013, and having considered the submissions of the pmties and conducted a telephonic 
hearing on August J 9,201); 
IT lS HERE13 Y ORDER.ED, that Plaintiffs Motion is <leniec1 as premature for the 
reasons staled hy the Court on the reeord. 
ORDER DENYING PT.ATNTTFF'S MOTION FOR AWARD 01" COSTS AND ATfORNDY 
FEES Pnge I 
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Jf'doyol~ :l 
CERTTFTCAfE (W SERVTCR 
I hereby certify thal on this ~ay of 14, A 0. , 20 I3, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was served upon opposing~! as indicated bcJow: 
Scot M. Ludwig 
Daniel A. Miller 
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP 
209 Main Street 
Roise, ID 83 702 
Daniel L Williams 
Thomas, Williams & Park, T ,T ,P 
121 N. 9111 Slreel, Suite 300 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
Via Facsimile: 208~387-1999 
_L'Via U.S. Mail 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
Via Fue,simile: 208-345-7894 
/"Via U.S. Mui! 
Deputy Clerk or the Court 
ORD1:1Z DENYTNG PLAINTWF'S MOTTON FOR AWARIJ OF COSTS AND AlTORNFY 
FEES - Page 2 
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~003/003 
DANIELE. WILLIAMS (ISB 3920) 
THOMAS, WlLLlAMS & 
N. 91" St., Suite 300 
0. Box 1776 
F '.J ~·o A.M ·· .,,..,. ~ P.M-1,---
[ A'!S 2 2 2013 Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-7800 
Fax: (208) 345-7894 
danw@thomaswilliamslaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court Btaine County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
.. 
lJI.~ .Jk) 
STATE OF &:ALif@RHIA 
County of p\A:i rJe.,, 
) 
)ss. 
. ) 
Case No. CV-2012-734 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MITCHEL J. AUGUST 
MITCHEL J. AUGUST, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF MITCHEL J. AUGUST, P. l 
608 
L personal knowledge of the facts and matters set forth herein. I am 
this to provide the with our current intentions with regard to real 
property, which I understand forms the subject of part of this case. The testimony set forth in this 
Affidavit is the same as I would provide if appearing live as a witness in a hearing or trial in this 
action. 
2. My wife, Gwynn E. August, and I are the Buyers referred to in the Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement of February, 2013, regarding real property at 265 Golden Eagle 
Drive, Hailey, Idaho ("the Golden Eagle property"). A true and correct copy of this Agreement is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
3. We understood that the transaction described in Exhibit A, as a "short-sale," 
required the consent of Bank of America, as the lender to the Sellers. 
4. We also understood that Bank of America gave its consent to the transaction set 
forth in Exhibit A, but that the transaction did not close as anticipated due to Robert Kantor's 
i 
effo11s instead to seek a loan modification. 
5. As a result of the multiple delays that have occu1Ted in closing on the Golden 
Eagle property, my wife and I have become frustrated at the lack of progress to complete the 
agreed-upon sale. We have started to look seriously at other properties in the area to purchase. 
While we wou]d still be willing to go through with the sale described in Exhibit A, it is our intent 
to abandon any effort to purchase the Golden Eagle property, if those efforts cannot be completed 
in the very near future. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MITCHEL J. AUGUST, P. 2 
609 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this i~ day of August, 2013. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MITCHEL J. AUGUST, P. 3 
IVYSLIKE 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
610 
hereby certify that on this:l( ~y of hi • 013, a true and correct copy 
foregoing instrument was served upon opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Scot M. Ludwig 
Daniel A. Miller 
Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP 
209 Main Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
..----Via Facsimile: 208-387-1999 
Via U.S. Mail 
--- ---_...c--=---=--~-
Daniel E. Williams 
AFFIDAVIT OF MITCHEL J. AUGUST, P. 4 
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Real Estate Purchase And Sale 
and Gwynn E. August, husband and wife 
Seller: Robert A. Kantor and Sondra F. Kantor 
Property Address: 265 Golden Eagle Drive 
Legal Description: Golden Eagle Ranch AM, Lot 34A 
City: Hailey County: Blaine Slate: Idaho ZIP: 83333 
3. Buyer hereby offers to purchase the above described Property on the following terms and conditions: 
Terms The purchase price is payable as follows: 
$ 2,400,000.00 Cash, cashier's check, loan proceeds, or certified funds at closing, including Earnest Money 
$ Seller Financing - See Financing Contingency "Other Financing Terms· 
$ Other- See Financing Contingency "Other Financing Terms" 
$2,400,000.00 Total Purchase Price- Not including closing costs 
4. Earnest Money $ 50,000.00 
Evidenced By: To be Held By: 
D Personal Check D Listing Broker 
D Cashier's Check 1:8] Selling Broker 
0 Promissory Note O Title Company 
Fifty Thousand and no/10oths Dollars 
Other Remarks: 
EM to be wired to Coldwell Banker Trust Account 
within 3 business days after mutual acceptance. 
Earnest Money to be deposited in a trust account upon written acceptance of this Agreement by all parties. 
5. Offer Expires On: Date: 02/06/2013 Time: 5:00 p.m. 
6. Closing Date: June 15 or sooner or whatever the date that is set by the short sale lender. 
Possession Date: l8I On closing date OR O Other: 
7. Responsible Closing Broker/ Office: Todd Conklin/Coldweli Banker 
Responsible Closing Agency/ Title Co: Sun Valley Title Company 
8. New Construction or Recent Improvements: Yes D No~ 
lf"YES", see Standard Terms, paragraph 6, of this Agreement. 
9. Inspection Contingency Yes [gj No D 
1) This offer is contingent upon Buyer's acceptance of the condition of the Property, subject to paragraph 7, 
below. If Buyer does not object to the condition of the Property in writing on or before 7 Business Days 
("inspection contingency period"), pursuant to paragraph 8, below, this inspection contingency shall be 
deemed released. 
2) Buyer shall have the right to, and is strongly advised to, conduct inspections, tests, surveys and other studies 
("inspections") at Buyer's sole cos! to confirm all information provided to Buyer, and to thoroughly inspect the 
Property. 
3) Square footage verification: Buyer is aware that any reference to the square footage of the Property or ils 
improvements has not been verified. Alternative methods of measurement and calculation may vary 
significantly. If square footage Is material to the Buyer, Buyer must verify same during the inspection period. 
4) Water Rights verification: It is strongly advised that the Buyer contact a knowledgeable attorney of the 
Buyer's choice, experienced in water law, to advise the Buyer of the validity, quality, and quantity of any 
water right acquired with real estate described in this Agreement. Buyer must verify same during !he 
inspection period. 
5) Buyer to select own professionals with appropriate qualifications to conduct all inspections and verifications. 
6) Seller shall provide reasonable access for such inspections; Buyer shall Indemnify Seller and hold Seller 
harmless from all injury, loss or liability regarding such inspections. 
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Inspection Contingency Continued 
7) THIS INSPECTION CONTINGENCY MAY NOT BE USED BY BUYER TO OBJECT TO ANY MA TIER 
OTHER THAN A MATERIAL CONDITION OR DEFECT UNKNOWN TO BUYER AT THE TIME THIS 
AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED. 
8) If Buyer objects to the condition of the Property, Buyer shall, prior to the expiration of the msoei}t1c1n 
contingency period, give one of the following written notices to Seller: 
A. Notice of the previously unknown material conditlon(s) and/or defect(s) to which Buyer objects and 
declaring this Agreement null and void, in which case the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less 
any unpaid expenses incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the ·costs To Be Paid By" section); or 
B. Notice of the previously unknown material conditlon(s) and/or defect(s} to which Buyer objects and 
Buyer's desired remedy shall be set forth on a Contingency Release form, in which case this Agreement 
shall remain in effect, subject to sub-paragraph C, below. 
C. Upon receipt of notice under paragraph 8, above, Seller shall have~ business days to give Buyer written 
notice {by signing the Buyer's Contingency Release form) that Seller will correct such condition(s) and/or 
defect(s) prior to closing. lf Seller does not sign the Buyer's Contingency Release form, Buyer may, within ,;a 
business days following Seller's notice period, above, release the contingency in writing, or this Agreement 
shall be nun and void, in which case the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less any unpaid 
expenses incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the "Costs To Be Paid By" section). Buyer's closing of the 
transaction shall constitute acceptance of the condltion of the Property, unless otherwise stated in wriling 
signed by both parties. 
9) FHA INSPECTION REQUIREMENT, If applicable: "For Your Protection: Get a Home Inspection", 
HUD 92564-CN must be signed on or before execution of this agreement. 
10. Lead-Based Paint Disclosure/ Contingency The subject Property is "Target Housing" (built prior to 1978) 
regarding lead-based paint and/or lead-based hazards, regardless of the source of the lead: Yes D No [2]. 
If "YES", Buyer has been provided with Seller's completed and signed "Disclosure of Information and 
Acknowiedgement: Lead-Based Paint and I or Lead-Based Paint Hazards" ("Disclosure") and a copy of the 
pamphlet "Protect Your Family From Lead in Your Home" ("Pamphlet"), and one of the following boxes must be 
checked: 
D Buyer shall have the unconditional right to cancel this Agreement and shall be allowed ten (1 O} days to 
conduct an inspection for lead-based pain! hazards. Should Buyer elect to conduct a lead-based paint inspection, 
a "lead-Based Paint Inspection Contingency Addendum• shall be attached hereto; OR 
0 Buyer hereby acknowledges receipt of the Disclosure and Pamphlet and hereby waives the right to conduct a 
lead-based paint inspection. 
11.Financing Contingency Yes 
This offer is contingent upon Buyer securing the following financing: 
Assume Existing Loan:D 
NewLoan: D 
Amount $/Percent % 
Years: 
Other Financing Terms: 
Type of Loan: 
Maximum% Rate: 
Maximum Points: 
Conv. D FHA D 
Fixed Rate 0 
Institutional Lender D 
VA D 
Adj. Rale D 
Private Lender D 
Buyer agrees to make a best effort to obtain such financing and to make written application to the lender within 
_ business days after acceptance of this Agreement by both parties. 
D Property must appraise at no less than the purchase price. 
0 Preliminary Approval: Buyer shall, on or before __ 
provide Seller with a letter from Buyer's lender evidencing preliminary approval of Buyer's ability to qualify for the 
loan amount and terms set forth above, subject only to such reasonable and customary conditions as the lender 
typically imposes on such preliminary approval letters. 
If Buyer has not released this contingency in writing on or before __ 
this Agreement shall terminate and the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less any unpaid expenses 
incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to !he "Costs To Be Paid By" section of this Agreement). 
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12. Sale of Buyer's Property Contingency Yes D NolZ] 
This offer is contingent on the closing of a sale of Buyer's property located at: 
Listed with: Listing Agent Phone: 
If Buyer has not released this contingency in writing on or before 
this Agreement shall terminate and the Earnest Money shall be refunded lo Buyer (less any unpaid expenses 
incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the "Costs To Be Paid By" section of this Agreement). 
13. Seller's Right to Accelerate Buyer's Contingency Releases Yes D No lZ] 
Should Seller receive another acceptable offer to purchase, prior to Buyer's contingencies being released, Seller 
shall give Buyer written notice of such new offer. !n the event the Buyer does not release all contingencies in 
writing within _ business days after the receipt of such notice then this Agreement shall terminate and the 
Eames! Money shall be returned to Buyer (less any unpaid expenses incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the 
"Costs To Be Paid By'' section of this Agreement). In the event the Buyer does release the contingencies, the 
Buyer shall proceed lo purchase the Property under the remaining terms and conditions of this Agreement, 
notwithstanding that the terms of the new offer may be more or less favorable. 
14. Other Contingencies Yes 0 No D See Addendum(s) D 
1. Buyer expects lo make modifications to the property. During the Contingency Period, Buyer shall employ 
contractor(s) and architect to determine the viability of the comtemplated modificaUons. This agreement is 
contingent upon the Buyer's acceptance of the viability and cost of modificalions. 
If Buyer has not released this/ these contingency(ies) in writing on or before 
7 Business Days after mutual acceptance 
this Agreement shall terminate and the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less any unpaid expenses 
incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the "Costs To Be Paid By" section of this Agreement). 
15. Additional Terms Yes !ZI No D See Addendum(s) D 
1. Property to be professionally cleaned including carpets and windows prior to close of escrow. 
2. All electrical, heating and plumbing to be in good working order at close of escrow. 
3. All holes from art in the walls to be repaired and painted. 
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16. Included Items (In addition to Standard Terms, oaragraph 4) Excluded Items 
All kilchen appliances, washer and dryer. 
17. Costs To Be Appraisal Standard 
Paid Bv Title Ins. 
Buyers gJ 
1 Sellers D 
Share Eauallv 0 
NIA D 
See Addi. Terms D 
18. Broker working with Seller 
Broker's Name: John Sofro 
Listing Agent: John Sofro 
Brokerage: JAP 
Maillng Address: 
City, State, Zip: 
0 
IZl 
D 
D 
0 
Office Phone: 208 726 3411 Fax: 
E-Mail: 
Closing 
Escrow Fee 
0 
D 
[8J 
D 
0 
Seller's personal property and belongings. 
Assess Well Septic Septic 
ments lnso. lnsp. Pumpino 
0 
n 
D 
lx1 
I l 
0 0 D 
D D 181 
D D D 
[8J [8J 0 
[ l D 0 
Broker working with Buyer 
Broker's Name: Todd Conklin 
Selling Agent: Deborah Sievers 
Brokerage: Coldwell Banker 
Mailing Address: 
City, State, Zip: 
Other: 
0 
0 
D 
D 
0 
Office Phone: 208 622 3400 Fax:622 3800 
E-Mail: 
19. REPRESENTATION CONFIRMATION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DISCLOSURE 
Check one {1) box in Section 1 below and one (1) box in Section 2 below to confirm that in this transaction, the brokerage(s) 
involved had the following re!ationship(s) with the BUYER(S) and SELLER(S). 
Section 1: 
181 The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) ls acting as an AGENT for Iha BUYER(S). 
0 The brokerage working with the BUYER{S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the BUYER(S), without an ASSIGNED 
AGENT. 
0 The brokerage working wilh the BUYER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the BUYER(S) and has an 
ASSIGNED AGENT acting solely on behalf of the BUYER(S). 
0 The brokerage working with the BUYER(S) is acting as a NONA GENT for the BUYER(S). 
Section 2: 
t8l The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) is acting as an AGENT for the SELLER(S). 
0 The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the SELLER(S), without an ASSIGNED 
AGENT. 
0 The brokerage working with the SELLER(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT for the SELLER(S) and has an 
ASSIGNED AGENT acting solely on behalf of the SELLER(S). 
0 The brokerage working wlth the SELLER(S) Is acting as a NONAGENT for the SELLER(S). 
Each party signing this document confirms that he has received, read and understood the Agency Disclosure Brochure 
adopted or approved by the Idaho real estate commission and has consented to the relaUonship confirmed above. In addition, 
each party confirms that the brokerage's agency office policy was made available for inspection and review. 
EACH PARTY UNDERSTANDS THAT HE IS A "CUSTOMER" AND lS NOT REPRESENTED BY A BROKERAGE UNLESS 
THERE IS A SIGNED WRITTEN AGREEMENT FOR AGENCY REPRESENTATION. 
20. Standard Terms. All parties are advised to carefully review the following: 
1) Withdrawal of Offer/Counteroffer - By delivery of a written notice of withdrawal to the office of the broker 
working with the Seller or Offeree (whether Buyer or Seller}. (A) Buyer can withdraw this offer at any time prior to 
Buyer's receipt of Seller's written acceptance of this Agreement, and (B) an Offerer (whether Buyer or Seller} 
may withdraw his Counteroffer at any time prior to Offeror's receipt of Offeree's written acceptance of such 
Counteroffer. 
2) Closing Date - On or before the closing date, Buyer and Seller shall deposit with the closing agency all 
funds and instruments necessary to complete the sale. Closing means the date on which all documents are 
either recorded or accepted by an escrow agent and the sale proceeds are available to Seller. Taxes, insurance, 
dues, assessments (using the last available assessment as a basis), rent, interest and reserves, liens, 
encumbrances or obligations assumed and utilities shall be pro-rated as of the Closing Date. 
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Standard Terms· Continued 
Closing Costs - Costs in addition to those listed may be incurred by Buyer and Seller. Unless otherwise agreed 
herein, or provided by law or required by lender, Buyer shall purchase Seller's reserve account If Seller's loan is 
assumed. 
included Items - If present at time of offer, all Items attached, including but not limited to, floor coverlngs, attached 
television antennae, attached plumbing, bathroom and lighting fixtures, window screens, window coverings, screen 
doors, storm windows, storm doors, garage door opener(s), transmi!ter(s), exterior trees, plants, shrubbery, water 
heating apparatus and fixtures, attached fireplaces and free-standing fireplaces, awnings, ventilating, cooling and 
heating systems, built-in and drop-in ranges (but excepting all other ranges), any alanns (burglar, fire, etc.), fences and 
gates, fuel tanks, irrigalion fixtures and equipment, any and all water and water rights, and all ditches and ditch rights 
that are appurtenant thereto shall be Included In the sale unless otherwise provided herein. 
5) Seller's Property Disclosure - If required by Title 55, Chapter 25 Idaho Code, Seller shall within ten (10) calendar 
days after the execution of this Agreement provide to the Buyer a "Seller's Property Disclosure Form• and Buyer shall 
have three (3) business days from receipt of the disclosure report lo waive or not waive the right to rescind the offer 
based upon Information contained In the report, a copy of which shall be delivered upon execution to Seller. 
6) New Construction or Recent Improvements- If Residential Property Is newly constructed or has a recent 
improvement of over $2,000.00, the General Contractor is required by Title 45, Chapter 5, Idaho Code, to provide 
certain disclosures to the prospective residential real property purchaser. If applicable, Buyer should obtain such 
comp!eled forms from the General Contractor. Such disclosure ls the responsibility of the General Contractor and i! is 
not the duty of your agent to obtain this information on your behalf. You are advised to consult with any General 
Contractor subject to Idaho Code §45-525 et seq. regarding the General Contractor Disclosure Statement. 
7) Existing Loans - Within three (3) business days of acceptance, Seller shall provide Buyer with all Notes and Deeds of 
Trust or other financing documents to be assumed or taken subject to. Within five (5) business days of receipt thereof, 
Buyer shall In writing notify Seller of his/ her approval or disapproval of the terms of said documents. Buyer's approval 
shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
8) Definitions - "Business Day" shall mean Monday through Friday, excluding Saturday and Sunday, and excluding 
holidays as defined by Idaho Code, Section 67-5302. "Notice(s)" shall mean a written document specifying the 
necessary information. "Delivery" shall mean transmittal of information by mail, facsimile transmission, courier, hand 
delivery, or e-mail, to the addresses stated herein. "Receipt" shaH mean possession of the Item of Information by the 
named recipient or within the office of the appropriate broker. "Written Acceptance" shall mean receipt of a document 
signed and dated by all undersigned parties, specifying a certain Offer or Counteroffer. "Signed" shall mean a 
document containing the original, facsimile. photocopied or scanned signature of a party, any of which shall be binding 
on the signatory. 
9) Counterparts I Facsimile Transmission/ E-mail - This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, 
each is deemed to be the original hereof, and all of which together constitute one and the same instrument. Facsimile 
or email transmission of any signed original document, and retransmission of any signed facsimile or emall 
transmission shall be the same as personal delivery of the orlglnal. At the request of either party, or the Closing 
Agency, the parties will confirm facsimile or email transmitted signatures by signing an original document. 
10) Standard Title Insurance - The Seller shan within a reasonable lime after closing furnish to the Buyer a title insurance 
policy in the amount of the purchase price of the property showing marketable and Insurable title subject to the liens, 
encumbrances and defects elsewhere set out in this Agreement to be discharged or assumed by the Buyer. Prior to 
closing the transaction, the Seller shall furnish to the Buyer a commitment of title insurance policy showing the 
condition of the title to said property. Buyer shall have either five (5) business days from the receipt of the commitment 
or until twenty-four (24) hours prior to the closing, whichever first occurs, within which to object to the condition of the 
tiUe as set forth in the commitment. If the Buyer does not object, the Buyer shall be deemed to have accepted the 
conditions of the !ille. 
11} Extended and Other Coverage Title Policies - A standard policy of HIie insurance does not cover certain potential 
problems or risks such as liens (I.e., a legal claim against property for payment of some debt or obligation), boundary 
disputes, claims of easement, and other matters of claims if they are not of public record al the time of closing. 
However, under Idaho law such potential claims against the property may have become a legal obligation before the 
purchase of the home and may not yet be of public record until after the purchase, Title Insurance companies may be 
able to issue an "extended coverage· policy for an additional premium. In addition to the premium for an extended 
coverage title policy, there may be other costs Involved, i.e., survey or additional closing fees. Such a policy may 
pmtect the Buyer against such problems. It is recommended that the Buyer talk to a title insurance company about 
what it offers in the way of extended coverage and other coverages that may be appropriate. Only the policy itself 
shows exactly what type or coverage Is offered, so contact a title company for particulars. 
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Standard Terms· Continued 
Title Conveyance - Tille of Seller is to be conveyed by warranty deed, unless otherwise provided, and is to be 
marketable and insurable except for rights reserved in federal patents, state or railroad deeds, building or use 
restrictions, building and zoning regulations and ordinances of any governmental unit, and rights of way and 
easements established or of record. Liens, encumbrances or defects to be discharged by Seller may be paid out 
of purchase money at date of closing. No liens, encumbrances, defects, except !hose which are to be discharged 
or assumed by Buyer or to which title is taken subject to, shall exist unless otherwise specified In this Agreement. 
13) Default by Buyer If the Buyer defaults in the performance of this Agreement, Seller will have the option of (1) 
accepting the Earnest Money as liquidated damages and this Agreement shall terminate; or (2) pursuing any 
other lawful right or remedy to which the Seller may be entitled, which may include specific performance. In the 
case of option ( 1 ), Seller shall make demand in writing upon the holder of the Earnest Money, upon which 
demand said holder shall pay from the Earnest Money any unpaid costs incurred by or on behalf of Seller and 
Buyer related to the transaction, as set forth in the ncosts To Be Paid By" section above, and said holder shall 
pay any remaining balance of the Earnest Money to the Seller. Seller and Buyer specifically acknowledge and 
agree that if Seller elects to accept the Earnest Money as liquidated damages, such shall be the Seller's sole and 
exclusive remedy, and such shall not be considered a penalty or forfeiture. 
14) Default by Seller - It is agreed that if the title of said property is not marketable, or cannot reasonably be made 
so within twenty (20) business days after notice containing a written statement of defects Is delivered to the 
Seller, or if the Seller defaults in the performance of this Agreement including Seller's obligations (if any) to 
correct defects pursuant to Paragraph 8) C of the Inspection Contingency, the Buyer has the option of (1) having 
the Earnest Money returned lo the Buyer and this Agreement shall terminate; or (2) pursuing any other lawful 
right or remedy to which the Buyer may be entitled, including specific performance. In the case of option ( 1 ), the 
Buyer shall make demand In writing upon the holder of the Earnest Money. Upon such demand, and provided 
there is no dispute as to the Seller's default, said holder shall refund the Earnest Money to the Buyer. Seller shall 
pay for the unpaid costs incurred of title Insurance and escrow fees, if any, and any unpaid costs incurred by or 
on behalf of the Seller and the Buyer related to the transaction, as set forth in this Agreement. 
15) lnterpJeader - If a dispute arises as to Buyer's or Seller's default and entitlement to the Earnest Money, and 
such dispute is not resolved within ten (10) business days of a demand for payment of the Earnest Money by the 
Buyer or the Seller, the holder of the Earnest Money shall file an interpleader action in a court of competent 
jurisdiction, and shall recover its attorneys fees and costs therefore, as provided by Idaho Code Section 5-321. 
16) Attorney's Fees_- If either party initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or proceedings, which are in 
any way connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the non-prevaillng 
party reasonable costs and attorneys' fees including such costs and fees on appeal and in any bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
17) Risk of Loss - Prior to closing of this sale, all risk of loss shall remain with Seller. In addition should the Property 
be materially damaged by fire or other cause prior to the closing, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option 
of the Buyer. Buyer shall give written notice of intent to void the Agreement to Seller or Seller's Agent and shall 
be entitled to a full refund of the Earnest Money. 
18) Entire Agreement - This Agreement contains the entire agreement of the parties respecting the matters herein 
set forth and supersedes any prior agreements or negotiations respecting such matters. No agreement, 
represel'ltations, or warranties Including, without limitations. any warranty of habitability. not expressly set forth 
herein shall be binding on either party. 
19) Time is of the Essence in this Agreement. 
20) Agent Representations - The Agents representing the Buyer and Seller in this transaction relay information to 
Buyers and Sellers that has been received from third parties. However, Agents do not make any representations 
regarding flood plain, wetlands, avalanche zone, hazardous waste, environmental or health hazards, code 
compliance, survey data, finished square footage, property size, zoning or other physical factors nor do the 
Agents make any representations regarding law or taxation, unless specifically set forth in writing in this 
Agreement. The Buyer and Seller specifically waive all claims against the Agents regarding any of these matters 
which are not specifically included in this Agreement. It may be diligent and prudent for the Seller and/or Buyer to 
employ the services of qualified independent professionals who perform services or provide opinions regarding 
these matters, and the Agents may, during the course of this transaction, identify such individuals or entities. 
However, Agents are not warranting in any way the services or opinions provided by such individuals or entities, 
and the Buyer and Seller specifically waive any and all claims against the Agents regarding such identification. 
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Standard Terms· Continued 
FIRPTA - Tax Withholding at Closing - The parties agree that they shall fully comply with the Foreign 
Investment in Real Property Tax Act ("FIRPT A"). If Seller Is not a "foreign person" under FIRPT A, at closing, 
Seller shall sign an affidavit stating the same. If Seller is a "foreign person" under FIRPTA, at closing the Closing 
Agent shall withhold from the sale proceeds the appropriate tax amount and submit such amount and any 
required forms to the Internal Revenue Service. Seller hereby indemnifies and holds Buyer and Closing Agent 
harmless from any and all liability, including attorney's fees, related to Seller's taxes under FIRPT A, or otherwise, 
which indemnification and hold harmless shall survive closing of the transaction. 
22) AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORY: If BUYER or SELLER is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, 
the person executing this agreement on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind BUYER or 
SELLER. 
THIS IS INTENDED TO BE A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, THE PARTIES ARE 
ADVISED TO SEEK THE ADVICE OF AN AITORNEY. 
In the event this fonn is received by electronic transmission and/ or email, the parties hereto acknowledge !hat they 
have not changed or altered the content of this form template. 
21. Buyer(s) Acceptance Buyer hereby acknowledges having read this Agreement in its entirety, including the 
Standard Terms, and having received a copy of this Agreemenl D _ Addendum(s) attached 
Buyer's Signature /l .,/1,1.. /,. ~ . .........,ig4flt. ........... ure~~[-=---fil~UA--'C),0 -r--'-- 2@l 
Printed Name: Mitchel Jay August Printed Name: Gwynn E. August 
Physical Address: Physical Address: 
Mailing Address: Mailing Address: 
City, State, Zip: City, State. Zip: 
Home Phone: Fax: Home Phone: Fax: 
Business Phone: Fax: Business Phone: Fax: 
E-MaU: E-Mail: 
22. Seller(s) Acceptance On the specified date, Seller acknowledges having read this Agreement in "its entirety, 
including the Standard Terms, and Seller hereby approves and accepts the offer to purchase set forth in the 
above Agreement 
D "AS-IS" D Subject to attached Counteroffer 
Seller agrees to carry out all of the terms thereof on the part of the Seller and acknowledges receipt of a true 
copy of this ment signed by all parties. 
Seller's Signature 
X'--------------
Signature Date 
Printed Name: :::R:.J<ootef Robert A. Kan to 
Physical Address: 
Printed Name: S Kanter Sondra F. Kantor 
Mailing Address: 
City, State, Zip: 
Home Phone: Fax: 
Business Phone: Fax: 
E-Mail: 
Physical Address: 
Mailing Address: 
City, State. Zip: 
Home Phone; 
Business Phone: 
E-Mail: 
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Real Estate Purchase And Sale Agreement 
1. Purchase Price$ 2,400,000.00 Two Million Four Hundred Thousaoo and oot10oths Dollars 
2. Buyer: 
Seller: 
Mitchel Jay and Gwynn E. August, husband and wife 
Kantor 
Property Address: 265 Golden Eagle Drive 
Legal Description: 
City: Hailey 
Golden Eagle Ranah AM. Lot 34A 
County: Ellaine State: Idaho Zl!-; 83333 
3. Buyer hereby offers to purchase the above described Property on the following terms and conditions: 
Terms The purchase price Is payable as.follows; 
$ 2,400,000.00 Cash, cashier's check, loan proceeds, or certified funds at closing, Including Earnest Money 
$ Seller Financing - See Financing Contingency "other Financing Terms· 
$ Olher - See Financing Contingency ·otner Financing Terms· 
$ 2,400,000.00 Total Purohase Price- Not Including closing costs 
4. Earnest Money $ 50,000.00 i 
Evidenced By: To be Held By: 
D Personal Check D Listing Broker 
0 Cashier's Check ~ Selling Broker 
0 Promissory Note O Trtle Company 
F'ifty Thousand and no/100ths Dollars 
other Remarks: 
EM to be wired to Coldw&II Banker TrU$t At:count 
within 3 business days after mutual accept.'lnco. 
Earnest Money to be deposited in a trust account upon written acceptance of this Agreement by all partia&.. 
5. Offer Expires On: Date: 02/06/2013 Time: 5:00 p.m. 
6. Closing Date: June 15 or sooner or whatever the date that is set by the short sale lender. 
Possession Date: ~ On closing date OR O Other. · 
7. Responsible Closing Broker I Office: Todd Conklin/CoidweB Banker 
Responsible Clos!ng Agency I TIile Co: Sun Vanoy Title Company 
8. New Construction or Recent Improvements: Yes D No l',83 
If •yes•. see Standard Terms, paragraph 6, of this Agreement. 
9. rnspec:tion Contingency Yes fgJ No 0 
1} This offer Is contingent upon Buyer's acceptance of lhe condition of the Property, subj eel to paragraph 7, 
below. If Buyer does not object to the condition of the Property in writing on or before 7 Business Days 
("inspection contingency period"), pursuant to paragraph B, below, this Inspection contingency shall be 
deemed released. 
2) Buyer shall have the rlght to, and is strongly advised to, conduct inspections, tests, surveys and other sb.ldm 
("inspections") at Buyer's sole cost to confirm aD Information provided 1o Buyer, and to thoroughly inspect !he 
Property. 
3) Square footage verification; Buyer is aware lhat any reference to the square footage of the Property or ils 
improvements has not been verified. Alternative methods of measurement and calculation may var-/ 
slgnificanlfy. If square footage is material to the Buyer. Bu~r must verify same during the inspection perlOd, 
4) Water Rights veriflcaUon: If is strongly advised !ha! the Buyer contact a knowledgeable attorney of the 
Buyer's choice, experienced in waler law, to adllise the Buyer of the validity, quality, and quantity of any 
waler right aequirad with rear estate described in this Agreement. Buyer must verify same during the 
inspecticm period. 
5) Buyer to sel&Ct own professionals with appropriate quallflcatlons to conduct all inspections and verifications. 
6) Seller shall provide reasonable access for such inspeotlons; Buyer shall indemnify Seller and hold Seller 
harmle-ss fl'om all injury, loss or liability regarding such inspectlons. 
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~ Contillgftncy • Continued 
7) THIS INSPECTION CONTINGENCY MAY NOT BE USED BY BUYER TO OBJECT TO ANY MATIER 
OTHER THAN A MATERIAL CONDITION OR DEFECT UNKNOWN TO BUYER AT THE TIME THIS 
AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED. 
8) If Buyer objects to the condHion of the Property. Buyer shall, prior to the expiration of the inspection 
contingency period, give one of tha following written notices to Seller: 
A Notice of the previously unknown material conditlon(s) and/or defect(&) to which Buyer objects and 
declaring this Agreement null and void, in which case the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less 
any unpaid expenses incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant lo the "Costs To Be Paid By' section); or 
B. Notice of the previously unknown material condltlon(s) andfor defect(s) to which Buyer objects and 
Buyer's desired remedy shall be set forth on a Contingency Release form. In Which case this Agreement 
shall remain In effect, subject to sub-paragraph C, below. 
C. Upon receipt of notice under paragraph B. above, SeUer shall have 2 business days to give Buyer written 
notlce (by signing the Buyer's Contingency Release form) that Seller Will correct such condition(s) and/or 
defect(s) prior to closing. If SeUer does not sign lhe Buyer's Contingency Release form, Buyer may, within ;J. 
business days following Seller's notice period, above. release the contingency in writing, or this Agreement 
sh~I be null and void. In which case the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less any unpaid 
expenses incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the "Costs To l3e Paid By" section). Buyer's closing of the 
transaction shaD constitute acceptance of Iha condition of the Propeny, unless otherwise stated in writing 
signed by both parties, 
9} FHA INSPECTION REQUIREMENT, if applicable; "For Your Protection: Get a Home Inspection". 
HUD 92564-CN must be signed on or before execution of this agreement 
10. Lead-Based Paint Disclosure I Contingency The subject Property is "Target Housing" (built pnor to 1978) 
regarding lead-based paint and/or lead-based hazards, regardless of the sourca of the lead: Yes D No 181. 
ff "YES·, Buyer has been provided with Seller's completed and signed "Disclosuro of Information and 
Acknowledgement lead-Based Paint and/ or Lead-Based Paint Hazards• ("Disel0$ure·) and a copy of the 
pamphlet "Protect Your Family From Lead In Your Home· rPamphler}. and one Of the following boxes must be 
chocked: 
D Buyer shall have the unconditional right to cancel this Agreemeritand shall be allowed ten (10)days to 
conduct an inspection fer lead-based paint hazards. Should Buyer elect to conduct a lead-based paint inspection. 
a "Lead-Based Pain! Inspection Contingency Addendum" shall be attached hereto; OR 
D Buyer hereby ackl'IOW!edgos receipt of the Disclosure and Pamphlet end hereby waives the right to conduct a 
lead-based paint inspecllon. 
11.Finanelng Contingency Yes D No r8J 
This offer is contingent ~n Buyer securing the following flnarioing; 
A$sume Existing Loan:D 
New Loan: D Type of Loan: Conv. D FHA D 
Amount $/Pef'C5nt % Maximum % Rate: Fixed Rate D 
Years: Maximum Points: lnstltulional Lender D 
Other Financing Tenns: 
VA D 
Adj.Rate D 
Private Lender D 
Buyer agrees lo make a best effort to obtain such financing and to make written application io the lender Within 
_ business days after acceptance of Ul!s Agreement by both parties. 
D Property must appraise at no leM than the purchase price. 
D Preliminary Approval: Buyer shall. on or before-~ 
provide Seller with a letter from Buyer's lender evidencing preliminary approval of Buyer's abi!Hy to qualify for the 
loan amount and terms set forth above, subject only to such re8$00able and customary conditions as the lender 
typlcally impl)SeS on such preliminary approval letters. 
If Buyer has not released !his contingency in writing on or before __ 
this Agreement shaU terminate and the Earnest Money shall be refunded to Buyer (less any unpaid eXPenses 
Incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to !he ·costs To Be Paid By" section of this Ag eement) 
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12. Sale of Buyer's Property Contingency Yes Norg] 
This offer is contlngenl on ttle closing of a sale of Buyer's property located at: 
Usted with: Listing Agent: Phone: 
If Buyer has not released this contingency in writing on or before 
this Agreement shall te1T11inate and the Earnest Money shall be refunded lo Buyer {less any unpaid expenses 
incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the ·costs To Be Paid By" section of 1his Agreement). 
13. Seller's Right to Ac:celerate Buyer's Contingency Releases Yes D No [gJ 
Should Seller receive another acceptable offer to purchase, pnor to Buyer's contingencies being released, Seller 
shall give Buyer written notice of such new offer. In the event the Buyer does not ~elease all conlingencles in 
writing Wittlin_ business days after the receipt Of such notice then this Agreement shall terminate and the 
Earnest Money shall be returned to Buyer (less any unpaid expenses incurred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the 
•costs To Be Paid By" section of this Agreement). In the avent the Buyer does release the contingencies, the 
Buye< shall l)(Oceed to purchase the Property under the remaining terms and conditions of this Agreement, 
nolWil:hslandlng that the terms Of the new offer may be more or !ass favorable_ 
14. other Contingencies Yes [Ei No D See Addendum(s) 0 
1- Buyer expects to make modifications to lhe property. During the Contingency Period, Buyer shall employ 
eontractor(s) and architect to determine the viability of the comtemplated modifications. This agreement is 
contingent upon the B1.1yers acceptance of the viability and cost of modifications. 
----·-------------------------------------' 
If Buyer has not released this/ these contlngency(ies) in writing on or before 
7 Business Days after mutual acceptanct 
this Agreement shall terminate and the Earnest Money shall be refunded lo Buyer (less any unpaid expenses 
il'ICl.lrred on behalf of Buyer pursuant to the •eos15 To Be Paid By" section of this Agreement). 
15. Additional Terms Yes tzl No D See Addendum(s) 0 
1. Property to be professionally cleaned including carpets and windows prior to close of escrow, 
2. All electrical. healing and plumbing to be in good working order at close of escrow. 
3. All holes from art In the walls to be repaired and painted. 
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16. Included Items (In addition to Standard Terms, oaraoraph 4) Excluded Items 
All kitchen appliances, washer and dryer. Seller's personal property and belongings. 
17. Costs To Be Appraisal Standard 
PaidBv Title Ins. 
Buvers IXl 
Sellers D 
Share Eauallv 0 
NJA D 
See Addi.Terms D 
18. Broker working with Seller 
Broker'$ Name: John Sofro 
Listing Agent John Sofro 
Brokerage: JAP 
Maillng Address: 
City, State, Zip: 
r 1 
t8l 
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Closing 
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Broker working with Buyer 
Broker's Name: Todd Conklin 
Selling Agent; Deborah Sievers 
Brokerage: Coldwell Banker 
Malling Address: 
City, State. Zip: 
Other: 
0 
I I 
D 
n 
D 
Office Phone: 208 726 3411 Fax: Office Phone: 208 622 3400 Fax:622 3800 
E-Mail: E-MaU: 
19. REPRESENTATION CONFIRMATION A.ND ACl<NOWLEDG14ENT OF DISCLOSURE 
Check one (1) box in Section 1 bolow and one (1 l box in Section 2 below lo confirm !hat in this transaction, Iha brOkerage(s) 
involved had the folloWing relationship(s} ~th the BUYER(S) and SB.LER(S). 
Section 1: 
181 The brokerage working wHh the BUYER(S} ls ading as an AGENT foc th& BUVER{S). 
0 Toa bmkerago working with th& SUVER(S) is acting as a LHl,UT'EO DUAi. AGENT for the BUYER($), withOUI an ASSIGNED 
AGENT. 
0 The brokerage working wilh the 8lJYER{S) ill acting aa a UMlrED OUAL AGENT for tho BUYER(S) and has an 
ASSIGNED AGENT acting solely on behalf of the BUYER(S). 
0 The brokerage working wilh the BUYER(S) is acting as a NONAGEITT for tho 6UYER(S). 
· Section 2: 
1ZJ The brokerage working willt !he SEli.ER(S) is acting a3 an AGENT for the SELLER(S). 
0 Toe brokerage working with the SEU.eR(S) is acting as a LIMITED DUA!.. AGENT forttle 51:LLER(S), witl10ut an ASSIGNED 
AGENT. 
0 The brokerage wortcing with the SELlER(S) I& acttng as a LIMITED DUAL AGENT forttta Sl:I.LER{S) and has an 
ASSIGNED AGENT ading solely r,m behalf of the SEUER(S). 
0 Toe brokerage working wlth th& SELLER{S) Is acting as a NON/\GENT fot !lie SEI.LER(S}. 
Each party signing tis document confirm& that he has recetved, read and understood Iha Agency Disclosure 6rocll uro 
adopted or approved by lhe Idaho real estate commission and has tooseoted to lhe relat!Ol'lship confirmed above. In addition, 
each party confirms that the PrOk.eraga·s agency Office pollcy was made available ror lnspectiorl and revieW. 
EACH PARTY UNDERSTANDS THAT HE IS A "CUSTOMER' AND IS NOT REPRESENTED BY A BROKERAGE UNLESS 
'!'HERE IS A SIGNED WRrrrEN AGREEMENT FOR AGENCY REPR!aSENTATION. 
20. Standard Terms. All parties are acMsed to carefully review the foll owing: 
1) Withdrawal of Offer/Counteroffer - By delivery of a written notice of withdrawal to the office of the broker 
working wi1h the Seller or Offeree (wttetner Buyer or Seller). (A) Buyer can wltl'lclraW tt,Is offer at any time prior to 
Buyer's receipt of Seller's written acceptance of this Agreement, and (8) an Offeror (whether Buyer or Seller) 
may withdraw his Counteroffer at any time prior to Offerer's receipt of Offeree's written acceptance of such 
Counteroffer. 
2) Closing Date - On or before the closing date, Buyer and Seller shall deposit with 1he closing agency all 
funds and instruments necessary to complete the sale. Closing means the date on which all documents are 
either recorded or accepted by an esctow agent and the sale proceeds are available to S811or. Taxes, Insurance, 
dues. assessments (using Ille last available assessment as a basis), rent, interest and reserves. Kens, 
encumbrances or obligations assumed and utilities shall be pro-rated as of the Closing Oate. 
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Sblndard T......., • Continued 
3) Closing Costs - Costs in addi!ion to those listed may be Incurred by Buyer and Seller. Unless otherwise agreed 
herein, or prQVided by law or required by lender, Buyer shall purchase Seller's rese.ve account if Seller's loan is 
assumed. 
4) Included Item~ - If pt8$f!)flf; at tima of offer, all items attached, including but not limited to, floor coverings, attached 
television antennae, attacheo p1umblng, bathroom Bnd lighting fixtures, window screens, window coverings, screen 
doors, storm windcms, slorm doom, garage door opener(,}, mmsmHter(s). exterior trees, plants, shrubbery, water 
heating apparatus and fiXtl.1(&$, attached fireplaces and frae-standlng fireplaces, awnings, venlilaliog, cooling Md 
healing $Y$1emS. built-in and drop.in ranges (but excepting an other ranges), any alarms (burglar. tire, etc.), fences and 
gates, fuel tanks. lrrlgallon fixtures and equipment, any Md all water and water rights, and Sil ditches and dlt.ch rights 
lhat are eppooenant thereto shall be included in the sale unless otherwise provided herein. 
5) Sailer's Property Disclosure - If required by TIiie 55, Chapter 25 Idaho Code. Seller shall within ten (10) calendar 
days after the execu1ion of this Agreement provide to the Buyer a "Seller's Property Dlsclcsure Fonn• and Buyer shaU 
have three (3) business days from receipt of the disclownt report to waive or not waive the rtght to reselnd 1he offer 
based upon Information contained in tha report, a copy of which shall be delivered upon execution lo Seller. 
6) New ConsttuctJon « Rec&nt Improvements· If Residential Property Is newly conslructed ot has a racent 
improvement of over $2,000.00, the General Conb'actor IS reqUlred by TIiie 45, Chapter 5, Idaho Cede, to provide 
certain disclosures to Iha prosp,;sclive residential real property purchaser. if applicable, Buyer should obtain such 
oompleted forms from the General Contractor. Such disclosure Is the responsibility of the General Contractor and it is 
not llie duty af y0ur agent to obtain lhls tnformatlon on your behaff. You are acMsed to consult Wlth any General 
Contractor subject tD Idaho Cede §45-525 er se4. regard"sng the General Contractor Disclosure Statement 
7) Existing Loans - Within three (3) business days of aCCfll)tance. Seller shall provide Buyerwilh all Notes and Deeds of 
Trusl or olher financing documents to be assumed or taken subject to. Within five (5) business days of receipt thereof, 
Buyer shall in wming notify Seiter of his I her approval or disapproval of the terms of said documents. Buyer's approval 
shall not be unreasonably wtlhheld. 
8} Definitions • "Business Day" shall mean Monday through Friday, excluding Saturaay and Sunday, and excluding 
holidays as defined by Idaho Code, Sedion 57-5302. "NoUce(s)" shall mean a written document specifying tne 
neceliliafy information. "Dellwry" shall mean transmittal of information by mall, facsimile transmission, courier, hand 
delivery, or e-mail, to the addresses stated herein. "Receipt" shall mean possession of the Item of Information by the 
named recipient or wllhln the office of lhe appropriatlil broker. "Written Acceptance" shall mean reco!pt of a document 
signed and dated by all undersignad panies, specifying e certain Offer or Counteroffer. "Signed" shall mean a 
document containing Iha original, filcslmile, photocopied or scanned signatul9 of a party, any or which shall be binding 
ort the signatory. 
9} Counterparts I Facsimile Tmnsmission l E-mail - This Agreement may be executed In one or more counterparts, 
each is deemed to be the original hereof, and all of which together constib.lte one and the $ame in$trument. Facsimile 
or email lransmission of any signed original documsnt. and relransmission of any signed facsimile or email 
transmission shall be !he same as personal delivery of the or!ginal. At the request of eilh0r party, or the Closing 
Agency, the parties will confm facsimile or eman transmitted signatures by signing an original document 
10) Standard Title lnsur.mce - The Seller shall within a reasonable IJme after closing furnish to the Buyer e title insurance 
pclicy in the amount of !he purchase price of the property showing marketable and insurable tiUe subject tn the tiens, 
encumbrances and defects elsewhere Ht out in this AgJSement to be discharged or assumed by the Buyer. Prior to 
c:loslng the transacllon, the Seller sliall furnish to the Buyer a commitment of title insurance poficy shawing the 
condition of the title to said property. Buyer shall have el1her Ave (5) business days from the receipt of the commitment 
or unUI twenty.four (24) hours prior to 1he closing, whichever first occurs. within which to object to the condition of the 
!Ille as set for1h in the commitment It the Buyer dOes not object. the Buyer sh.all be deemed to have accepted the 
conditions of the tille. 
11} Extended and Other Coverage rrtle Poliaies -A standard policy of tille insurance does not cover certain potential 
problems or rl9ks such as liens {I.e., a legal Claim against property for payment of some debt or obligation), bounda,y 
disputes, claims of easement. and other matters of claims if they are not of public record al !he time of closing. 
However, under Idaho raw such potential claims against the propeny may have become a legal obligaUon before 01e 
purchase of the home and may not yet be of pubHc record until after too purchase. Title l118urancE1 companies may be 
able to issue an ·extended coverage• policy for an additional premium. In addition to the premium for an extended 
coverage Htle policy, !here may oo other cQ$f.s Involved, I.e., survey or additional closing fees. Such a policy may 
protect the Buyer against sUCh problems. It is recommended that the Buyer talk to a Ufle insurance company about 
what it offers in the way of extended coverage and other coverages that may be appropriate. Only the policy Itself 
shows exactly what type of coverage ls offered, so contact a title company for patticulars. 
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12) Title Conveyance - Tille of Seller Is to oo comreyed by warranty deed, unless otherwise provided, and is to be 
marketable and insurable except for rights reserved in federal patents, state or railroad deeds, building or use 
restrictions. building and 2:0ning regulations and ordinances of any governmental unit, and rights of way and 
easements established or of record. Liens, encumbrances or defects to be discharged by Sen81' may be paid oul 
of purcha$e money at date or closing. No liens, encumbrances, defects, except those which are to be discharged 
or assumed by Buyer or to which title is taken subject lo, shall exist unless otherwise specified In thts Agreement. 
13) Default by BUY9r- If the Buyer defaults in the performance of this Agreement, Seller will have lhe option of ( 1) 
accepting the Eamast Money as liquidated damages and this Agreement shall terminate; or (2) pursuing any 
oUier lawful rtght or remedy to which the Seller may b& entitled, wllieli may include specific performance. In the 
case of option (1 ). Seller shall make demand In writing upon the holder of the Earnest Money, upon which 
demand said holder shall pay from ti'>e Earnest Money any unpaid costs incurred by or on behalf of Seller and 
Buyer related to the lransarniOn, as set forU, in the #Costs To Be Paid By" secllon above, and said holder shall 
pay any remaining balance of 1he Earnest Money to the Seller_ Seller and Buyer specifically acknowledge and 
agree that If Sefler elects to accept the Eamest Money as liquidated damages, such shall be the Seller's sole and 
exclusiVe remedy, and such shall not be considel'ed a penalty or forfeiture. 
14) Default by Seller- It is agreed that if the Htle af said property i& not marketable, or cannot reasonably be made 
so withili twenty (20) business daY-f after nolk:a containing a wrltten statement of defects is delivered to the 
Seller, ot if the 8eller defaults in the performance of 1his Agreement including Seller's obligations (if any) to 
correct defects pursuant to Paragraph 8) C of the Inspection Contingency, the Buyer has the option of (1) having 
the Earnest Money returned to the Buyer and this Agreement shall terminate; or {2) pt.J1'$1.1lng any other lawful 
right or remedy to which the Buyer may be entitled. lnclu<fing specific performance. In the case of opiiOn ( 1 ), the 
Buyer shall make demand In writing upon the holder of the Eamest Money. Upon such demand, and provided 
thE:fe is 110 dispute as to the Seller's default, said holder shall refund the Earnest MonEly to the Buyer. Seller &hall 
pay for the unpaid cosls Incurred of title insurance and escrow fees, if any, and any unpaid costs Incurred by or 
on behalf of the Seller and !he Buyer related to the transaction. as set forth In tl'lls Agreement. 
15) lnterpleader- If a dispute arises a& to Buyer's or SeUer's default and entitlement to the Earnest Money, and 
such dispute is not resolved within ten (10) business days of a demand for payment of the Earnest Money by the 
Buyer or the Saller, the holder or the Earnest Money shall file an interpleader action In a court of competent 
jurisdiction, and shall recover Its attorneys fees and costs therefore, as provided by Idaho Code Section 5-321. 
16) Attorney'a Fee&_- If either party initiates or defends any arbitration or legal action or p(OCeedlng$, whleh are in 
any way connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the noo-prevaifing 
party reasonable costs and attorneys' fees including such costs and fees on appeal and in any bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
17) Risk or Loss - Prior to closing of this sale, all risk of Joss shall remain with Seller. In addition shoUld the Property 
be matenatly damaged by fire or other cause prior to the closing, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option 
of the Buyer. Buyer shall give written notice of intent to void the Agreement to Seller or Seller'!! Agent and shall 
be entitled to a full refund of the Earnest Money. 
18) Entire Agreement- This Agreement contains the entire agreement of the parties respecting toe matters herein 
set forth and supersedes any prior agreemenm or negotiations respecting such matters. No agreel'Oent, 
represent.alions, or warranties lncludlng, wilhout limllalions, any wammly of habitability, not expressly set forth 
l'lel'ein shall be binding on either party_ 
19) Time Is of the 1:ssence in this Agreement. 
20) Agent Representatlol'IS - The Agents representing the Buyer and Seller In this tran$$C1lon relay infonnation to 
Buyers end Sellers !hat has been received from third parties. However, Agents do not make any representations 
regarding flood plain, wetlands, avalanche zone, hazardous waste, environmenmi or health hazards, code 
compliance. survey data, finished square footage, property siZe, zoning or oU,er physical factors nor do lhe 
Agents make any representations regarding law or taxation, unless speclflcaHy set forth in writing in this 
Agreement. The Buyer and Seller specifically v,,ahre all claims against the Agents regarding any of these matters 
which are not speclflcally included in !his Agreement. It may be diligent and prudent for the Seller and/or Buyer to 
employ lhe services of Qualified independent professionals who perform services or provide oPinions regarding 
these matters, and 1he Agents may, during the course of this transaction, identify such lndMduals or entities. 
Hr.>wever, Agents are not waminting in any way the seJViC85 or opinions provided by such Individuals or entities, 
and the Buyer and Seller specifically waive any and afl claim5 against !he Agents regarding such Identification. 
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21) FIR.PT A - Tex Withholding at Closing - The parties agree that they shall fully comply with !he Foreign 
Investment ln Real Property Tax Act ('FIRPTA"). If Seller Is not a "foreign person" under FIRPT A, at closing, 
Seller shall sign an affidavit stating the same. If Seller is a "foreign person· under FIRPTA, at closing 1he Cloilng 
Agent shall withhold from Iha sale proceeds the appropriate tax amount and submit such amount and any 
required forms to the tntemaf Revenue Service. Seller hereby indemnifies and holds Buyer and Closing Agent 
harmless from any and all liability, including attorney's fees, related to Seller's taxes under FIRPT A, or otherwise, 
which indemnification and hold hannless shall survive closing of the transaction. 
22) AUTHORITY Of SIGNATORY: If BUYER or SELLER is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other enllty, 
lhe person executing this agreement on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind BUYER or 
SELLER. 
THIS IS INTENDED TO BE A LEGAl.LY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, THE PARTIES ARE 
ADVISED TO SEEK THE ADVICE OF AN ATTORNEY. 
In the event this fomi is received by electronic transmission and / or email, the parties hereto acknowledge that they 
have not changed or altered the content of this form template. 
21. Buyer(s) Acc:epiance Buyer hereby acknowledges having read this Agreement in its entirety, fr.cludlng the 
standard Terms, and having reoeived a copy or !his Agreement D _ Addendum(a} attached 
8uyar'a Signature 11-u r 
~lg~{-~~ 
Printed Name: Mitchel Jay August Printed Name: Gwynn E. August 
Physical Address: Physical Address: 
Malling Address: Mamng Address: 
City, State, Zip: City, State. Zip: 
Home Phone: Fax: Home PhOne: Fax: 
Business Phone: Fax: Business Phone: Fax: 
E~Mad: E-Mafl: 
22. Seller(s) Acceptance On !he specified date, Seller acknowtedges having read 1111s Agreement in its entirety, 
induding lhe Standard Terms. and Seller hereby approves and accepts the offer to purchase set forth in the 
bo e Agreement 
'AS-IS" 0 SUbJect to attached Counteroffer 
r ag-ees to carry out all of the terms thereof on the part of the Seller and acknowledges receipt of a true 
copy of ihis Agreement signed by all parties. 
Seller's Signature 
X~----------
Signature ~~ ,;J;~ 
Printed Name; R. Kantor 
Physical Address; 
· Malling Address; 
Printed Name: S. Kant~ fl_ _. ·~ 
Physical Address: ~ J 
~1ins Addr~ss: po Boy.., LI o '6; cf4 · 
City, State, Zip; 
Home Phone: 
Business Phone: 
E-Mao: 
Document# DSMGA2313 
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Short-Sale Addendum Date of Addendum: 02/03/201 3 
This is an ADDENDUM to the [81 Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement, D Counter Offer, 
0 Other 
Document#: OSMGA2313 Date of Document: 02/03/2013 
Property Address: 265 Golden Eagle Drive, Hailey, Idaho 
Buyer(s): 
Seller(s): 
Mitchel Jay and Gwynn E. August 
Kantor 
A. SHORT SALE APPROVAL. This Agreement is contingent upon Seller's receipt of written consent from all existing 
secured lenders and lien holders ("Short-Sale Lenders"). no later than 5:00 pm MST on 03/15/13 (date) ("Short-Sale 
Contingency Date"). to reduce their respective loan balances by an amount sufficient to permil the proceeds from the sale of 
the Property to pay the exlsUng balances on loans secured by the Property, real property taxes, brokerage commissions, 
closing costs, and other monetary obligations the Agreement requires Seller to pay at Close Of Escrow (lncludlrg, but not 
limited to, escrow charges, title charges, prorations, retrofit costs and repairs) without requiring Seller to place any funds into 
escrow. If Seller fails to give Buyer written notice of all existing Short-Sale Lenders· consent by the Short-Sale Contlngency 
Date, either Seller or Buyer may cancel the Agreement in writing, and Buyer shall be entitled to a return of any deposit. SeUer 
shall reasonably cooperate with existing Short-Sale Lenders in the short-sale process. 
B. TIME PERIODS. lime periods in the Agreement for contingencies, and/or additional terms shall begin: ( 1) as specified In 
the Agreement; (2) - or if checked - [81 the day after Seller delivers to Buyer a written notice of Short-Sale Lenders' consent; or 
(3) - If checked- D Other 
C. NO ASSSURANCE OF LENDER APPROVAL Buyer and Seller understand that Short-Sale Lenders (1) are not 
obllgated to accept a short-sale; {2) may require Seller to forward any other offer received; and (3) may accept other offers. 
Additionally, Short-Sale Lenders may require that, in order to obtain their approval for a short sale, some terms of the 
Agreement, such as the Close of Escrow, be amended or that Seller sign a personal note or some other obligation for all or a 
portion of the amount of the secured debt reductions. Buyer and Seller do not have to agree to any of Short-Sale Lenders' 
proposed terms. Buyer, Seller and Brokers do not have control over whether Short-Sale Lenders will consent to a short-sale, 
or any act, omission, or decision by any Short-Sale Lender in the short-sale process. 
D. BUYER AND SELLER COSTS. Buyer and Seller acknowledge that each may incur costs In conneclion with rights or 
obligations under the Agreement These costs may include, but are not limited to, payments for loan applications, Inspections, 
appraisals, and other reports. Such costs will be the sole responsibility of the party Incurring them, if Short-Sale Lenders do not 
consent to the transaction or either party cancels pursuant to the Agreement. 
E. OTHER OFFERS. Unless othefWise agreed in writing, Seller may continue to market the Property despite acceptance of 
Buyer's offer, and to present to Short-Sale Lender(s) any additional offers that are received on the P.roperty. 
F. CREDIT, LEGAL AND TAX ADVICE. Seller is informed that a short-sale may have credit or legal consequences and 
may result in taxable income to Seller. Seller is advised to seek advice from an attorney, certified public accountant or 
other expert regarding such potential consequences of a short-sale. 
G. TERMINATION BY BUYER. Buyer~ may or O may not (may, if box is left unchecked} give notice to terminate this 
Agreement at any time prior to the delivery of Lender Consent. It Buyer terminates this Agreement, the Earnest Money, if 
deposited, shall be refunded to the Buyer. 
By signing below, Buyer and Seller each acknowledge that U1ey have read, understand, accept and have received a copy of 
this Short-Sale Addendum. 
Buyer's Signature 
11..rf;-? 
Da!J!f-!,2 
Signature 
~3 
Date 
x: _ _____ _ _____ _ 
Signature Date 
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Short-Sale Addendum Date of Addendum: 02/03/2013 
This is an ADDENDUM to the 18! Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement O Counter Offer, 
Oother 
Document#: DSMGA2313 Date of Document: 02/03/2013 
Property Address: 265 Golden Eagle Drive, Halley, Idaho 
Buyer{s): 
Seller{s): 
Mllchel Jay and Gwynn E. August 
Kantor 
A. SHORT SALE APPROVAL. This Agreement Is conHngent upon Senor's receipt of wrl118n consent ftom all existing 
secured lenders and len holdel's ("Short-Sale lenders'"), no later than 5:oo pm MST on~ (date} {·Short-sale 
Conflngency Da!Ei»). to rewce their respectivo loan balances by an amount S\lfllclent to pennlt the proceeds from the sale of 
the Property lo pay ttle •xisling balallCl>S on leant 88Ctired by the Property, real property mxes, brokerage rommlssfons, 
closing costs, and other monetary obligations ll'le Agreement mquir9s Sell81' to pay at Close Of Escrow fincludlog. but not 
Dmlled to, e&erow charges, 1ille ctlarges, pmraUOflS, retrofit costs and repairs) without requiring Seller to placa arJ'] funds Into 
e:,cmw. If Seller fails to give Buyerwrltren notice of all existing Short-Sale J.eaclers' conaent by the Short-Sale Contingency 
Date, eilher Seller or Buyer may cancel the Agreemenl in wrffing, and Buyer shafl be enttlled to a return of any depOSit Seller 
;hall f8ffli0nably cooperate with existing Short.Sale Lenders fn the short-ea!& pmcess. 
B. TIME PERIODS. Time periods in !he AgrHmal'lt for contingencies. and/or additional terms shall begin: (1) as specified in 
Ille Agreement; (2} - or if checked -181 lhe day .sfter SeDer delivers to Buyer a wrlttoo JlOllce of Short.Salo Lenden;' conslilllt; er 
(3) - if dlecke<f.. D Other 
C. NO ASSSURANCI: OF LENDER APPROVAL.. Buyer and SoUer undersland lhat Short-Sala Lenders (1) are not 
obligated to accept a short-sale; {2) may require Seller to forward any other offer received; and (3) may accepl other offers. 
Additionelly. Short-Sale Lenders may require that, In order to ob lain their approval for a llhort sale, 9Mle terms of the 
Agreement, such as 1he Close of Escrow, be amended or that Senor sign u personal note or some other obligation for all or a 
portion of the amount of the SGCured debt reducllons. Buyer and Seller do not have It! agree to any of Shott-Sal& Lendern' 
propo&ed terrn6. Buyer, Seller ood Brokers do not haw canlrol over wl'letiler Short-Sale Leno en; wlll consent to a shol'kale, 
or any act, omission, or decision by any Short-Sale Lender In the ahort-aale proce5s. 
@Oi0/012 
D. BUYER AfllD SEU.ER COSTS. Buyer .and seoer 1.1eknowledge !hat each may incut eosts ln connection With rights or / 
oblgalio1111 under the Agmement Theee wsts may include, bu! are not limited to, J)&yments for loan 11pp6callons, Inspections, 
appraisal&. and other reports. Such costs wm be the sole ~pon:,i'bility of the party incurring them, if Short-Sale lender$ dO not 
consent w the lransactlon or eilher party cancels pursuant to lhe AgreemenL 
E. OTHER OA=ERS. Unless othe!wise agreed In w!lllng, Seller may continue to market the Ptoperty despite acceptance of 
Buyers offer, and to prel!Cnt lo Short-Sale Lender(s} any eddlUonal offers Iha!: are received en the P.roperl.y. 
t. CREDfT, l.EOAI.. AND TAX ADVICE. sener is Informed that a shOJt..:sale may ha~ credit rs legal eoru1&qUllflces and 
may result In taxable income lo Seller. Seller is advised to seek advice from an attorney, certified public accountant or 
ottier expert regarding such pot~ntlal consequences of a short.sale. 
G. TERMINATION BY BUYER. Buyer 181 may or D may not (rn.,y, if box is lett uncooci<ed} give notice to terminate this 
Agreement at any lime prior to the delivery of Lender Consent If Buyer tenninates this Agreell'!fflt. the Earnest Money, if 
deposited, shall be refunded to the Buyer. 
By signing below, Buyer and Seller each aclolow!edge that they have read, und&tllland, accept arid have received a copy of 
this Short-Sele Addendum. · 
x,__ _________ _ 
Slgnawra ~ Dale Seller's Signature 
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SCOT M. LUDWIG 
DANIEL A. MILLER 
LUDWIG • SHOUFLER • 
Attorneys at Law 
209 West Main Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208-387-0400 
Facsimile: 208-387-1999 
ISB 3506 
ISB 3571 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FI LED ~ .. ~ . ..........._"-=-llo-4, 
SEP 1 2 2013 
JoLynn Drage, Clerk District 
Court S1alrie Ooun klaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, 
Defendant. 
.. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2012-734 
BENCH BRIEF, RE: 
MOTIONS FOR 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, ROBERT ARON KANTOR, by and through his attorneys, Scot 
M. Ludwig and Daniel A. Miller of Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP, and hereby submits this 
Bench Brief to the Court relating to the pending Motions pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
65(a)-(e). 
Mr. Kantor seeks an Order entering a Preliminary Injunction enjoining Ms. Kantor, her 
BENCH BRIEF, RE: MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF -1-
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regarding the financing on Golden 
Ms. Kantor has requested a Preliminary Injunction requiring Mr. Kantor to cease taking any 
further actions with regard to a Joan modification and to cooperate fully in consummating a short sale 
with the Augusts. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65( e) (grounds for preliminary injunction) provides, in relevant 
part, that 
A preliminary injunction may be granted in the following cases: 
(I) When it appears by the complaint that plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, 
and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or 
continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. 
(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance 
of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury 
to plaintiff. 
(3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens, or 
is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the 
plaintiffs rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the 
judgment ineffectual... 
(5) A preliminary injunction may also be granted on the motion of the defendant 
upon the filing a counterclaim, praying for affirmative relief upon any of the grounds 
mentioned above in this section, subject to the same rules and provisions provided 
for the issuance of injunctions on behalf of the plaintiff. 
BENCH BRIEF, RE: MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF -2-
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65(e)( 
Whenever a party is relying as the grounds upon which to enter an injunction 
our Supreme Court has stated that the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction rests within the 
discretion of the trial court. Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513,517,681 P .2d 988,992 (1984). 
A preliminary injunction should be granted where the right is very clear and it appears that 
irreparable injury will flow from its refusal. Harris, supra, 106 Idaho at 518. 
EVIDENTIARY ISSUE 
Mr. Kantor has had numerous conversations with Bank of America employees regarding the 
financing of the Golden Eagle property. It should be noted that although the Property Settlement 
Agreement states that the property should be sold as soon as reasonably possible (paragraph 5 .0 l) 
there is absolutely no prohibition in the Property SettlemenfAgreement that prevents a Party from 
working with the lender to modify the loan that is secured by the real property. 
In light of there being no prohibitions in the contract preventing Mr. Kantor from working 
with the lender, Mr. Kantor has been working to improve the Parties' financial position by seeking 
a Joan modification from Bank of America. As a result of Mr. Kantor's efforts a Bank of America 
employee has told Mr. Kantor that he has been approved for a loan modification program. Mr. 
Kantor also has correspondence from Bank of America that supports his claim that Bank of America 
will approve Mr. Kantor entering into a program that provides home owners the opportunity to 
modify their loans. 
The correspondence Mr. Kantor has received and the taped phone conversation of the Bank 
of America employee stating that Mr. Kantor has Bank of America approval to enter into the 
program are admissible pursuant to Idaho's Rules of Evidence. 
BENCH BRIEF, RE: MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF -3-
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1 
803(3) an exception to the hearsay rule for a statement made 
a declarant that shows intent or plan of the declarant. The 
recording and correspondence show Bank of America's intent or plan as it relates to the Kantor's 
loan,with Bank of America. 
In the case of Herrickv. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293,900 P.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1995), our Court 
of Appeals held that out of court statements made by a property owner as to her intent to go into the 
cattle business were admissible pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(3). Herrick, 127 Idaho at 
301. The Court went on to note that the rationale for the 803(3) exception is that the element of 
contemporaneity provides some assurance against fabrication. Id. 
In this particular case the statements made by the Bank of America employee cannot be 
disputed as there is a tape recording of those statements. In addition, they were made pursuant to 
a conversation about the parties' loan and the modification. This Court should allow the admission 
of the tape recording as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(15) provide an exception to the hearsay rule for statements that 
are contained in documents that purport to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter was 
relevant to the purpose of the document. LR. E. 803(15). The letters Mr. Kantor has from the Bank 
of America are documents that address and relate to an interest in the Kantor property. The purpose 
of those letters was to address the Bank's interest in that property. This Court should allow the 
admission of the Bank of America letters pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(15) and 803(3). 
BENCH BRIEF, RE: MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF -4~ 
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v. Leuzinger, 1 0 293 
Atb VF? \FF . M.??m 
.~Hernck v. Leuz,nger, 127 Idaho 293 
Reporter 12.7 !doho 293 
Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293 (Copy citation) 
Court of Appeals of Idaho 
June 9, 1995, Filed 
Docket No. 20361, 1995 Opinion No. 60 
Reporter: 127 ldaho 293 i 900 P.2d 701 I 1995 jda. App. LEXIS 78 ! 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(Callaghan) 1152 
GERALD D. HERRICK and KATHRYN 5. HERRICK, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants·Cross 
Respondents, v. DOYLE LEU ZINGER and JUDI LEUZINGER, husband and wife, Defendants· 
Respondents-Cross Appellants. 
Subsequent History: Petition for Review Den,ed August 25, 1995. Released for Publication 
August 2.5, 1995. 
Prior History: Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Custer County. Hon. James C. Herndon, District Judge. 
Disposition: Judgment for defendants on conversion and fraud claims, vacated and case 
remanded. 
Core Terms 
cattle, gift, bill of sale, hearsay, notebook, brand, district court, herd, directed verdict, deposition, 
lease, ranch, summary judgment, attorney's fees, donative intent, parol evidence rule, hearsay 
rule, tnal court, regularly, grazing, commercial transaction, statute of limitations, head of cattle, 
contradict, custodian, decedent, delivery, calf, identification, ownership 
Case Summary 
Procedural Posture 
Plaintiff landowners filed suit against defendant cattle rancners claimmg that the ranchers had 
converted the iandowners' cattle to their own use and comm,tted fraud. The District Court of the 
Seventh Judicial District, Custer County (Idaho) granted judgment in favor of the ranchers. The 
landowners appealed. 
Overview 
The ranchers had an agreement with the landowners' predecessors that the ranchers would 
lease the predecessors' ranch and manage the predecessors' herd of cattle along with their own 
and the parties would split the profits from calves sold at auction each year. After the death of 
the predecessors, the ranchers claimed that the entire herd belonged to them as a result of a 
gift by the predecessors. At trial, the landowners sought to admit evidence of the predecessors' 
bookkeeping documents and statements from a witness in support of their contention that there 
had ·been no gift of the cattle. The trial court refused to admit the evidence as inadmissible 
hearsay, and judgment was rendered in favor of the ranchers. On appeal, the court reversed 
and remanded the matter for a new trial, fmding that the trial court had erred in refusing to 
admit the evidence which was probative of whether the predecessors had continued to maintain 
that they owned the cattle even after the purported gift, which was evidence that could have 
negated donative intent. 
Outcome 
The trial court's judgment in favor of the ranchers on the landowners' conversion and fraud 
claims was vacated and the matter was remanded for a new trial. 
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.:.,Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293 Shepardize® Tools About this Document 
Reporter 127 ld.aho 293 
··-· C1Vi! P"l"Ocedure ·;,, Ir:!ltls. > Jlidomeot a? Matter Qf 2W > Directed Verdicts · · · 
Evidence > Admrssibil!ty :> &ii Dernonst;at1ve Evidence 
Tax Law > Federal ! nrome Tax Comoutat100 > ~ > Gen°rat Overview 
~± When reviewing the disposition of a motion for a directed verdict under Idaho R. Civ. P. 
SO( a), the appellate court utilizes the same standard that governs the tnal court's decision. The 
court must determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every 
legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party, there exists substantial evidence to 
justify su~mitting the case to the Jury. snepa,qizi, · Narrow bv this Headnote 
Evtdence > H. > Documentary Evidence > ~ > Genera! Overview 
Evidence> .. >~>~-Business Recoros > General Overview 
!::!J:Q.± Idaho R. Ev1d. 803{6) provides an exception to the hearsay exclusion for any: 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, cond1t1ons, 
opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a 
person with knowledge, if kept m the course of a regularly conducted busmess activity, and if ,t 
was the'regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, 
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. She;oardize - Narrow pv this Headnote 
Evidence > .. > ~ _> di Business Records > Genera1 Overview 
~± Idaho R. Evid. 803(6\ does not require a foundation of testimony by the person who 
prepared the document in order to admit the document as a business record. The general 
requirement for admission under Idaho R. Evict. 803(6) 1s that the document be produced m the 
ordinary course of business, at or near the time of occurrence and not in anticipation of 
tria!. Sheoarc11ze - Narrow bY this Headnote 
Evidence > . , > Statements a~ Evidence > ~ > General Qverv,gw 
Evidence > ... > ~ > fple Components > ~
Evidence > ... > ~ > Ryle Components > Trutn pf Nlatter Asserted 
l::1l!!.5.± An out-of-court statement or writing is hearsay only if it is offered ro prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. Idaho R. Evid 80Hcl. When a statement 1s not being offered as proof of 
the facts contained in the statement, but merely as proof that the statement was made, the 
hearsay rule has no application. A statement that would be inadmissible hearsay if offered to 
prove the truth of the assertion 1s nonetheless admissible (generally with an appropriate hmit•ng 
instruction to the jury) if the mere fact the statement was made 1s itself relevant. saeoard.'ze · 
Narrow bY thic: Headnote 
Commercial Law (UCC) > Genera! Provisions {Art1c1~ 1) > General Drpv!i::ions 
Commercial Law (UCC) > Sales (Article 2} > Gen.oral Overview 
Commercial Law (UCC} > Sales (Art1c1e 2) > Form Formatmn & Beadwstment > General Overview 
Commerdal Law (UCC) > Sales {Article 2} > SubteC! Matter> Genera! Qyerview 
Commercial Law (UCC) > ... > Sub1ect Matter > ~ > General Qyery,ew 
Contracts Law > Contract Interpretatmn > ill Paro! Evidence > Genera! Overview 
Contracts Law > ... > Salee: Qf Goods > ReadJUStments > Pargl Ev1ctence 
Evidence > TYPCS pf ~videoce > Documentary Evidence > Parot Ev1aence 
tlt!§.± The parol evidence doctrine 1s a rule of contract construction and provides generally that 
when a contract has been reduced to a writing that the parties intend to be a final statement of 
their agreement, evidence of any prior or contemporaneous agreements or understandings 
which relate tc the same subJect matter 1s not admissible to vary or contradict the terms of the 
written contract. ln its application to contracts for the sale of goods, including the sale of cattle, 
this common law rule has been codified in the Uniform Commercial Code, Idaho Code § 28·2-
l.Ql. snea@rc11z1; · Narrow PY tbrs Headnote 
Commercial Law (UCC) > , .. > Aoottcation & Construction > Contract Proyfs100S > Gap Filler Prpytfif00S 
Commercial Law (UCC} > Salee; (Aaicle 2} > Fqrm Formation & Read1ustment > General Qyerv,ew 
Commercial Law {UCC) > ... > Form Formation & Readmstment > Paro! Evidence Ryle > General Overview 
Commerc1a! Law {UCC} > ... > Form Formation & Readiustment > Parpl Evidence Rule > Gao Fj!ler Prpvt5ipn~ 
Contracts Law > Contract lnterorotatron > Ill Paro! Evidence > General overview 
Contracts Law > ... > saies or Goocts > Readiustments > Paro! Evidence 
Contracts Law > Types of Contracts > Iii Ora! Agreements 
1:1!!1.Z.± Pursuant to Idaho Code § 28·2-202, terms with respect to which the confirmatory 
memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set Forth in a writing intended by the 
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included 
therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous 
oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented: (a) by course of dealing or usage of 
trade ( Idaho Code§ 28·1-205) or by course of performance ( Idaho Code § 28·2·208); and(b) 
by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been 
intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. Sneoarct,ze -
Narrow PY thi$ Headnote 
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V. 
Sources Idaho Court Rules \'§; I.R.E, Rule 803 Herrick v. Leuzin •.. 
tf1!lll.± The community or separate property status of an asset acquired during a marriage is 
determmed by the source of funds with which it was purchased, not by the fact that only one 
spouse 1s named as owner on a document of title. sne®rd:ze ~ Narrow bY th!' Headnote 
Evidence > .. > ~ > ~ > Genera1 Overview 
Evidence > ... > ~ > > Iii Medical D1agnos1s & Treatment 
Evidence> ... >~>Iii State of Mmd > General Overview 
Evidence > .. >  > Ill State of Mmo > PrgQf gf EarJier Acts 
Evidence > > ~ > ~ > General Overview 
Evidence > . > ~ > Rule Component~ > ~
fJ.!JJil.:!:. Idaho R. Ev1d. 803{3) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for statements offered to 
prove the dec!arant's then-existing mental or physical condition. The rule provides that a 
hearsay statement is admissible if it is: a statement of the declarant's then existing state of 
mmd, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental 
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove me 
fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the· execution, revocation, identification, or 
terms of declarant's will. Sneoardize · Narrow PY thts Headnote 
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > ~ > Personal Gifts 
J::tl!UJJ.;i When intent is a material element of a disputed fact, declarations of a decedent made 
after as well as before an alleged act that mdicate the intent with which he performed the act 
are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, and it Is immaterial that such 
declarations are self-serving. Thus, in cases involving the delivery of deeds, declarations of the 
alleged grantor made before and after the making of the deed are admissible upon the issue of 
delivery, and it is immaterial that such declarations are in the mterest of the party producing 
them< sneoarcfize - Narrow PY rors Headnote 
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > Estate Planning > community Prpperty > General overview 
f:state, Gift & Trust Law> Estate Plannmg > rommunity Property>~ 
Estate., Gift & Trust Law > ~ > Personal Gifts 
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > ™ > Personal Gift$ > General Overview 
Estate:, Girt & Trust Law > . > Pe'"!,;ooa1 Gifts > i=1ement<;; of Yahd Gifts. > Gene@! overview 
Estate, Gift & Trust Law > . > PPr:;gna1 Gifts > i=iementc;, pf Vahd Gifts > Donative Intent 
Family Law > Mantal Duties & RIPht? > Property RjgQts > General overview 
Family Law > , ,, > Prooertx Rights > Charactenzat1on > General Qverv~ew 
Family Law > ... > Property R1gnrs > Characten2at1on > Commurntv Prpoe:rv 
Family Law > .,. > Prqpg[ty P1strtbut1on > Charactenzatioo > Communrtv Pcooertv 
Family Law > . > Property p15tribut1on > Ctassmcat1on > ~ 
l11i1,.1!:. A gift occurs when there is a delivery of the 'asset to the donee with a present donative 
intent. The person whose donative intent must be shown to prove a gift is the person who 
owned the property and thus had authority to give if away. If the property at issue is community 
property, it may not be given away without the consent of both husband and wife. snepqrd,ze -
Narrow bY th15 Headnote 
Evidence > Ill Authentication > General Overview 
Evidence> .,, > Documentary Evidence>~> General Overview 
Evidence > Wg1qht & SuffiC!eOCY 
tl11J..2.;i ldaho R Eyid 901 requires that when offering any physical exhibit, a proper foundation 
must be laid to show that the item is what it is represented to be. The rule states that the 
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims. This standard requires only that the court admit evidence if sufficient proof 
has been introduced so that a reasonable Juror could find in favor of authentication or 
identification. Shepardfze ; Narrow by this Heaqngti1. 
Civil Procedure > ~ > Summary Judameots > General overview 
Ctv1! Procedure > ~ > Summary Judame:or Rey,ew > General overview 
Civil Procedure > ~ > Summary )udoment R0 v1ew >_ ARPffea!at1ilrty 
Civil Procedure > . · > summary )udaments > Motions for Summary Judamem > Gene,..al Qve1v\ew 
Civil Procedure > ~ > ReviewabiHtv Qf Lower Court Decisions > Genera! Overview 
!:l.l:J.ll,± The denial of a motion for summary Judgment is ordinarily both non-appealable and non 
-revlewable. Sheoardize - Narrow bx this Headnote 
Civil Procedure '> • > Costs & Attorney :Fees > Attorney Fee~ & Expenses > • Reasonable Fees 
Civil Procedure > .. > Attorney Fee;s & fxpe;n5e1s > Basis pf Recovery > StatU\DCY AwafOS 
Contracts law > Types pf Contracts > Lease Agreements > Generar overview 
l:Jl!.Jd.± idaho Code § 12-120(3} provides that the prevailing party in a lawsuit arising from a 
commercial transaction is entitled to the award of a reasonable attorney fee. The term 
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Opinion 
[29S] LAN$ING, Judge 
The plaintiffs, Gerald and Kathryn Herrick, filed suit alleging that Doyle and Judi Leuzinger had 
converted the Herncks' cattle to their own use and committed fraud. The Leuzmgers asserted m 
defense that the Herricks' predecessors ,n interest had gifted the cattle herd to the Leuzingers. At 
the close of evidence the Herricks moved for a directed verdict, which was derned. The jury found 
in favor of the Leuz1ngers. The Herricks now appeal, asserting error in the oemal of their motion 
for a directed verdict ano numerous errors in the exclusion of evidence by the district court. We 
affirm the district court's denial of a directed verdict, but because we find that evidence was 
erroneously excluded by the district court to the Herncks' detriment, we reverse and remand the 
case for a new trial. 
I. FACTS 
Prior to 1973 Mildred and Lewis Carlisle acquired land in Custer County known as the Broken Wing 
Ranch. The Carlisles obtained a registered brand certificate for use of an "ML" cattle brand. They 
also held a United States Forest Service permit entitling them to graze 150 head of cattle on 
Forest Service land. 
In 1973 the Carlisles purchased forty-five head of cattle with the proceeds of a five-year bank 
loan. The bill of sale states that the cattle were sold to Lewis, and Mildred's name does not appear 
on the document. The Carlisles did not operate the ranch themselves or manage the cattle herd. 
Rather, neighboring ranchers and close friends, Doyle and Judi Leuzinger, leased tne ranch from 
the Carlis!es and managed their herd. All parties agree that from 1973 until 1975, the Leuzingers 
were managing the Carlisle herd in exchange for one-half of the profits from the yearly calf crop. 
During this period, if any of the calves were retained by the Carlisles to replace a cow or to expand 
the herd size, the Carhsles paid the Leuzingers half the value of that calf. 
ln c982 Lewis Carlisle died, leaving all of his interest in the ranch to Mildred. ln 1988 Mildred 
passed away. She bequeathed the ranch to a trust administered by First Interstate Bank. The 
benef1c1anes of the trust were various relatives of Mildred. For convenience, the trust and 
beneficiaries are hereinafter referred to collectively as Mildred's heirs. 
At various points in 1988 and 1989, the heirs, while visiting the ranch, asked the Leuzmgers about 
the ownership of cattle that were being grazed on the ranch. The Leuzingers stated that none of 
the cattle belonged to the Carlisles. Mildred's heirs eventually sold their interest in the ranch to 
Gerald and Kathryn Hernck, the plaintiffs m the current action. The sale included a transfer of any 
rights the heirs possessed in the herd of cattle. When the Herricks began investigating to 
determine what cattle were encompassed withm their purchase, the Leuzingers [296] again 
asserted that all of the cattle on the Broken Wing Ranch belonged to them. 
On November 19, 1991, the Herricks brought suit against the Leuzingers for an accounting, 
alleging that the Leuzingers, as the Carlisles' managers, owed an accounting for assets. In January 
1992, the Leuzingers answered and filed a counterclaim asserting that the Herricks had breached 
the Leuzingers' lease of the Broken Wing Ranch. Eventually, through discovery, the Herricks 
learned it was the Leuzmgers' contention that in 1975 Lewis Carlisle had transferred the entire 
herd to the Leuzingers as a gift Thereafter the Herricks amended their complaint to allege that 
the Leuzingers had converted the herd to their own use and had committed fraud. 
The trial court bifurcated the trial, separating out the Leuzingers' counterclaim for breach of lease 
from the issues raised by the Herricks' complaint. A court trial on the breach of lease case was 
held in April 1992, and the court found for the Leuzingers. 
A Jury tnal was then held on the Herncks' claims in October 1993. At this trial Doyle Leuzinger 
testified that in 1975 Lewis Carlisle had given the entire herd to the Leuzingers. He stated that out 
of gratitude for this gift, and to enable the Carhsles to obtain certain tax advantages from their 
ownership cf the Broken Wing Ranch, even after the cattle were given to them the Leuzingers 
continued to split the yearly calf crop with the Carhsles. This sharing of the calf crop after 1975 
was, according to the Leuz1ngers, a return gift to the Carlisles. ln 1975 when Lewis allegedly gave 
the cattle to the Leuzingers, he executed a bill of sale which recited that Lewis Carlisle sold to 
Doyle Leuz1nger seventy-eight head of cattle bearing tne Carlisles' "ML" brand. Doyle Leuzinger 
testified at one point that this bill of sale was to transfer title and thereby effectuate the gift. At 
another point he testified that the bill of sale was executed because the Leuzingers were running 
their own cattle on United States Forest Service land for which the Carlis!es' held a grazing permit. 
In order to graze their cattle on the land, he said, the Leuzingers had branded their own cattle 
with the Carlisles' ML brand in addition to the Leuzingers' brand. Doyle Leuzinger stated that he 
therefore asked Lewis Carlisle to execute the bill of sale in order to show that these cattle, though 
falsely branded with the ML brand, belonged to the Leuzingers. 
From 1975 until Mildred's death in 1988, the leuzingers continued to split with the Carhsles (and 
after Lewis' death, with Mildred) the yearly calf crop from those cows branded solely with the ML 
brand. During this period, the Carlisles continued to pay Leuzinger one-half the vaiue of any calves 
retamed and not sold at the yearly auction. In 1983, at Doyle Leuzinger's request, Mildred 
executed a bill of sale to the Leuzingers for seventy-four head of cattle. Doyle Leuzinger testified 
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A: the close of the evidence m the October 1993 trial on the conversion and fraud claims, the 
Hemcks moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the Leuzingers had failed to carry their burden 
of proof regarding the alleged gift. The tnal court derned the motion, and the Jury later returned a 
verdict for the Leuzingers. On appeal the Herncks contend that the district court erred in excluding 
certain evidence, giving an improper Jury instruction, and denying the motion for directed verdict. 
The Leuzmgers cross-appeal from the denial of a motion for summary Judgment they had filed and 
the denial of their request for attorney fees in the breach of lease case which was tried to the 
court in April 1992. 
II. MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
We first address the Herncks' argument that they are entitled to a directed verdict on the 
Leuzingers· affirmative defense of gift. They contend that the tnal evidence was insufficient to 
support a finding by the Jury [297) that the Carlisles gave the herd to the Leuz1ngers. The 
Herncks point out that !::!!:J.J_+ under Idaho law, proof of an enforceable gift must include a 
showing that the transferor had a present donative intent and that the gift was delivered to the 
donee with the donor immediately relinquishing all dominion over the obJect given. See 
Christiansen v. Rumsev 91 Idaho 684. 42C} P.2d 416 11967); Claunch v. Whyte 73 Idaho 243. 
249 P,2d 915 ( 1952). Because 1t 1s undisputed that the Carlisles continued to receive income from 
the calf crops until Mildred's death, the Herricks argue there was no complete relinquishment of 
dominion over the cattle herd and that an essential element for the claim of gift was therefore 
m1ss1ng. 
l::J.N2.+ When reviewing the disposition of a motion for a directed verdict under l.R.C.P. SO(a), we 
utilize the same standard that governs the trial court's decision. That is, we must determine 
whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most 
favorably to the opposing party, there exists substantial evidence to Justify submitting the case to 
the jury. Quick v Crane 111 ldaho 759. 727 P,2d 1187 !1986); StPohens y. Steams• 106 ldaho 
249 678 P.2d 41 r 1984); Smith v Great Basin Grain Co. 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 {1977). 
Applymg this standard, we conclude that the d1stnct court correctly denied the Herricks' motior.. 
The Leuz1ngers presented evidence that Lewis Carlisle expressed an intent to completely transfer 
all control over the cattle to the Leuzingers and that because the cattle were already on the ranch 
which they leased from the Carllsles, delivery was complete at the inception of the alleged gift. 
They also presented testimony from two of Lewis's friends who said Lewis had told them that he 
gave the cattle to tne Leuzmgers. As explanation for the fact that the Carlisles continued to 
receive nalf the income from the calf crops, the Leuz1ngers testified that this income was a gift 
back from them to the Cari1sles, not a retention of control or limitation on the gift imposed by 
Lewis Carlisle. Although the Herncks presented evidence that called into question the credibility of 
this explanation from the Leuz1ngers, we cannot say that the evidence of gift was insufficient to 
submit the question to the Jury. Accordingly, the d1stnct court's denial of the motion for a directed 
verdict is affirmed. 
!I!. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
The Herricks maintain that the trial court committed error by excluding from evidence testimony 
about statements made by Mildred to her sister and three exhibits. This evidence was offered by 
the Herncks principally to show that Mildred and Lewis considered themselves to b€ the owners of 
the cattle herd both before and after the date when the Leuzingers allege Lewis gave the cattle 
away. 
A. HANDWRITTEN NOTEBOOK OF MILDRED CARLISLE 
The Herricks contend the court erred in excluding a spiral notebook in which Mildred Carhsle made 
handwritten entries from 1973 to 1986. On their face, these entries purport to record the 
expenses and earnings of the cattle operation at Broken Wing Ranch for those years. The district 
court sustained the Leuzmgers' obJect1on that the notebook contents were hearsay. 
On appeal, the Herricks aver that the notebook should have been admitted under the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule. l:lli3.+ LR E 803(5). That rule provides an exception to the 
hearsay exclusion for any: 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, 
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity 
to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the 
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information 
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack cif trustworthiness. 
The premise for this hearsay exception is that business records possess a high degree of reliability 
because persons [298] engaged in business inherently have incentives to keep accurate and 
truthful records. Curiel v Minqo 100 Idaho 303 305 597 P.2d 26 28 ( 1979}; Christensen v 
Rire 114 Idaho 929 933-34, 763 P.2d 302, 306·07 (Ct. App. 1988); 2 Kenneth S. Broun et al. 
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 286 at 264 (John W. Strong ed. 4th Ed. 1992). Prior to adoption of 
the idaho Rules of Evidence, admission of business records was governed by LC. § 9·414. wh1cn 
is similar to !.R.E. 80316). Sectior 9-414 and Rule 803(6) have been interpreted broadly to 
liberally allow ,ntroduct1011 of such records See Curiel v. Mingo, 100 ldaho at 305, 597 P.2d at 
305; Beco Corporation v. Robe[Ts & Son, Cons:truc:tion Companv, inc. 114 Idaho 704, 71 L 760 
P.2d 1120, 1127·{19881 overruled on other grounds. Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, : 19 
Idaho 72 803 P.2d 978 ( • 990). In doubtful or close cases, evidence should be admitted under the 
business records exception. 8"CQ Corp. 114 idaho at 711 760 P.2d at 1127. 
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the ordinary course of business, at or ·near the time oi occurrence and 
not in anticipation of tnai.· The comment to LR.E. 803(6) ooints out: 
Because records of regularly conducted act,vity are not normally self proving, as 
public records may be under Rule 803(8), the testimony of the custodian or other 
person who can explain the record keeping of the organization 1s ordmarily essential. 
The custodian need not have personal knowledge of the actual creation of the 
document nor need [the custodian] have been an employee of the business when the 
record was made. The test 1s whether [the custodian] has knowledge of the system 
used to make the record and not whether [ the custodian] has knowledge of the 
contents of the record. 
Large v. Cafferty Realty Inc., 123 Idaho 676 683, 851 P.2d 972 979, (1993) quoting from 
REPORT OF IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, C 803, p. 10 (Supplemental 6/1/85) 
(citation omitted). 
In the present case, Dons Long, Mildred Carlisle's sister, testified that the entries in the cattle 
spiral notebook were 1n Mildred's handwriting, that it was Mildred's regular practice to annually 
make entries in the notebook, and that the notebook constituted the thirteen-year compilation of 
such records of income and expenses related to the cattle operation. Doris based her testimony 
upon personal knowledge, having assisted Mildred m maintaining her records, though not the 
notebook specifically, during Mildred's final illness. Doris testified that Mildred kept the spiral 
notebook and numerous receipts and other documents relating to the cattle in a folder labeled 
"cattle." Doyle Leuzinger testified that he regularly reported the transactions involving the cattle 
herd to both Lewis and Mildred prior to their deaths. Finally, the tna! court heard the testimony of 
Robert Overstreet, a certified public accountant who compared the entries in the notebook to the 
various rece1ots and other records contained in the folder marked "cattle." Overstreet testified that 
the entries in the notebook accurately reflected 1nformat1on on the receipts and check stubs 
contained in the folder, 
Th,s evidence, taken together, established the necessary foundation to show that Mildred's spiral 
notebook fell within the Rule 803(6) hearsay exception. The testimony'of Dons, who was a 
qualified witness by virtue of her familiarity with Mildred's record-keeping methods, indicated that 
the notebook entries were made regularly at or near the time of occurrence as part of the records 
of the cattle operation, and that this record was not prepared in ant1cipat1on of lit1gat1on. Further, 
the testimony of Robert Overstreet 1nd1cated that tne notebook rehably reflected the receipts and 
check stubs showing ,ncome from and expenses of the cattle. Although this foundational testimony 
was offered at different times in the trial and not" as a [2.99) cohesive "offer of proof," when the 
notebook was offered following all of the foregoing testimony, a sufficient foundation had been 
established to bring the notebook within the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and ,t 
should have been admitted into evidence. W 
The erroneous exclusion of evidence Justifies setting aside a Jury verdict only i' substantial rights 
of the parties were affected by the error. I.R.C.P. 61;· l.R.E. 103(a}. In our v,ew, the exclusion of 
the spiral notebook was sufficiently preJudic1al to the HerrickS that the verd,ct and Judgment must 
be vacated. The Herricks were faced with the Leuzingers' assertion that cattle once belonging to 
the Carhsles had been gifted to the Leuzingers. The Leuzingers relied principally upon Doyle 
Leuzinger's own testimony of a conversation with Lewis Carlisle that had not been witnessed by 
any other person. With Lewis Carlisle now deceased, the Herricks had no ability to directly refute 
Doyle Leuzinger's version of that conversation but, of necessity, had to rely upon less direct 
evidence of Lewis and Mildred Carlisle's understanding regarding ownership of the cattle. The 
spiral notebook was indirect evidence that Mildred believed herself to be the owner of the herd. An 
inference of such belief on Mildred's part could be drawn both from the fact that such detailed 
records of the cattle operation were maintained and from the content of entnes regarding 
particular expenses paid and income received. The notebook entries would have been probative 
for the Jury's determination as to whether the cattle had been gifted to the Leuzmgers and, if not, 
the number of cattle owned by Mildred at the time of her death. Because the Jtiry was prevented 
from considering this probative evidence, the Judgment in favor of the Leuzingers on the fraud and 
conversion claims must be set aside and the case remanded for a new trial. 
B. STATEMENTS OF MILDRED TO DORIS LONG 
Before trial, the leuzingers filed two rnot1ons ,n limine seeking to exclude from trial any testimony 
by Doris Long regarding statements made by Mildred to Doris relative to ownership of the ca.ttle. 
The distnct court apparently held that these statements were inadmissible parol evidence because 
they would alter or contradict the terms of the 1973, 1975 and 1983 bills of sale. At trial, the 
Herncks sought to ehcit testimony from Doris regarding at least one statement, apparently made 
by Mildred in 1973 shortly after the car11sles purchased the cattle. Ill According to the offer of 
proof, the proffered evidence was to the effect that Mildred said to Dons: "You won't believe it, but 
I'm in the cattle business;" to which Doris responded, "You>'' Mildred then replied: "Yeah. Me, 
myself personally. l have gone into the cattle business." Upon ObJection by the Leuzingers, the 
district court again ruled this testimony inadmissible both because it violated the parol evidence 
rule and because it was [300] hearsay. We therefore review each of these grounds for 
exclusion. · 
l. Parol Evidence Rulel:l!YR+ The parol evidence doctrine 1s a rule of contract construction and 
provides generally that when a contract has been reduced to a writing that the parties intend to be 
a final statement of their agreement, evidence of any prior or contemporaneous agreements or 
understandings which relate to the same subject matter is not admlssll:>le to vary or contradict the 
terms of the written contract. Tuscn Enterprises v. Coffin 113 Idaho 37 44,740 P.2d 1022 1029 
ill.!lZl.; Chapman v. Haney Seed Co., Inc .. 102 Idaho 26t28, 624 P,2d 408. 410 /l981). In its 
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a bill of sale from Mildred Carl!sle 1r 1983 to Doyle and iudi Leuztnger for s1xty·three head of 
cattle. 
The Leuzingers contend that Mildred's statements that she was going into the cattle business 
would contradict the 1973 bili of sale by indicating that Mildred was an owner of the cattle, while 
the bill of sale indicates that Lewis alone had purchased them. The parol evidence rule is 
inapplicable, however, for it excludes only extnnsic evidence of agreements or understandings 
that precede or are contemporaneous with the written contract; it does not preclude evidence of 
agreements or statements made after the writing. Brewer v. Pitkm 99 Idaho 114, 116 577 P.2d 
1162, H66 (1978); Tusch 113 Idaho at 44 740 P.2d at 1029. The bill of sale showing Lewis as 
purchaser does not obviate the possibility that Mildred subsequently acquired an interest in the 
cattle, by gift from Lewis or otherwise. Moreover, tl.!!J[+ the community or separate property 
status of an asset acquired during a marnage ,s determined by the source of funds with which it 
was purchased, not by the fact that only one spouse is named as owner on a document of title. 
Stanger v. Stanger 98 Idaho 725 571 P.2d 1126 (1970); Farmers Insurance Exchange v. 
Wendler 84 ldaho 114 118 368 P.2d 933 935 ( 1962); Bowman v. Bowman 72 Idaho 266 270 
240 P.2d 487 489 11952). 
The parol evidence rule likewise has no application v1s·a·vis the 1975 bill of sale from Lewis to the 
Leuzmgers, which the Leuzingers contend was delivered to evidence a gift. First, as noted above, 
the parol evidence rule applies only to evidence of agreements or understandings between the 
parties to the writing which vary or contradict the written contract. Absent any evidence that she 
Joined or acquiesced in the alleged gih, Mildred was not a party to the writing; and her statements 
to Dons that she was gomg into the cattle business were not evidence of any agreement or 
understanding with the Leuzingers. 
Second, even the Leuzingers, who are the proponents of the bill of sale and advocate for 
application of the parol evidence rule, acknowledge that the bill of sale 1s not an accurate 
expression of their agreement with Lewis. In direct contradiction of the bill of sale's statement tnat 
the cattle were being "bargained and sold to" the Leuzingers, the Leuzingers presented extrinsic 
evidence that [301] Lewis contemporaneously said he was giving the cattle to therr and that the 
bill of sale was intended to effectuate a gift. Moreover, at one point Doyle Leuzinger also testified 
that the 1975 bill of sale was intended to not only convey Lewis's cattle but also to essentially 
clear the title to the Leuzmgers' own cattle, which carried both the Leuzingers' brand and the 
Carlisles' Ml brand in order to take advantage of Carhsles' grazing rights. Both the Leuzingers' 
position that the bill of sale effectuated a gift and their testimony that it covered cattle the 
Leuzmgers already owned are fundamentaliy inconsistent with their reliance upon the parol 
evidence ruie. In short, the 1975 bill of sale does not, by virtue of the parol evidence rule, present 
an obstacle to the admissibility of Doris's testimony about Mildred's 1973 statements that she was 
entering the cattle business. 
Finaliy, the 1983 bill of sale from Mildred to the Leuzingers provides no basis for exclusion of parol 
evidence for the same reasons that apply to the 1975 bill of sale. The Leuzingers themselves 
acknowledge that it, like the 1975 bill of sale, is not what it purports to be. Their evidence showed 
1t was not a conveyance by Mildred but was a device used to again clear title to the Leuzingers' 
own cattle which falsely carried the Carlisle brand in order to gain use nf grazing rights. 
2. Hearsay 
The district court also concluded that Mildred's statements to Dons were inadmissible as hearsay. 
The Herncks contend that the statements fell within the hearsay exceptions of LR.E. 803/3) (then 
existing mental or physical condition) and 803(24) (the residual exception). 
J:ll!l!l+ ldaho Rule of Evidence 803(3) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for statements 
offered to prove the declarant's then-existing mental or physical condition. The rule provides that 
a hearsay statement is admissible if 1t is: 
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or 
phys,cal condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feelmg, pain, and 
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact 
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, 
or terms of declarant's will. 
The rationale for the Rule 80313) hearsay exception 1s that the element of contemporaneity 
provides some assurance against fabrication. REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE 
COMMJITEE, C 803 p. 4 (Supplemented 6/1/1985), 
Rule 803(3) effecteC: no change from prevmus Idaho law except, perhaps, with respect to 
statements of memory. Id., at 4·6. Idaho law has long allowed evidence of statements of a 
decedent to snow that she had considered herself to be the owner of certain property. In 
Fredricksen v. Fullmer. 74 Idaho 164 258 P,2d 1155 {1953), an alleged purchaser of the 
decedent's real property produced a copy of a sale contract purportedly signed by the decedent 
and sought to compel specific performance of the contract by the decedent's estate. The estate 
denied that the contract was genuine and sought to introduce evidence of the decedent's 
statements made and letters written after the date of the alleged contract indicating that she 
believed that she was still the owner of the premises. The Court, citing its previous decision in me 
same case, Fr,.dricksen v, Luthy 72 Idaho 164 238 P 2d 430 {195ll, held the statements and 
ietters were admissible despite a hearsay objection. 
In Crensnaw v Crenshaw 68 ldaho 470 1 99 P.2d 264 0948). the parties disouted whether a 
deed, executed t,y the deceased granter, was delivered to the grantee prior to the grantor's death. 
Both the grantor's estate and the grantee sought.to. introduce ~t_"..~er:;~nt5._by_the deceased 
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involving the [302] dehvery of deeds, declarations of the alleged grantor made 
before and after the making of the deed are admrssible upon the issue of delrvery, and 
It is immaterial that such declarations are rn the interest of the party producing them. 
Id at 476 199 P 2d at 267. 
Thus, by terms of i.R.E. 803(3) and the aforementioned decisions, the adm,sslbillty of Mildred's 
statements to Doris turns upon whether the statements were probative as to Mildred's state of 
mind about ownership of the cattle. It is apparent that Mildred's statements to Doris indicated her 
belief that she owned the cattle shortly after their acquisition in 1973, and the statements are 
therefore relevant for determining whether she had an ownership interest. 
This evidence was relevant to a material issue in the action. The existence of donative intent was 
a central issue with respect to Leuzingers' contention that Lew,s Carlisle gave the cattle to them in 
1975. !::ll!!1.1.+ A gift occurs when there is a delivery of the asset to the donee with a present 
donative intent. In re Estate of Lew•s 97 Idaho 299 302 543 P 2d 852. 855 (1975), The person 
whose donative intent must be shown to prove a gift is, of course, the person who owned the 
property and thus had authority to give it away. If the property at issue is community property. it 
may not be g,ven away without the consent of both husband and wife. Koenig v. Bishop 90 Idaho 
182 186 409 P 2d 102 103 <1965); Anderson v. i®ho Mutual Benefit Association 77 Idaho 373. 
380 292 P.2d 760. 764 /1956). Hence, evidence md,cating whether the cattle were owned 
separately by Lewis or Mildred or were the community property of i:ioth was relevant. Therefore, 
upon retria! of this case, this evrdence of Mildred's comments to Doris should be admitted unless 
the Leuzingers then concede that Mildred was an owner such that her donative intent was 
necessary to effect a gift of the cattle. 
We agree with the Leuzrngers, however. that these 1973 statements are not relevant to establrsh 
whether Mildred had a donative intent two years later when the gift allegedly was made. 
Therefore, if the Leuz,ngers concede·on remand that Mildred was an owner of the cattle, evidence 
of these statements should be excluded because they would no longer be relevant on any disputed 
issue. !41 
C. LETIER FROM LEWIS CARLISLE TO HIS ACCOUNTANT 
Next the Hemcks argue the district court erred in excluding a letter purportedly written by Lewis 
Carlisle in 1980 to his now-deceased accountant. ln the letter, Lewis explained: 
As you know we give the Leuzmgers half the calves for running our cattle etc. We held 
back seven heifers this year so Millie paid Doyle Leuzinger half the market value of 
these heifers. , 
The district court excluded this exhibit for lack of an evidentiary foundation, 
l:!lin+ Idaho Rule of Evidence 901 requires that when offering any physical exhibit, a proper 
foundation must be laid to show that the item ,s what it is represented to be. The rule states: "The 
requirement of authentication or identif,cat,on as a condition precedent to admissibilrty is satisfied 
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in ouest,on ,s what its proponent 
claims." This standard "requires only that the court admit evidence if sufficient proof has been 
introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authentication or identification." 
REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMJTIEE, C 901 p. 1 (Supplemented 6/1/85) 
quoting 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE P 901(a)[01] at 16 (Supp 1983). 
We conclude that the district court properly exduded the proffered letter. The Herncks made no 
effort to lay a foundation for admission of the letter through any witness. Instead, they argued 
only that the [303] Leuz,ngers' attorney had opened the door for admission of thrs letter by 
referring to it in his opening statement to the Jury, This contention by the Herricks that reference 
to an exhibit during an opening statement will waive any ODJect,on when the exhibit is offered 
during the trial has not been supported by any citation of authority, and we find it to be without 
merit. Attorneys' opening statements often comment upon anticipated adverse evidence in order 
to defuse ,ts impact or diminish its importance. We perce,ve no reason that such a comment 
should excuse the proponent of the evidence from laying an adequate foundation for ,ts 
admission. Therefore, the tnal court's exclusion of this ietter was not in error. 
Our ruling does not, of course, preclude the Herricks from again offering th,s evidence with a 
proper foundation in the event of a new trial on remand. 
D. DEPOSITION OF MILDRED CARLISLE 
The Herricks next claim as error the district court's exclusion of a portion of a deposition of Mildred 
Carlisle that was taken in another case. They sought to place in evidence part of the transcript of a 
deposition of Mildred ta ken ,n February 1988 during proceedings for her divorce from a man she 
had married following Lew,s Carlisle's death. In that deposition the following questions and 
answers occurred: 
Q. What 1s the property 111 Idaho? 
A. The property ,s in Idaho is a cattle ranch. 
Q. Are there presently cattle on it? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And l have someone else on the ranch so some of these cattle belong to him. 
ls tnat a person who rents the property or is that like a supervisor that you hire? 
He leases part of it to run his cattle and then he runs my cattle. 
And has this setup with Mr. Lysinger [sic], has that -- now long has that been going 
on? 
A. It's been going for about 20 years. 
Q. 
How many of the-· are the 300 cattle yours plus his or does that include both? 
A. That includes part of both. That includes both, yes. 
Q. Do you know how many cattle you have? 
A. Not totally. 
Q. Is it around half and half or do you know> 
A. Probably he has more. 
The Herricks do not contend that this deposition testimony was admissible as direct evidence that 
Mildred owned the cattle, apparently conceding that it would be hearsay if offered for that 
purpose. Rather, they argue it was admissibie to impeach the testimony of a witness called by the 
Leuzingers during their case in chief. The witness. Clark Munger, was an attorney from Arizona 
who had represented Mildred 1n the divorce proceedings in that state and was present during the 
deposition. Munger testified on direct examination that when he was representing Mildred he 
asked whether she owned any cattle and Mildred informed him that she had none. He also said 
that he never at any time heard Mildred say that she had a cattle herd. When it came time to 
cross-examine Munger, the Herncks' attorney apparently did not have a copy of Mildred's 
deposition transcript in the courtroom, and he therefore did not place the transcript 1n front of 
Munger but, rather, asked him whether he had heard Mildred state under oath in her deposition 
that she owned cattle on the Broken Wing Ranch. Munger responded that, to his recol!ect1on, 
Mildred had not made a definite statement but rather had ··waffled" on that issue and had given 
ambiguous testimony. The day after Munger's testimony was completed and he had left Idaho to 
return to Arizona, the Herricks moved to have Mildred's deposition entered into evidence. The 
[304) Herricks contend that the deposition testimony was not hearsay because it was offered 
not for the truth of Mildred's statements, but only to impeach Munger's testimony that he never 
heard Mildred c!aim that she owned cattle. 
As noted above, the hearsay preclusion of LR.E. 802 applies when an out-of-court statement ,s 
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated and its value thus rests upon credibility of the 
declarant. If the evidence is offered for purposes for which the truth or falsity of the statement is 
irrelevant, the hearsay rule does not apply. For that reason, an out-of-court statement offered to 
impeach a witness's credibility is not hearsay. United States v. Miller 874 F 2d 1255 1271 n 9 
(9th Cir. 1989). cert. denied, U.S. , 126 l.Ed.2d 210 114 S Ct. 258 Cl993l; UnitedSrate, v 
Wmkle 587 F 2d 70'1 710 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, <144 U.S. 827, 62 L Ed 2d 34 JOOS Ct. 
SJ /l979): 1 Kenneth S. Broun, et. al., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 34 at 113 (John W. Strong, 
ed., 4th ed. 1992). In such circumstances it is not the truth of the statement that has evidentiary 
value, but rather its juxtaposition against the inconsistent testimony of the witness. 
Munger's testimony that he never heard Mildred Carlisle say that she owned cattle was directly 
contradicted by the transcript of the deposition at which he was present as counsel. Regardless of 
whether Mildred's deposition testimony was true, the transcnpt had ev1dentiary value to draw into 
question the reliability of Munger's testimony. Therefore, the hearsay rule presented no obstacle 
to admission of the transcript for impeachment purposes. 
Although we conclude that the HerrickS' position has merit, we cannot find error m this case due to 
the timing of their motion for admission of the partial transcript. After establishing the necessary 
foundation, the Herricks' attorney properly could have read from the transcript during cross-
examination of Munger and asked htm whether he heard that testimony by Mildred. Alternatively, 
with appropriate foundation to establish authenticity, the pertinent portion of the transcnpt could 
have been placed in evidence during the Herricks' rebuttal case following the Leuzingers' 
completion of their case In chieL We find no error in exclusion of the transcript in this case, 
however, because the Herricks attempted neither of these alternatives, Instead, the Herricks' only 
offer of the deposition transcrlpt'°was mad ii' the -day'° after Munger's testimony had beer completed 
and while the Leuz,ngers were still in the midst of presenting their case in chief. The Herricks were 
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JURY lNSTRUCT!ON AND SPEClAL VERDICT 
The Herricks claim that the d1stnct court committed error in giving Jury 111struct1on number fifteen. 
which stated: 
"You are instructed that when used in these instructions the terms 'plaintiff's 
predecessors in interest' and 'Millie's successors in interest' refer to and mean 1. Tne 
personal representative bank, acting through its representatives who were involved m 
the probating of Millie's estate, including its attorney, ~l,'1;:I<; .i".1.4.1)9~.r . . " 
The Herricks contend that this instruction improperly told the Jury that attorney .c:;1.i'.r.~ .Ml!Q9..er was 
the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest. We cannot agree with the Herncks' interpretation of this 
instruction. It does not indicate that Munger himself should be considered the Herricks' 
predecessor in interest but that the bank, which was the personal representative of Mildred's 
estate, was a predecessor in interest. Munger is identified in the instruction only as a 
representative who acted for tne bank. Therefore, we find no error in the instruction. 
The Herricks also claim tnat there was an error in the special verdict forno presented to the Jury. 
We decline to resolve this issue due to the Herricks' failure to obJeCt to the special verdict form on 
the [30SJ record. Fa,!ure to ObJect to the verdict form ,n the trial court constitutes a waiver of 
the issue. Garrett v. Nobles. 1 02 Idaho 369. 374 630 P 2d 656 661 {1981}: ~
international Harvester Co. 95 Idaho 881. 890 522 P.2d 1102 1111 /1974 }. 
V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION BASED ON STATUTE OF LlMITATJON 
The Leuzingers cross-appeal from the denial of their motion for summary Judgment. in which they 
asserted that the Herricks' claims were barred by the statute of limitation, LC.§ 5-218{4). The 
district court denied the motion, concluding that there' existed genuine issues of fact material to 
this defense which required resolution by the jury. On appeal, the Leuzingers contend that even if 
there were errors in the trial that invalidate the jury verdict, they are nonetheless entitled to 
Judgment based upon their statute of limitation defense. 
We conclude that the order denying summary Judgment is non-reviewable. l:l!!ifl.+ The denial of a 
motion for summary Judgment 1s ordinarily both non·appealable and nor,-rev1ewable. Watson v. 
Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals inc. 1111daho 44, 46 720 P.2d 632 614 r1986); ~
Keeler 124 )daho 407 410 860 P.2d 23. 26 /Ct. App. 1993); Evans v, Jensen, 103 Idaho 937 
655 P.2d 454 /Ct. App. 1982). The rationale for this rule is that, once all the evidence has been 
presented at trial, the final judgment ,n a case should be tested upon tne record made at tnal, not 
the less complete record existing when summary judgment was denied. Evans 103 Idaho at 942 
655 P 2d at 459. ln Evans we stated: 
This will prevent a litigant who loses a case, after a full and fair trial, from having an 
appellate court go back to the time when the litigant had moved for summary 
Judgment to view the relative strengths and weaknesses of the litigants at that earlier 
stage. Were we to hold otherwise, one who had sustained his position after a fair 
hearing of the whole case might nevertheless lose, because he had failed to prove h,s 
case fully on an interlocutory motion. 
Id. The Leuzingers ask this Court to do precisely what this discussion in Evans re;ected. We 
dechne their request to review the demal of summary Judgment after a complete trial has 
occurred. 
Nor can we consider the ,ssue as part of our review of the trial proceedings. At the conclusion of 
trial, the jury was presented with a special verdict form containing seven interrogatories. Question 
number four asked the jury to resolve the statute of limitation issue. Question number one, 
however, instructed that if the jury responded to question number one in favor of the Leuzingers, 
it should proceed no further but sign the verdict form and return it to the court. Upon resolving 
this first question 1n the i.euzmgers' favor, the Jury did as instructed and proceeded no further, 
leaving unresolved any factual issues regarding the applicability of the statute of limitation. 
Therefore, we have no jury verdict on this defense to review. 
The Leuzingers did not request a ruling from the court on this defense by a motion for directed 
verdict before submitting the case to the jury or by any post-trial motion. The Leuzingers 
essentially request that this Court enter a directed verdict in their favor. We, however, will not rule 
on a matter that was not presented to the trial court. See Sun Vallev Shoppmq Center v. Ioaho 
Power Co., 119 ldaho 87 93. 803 P.2d 993 999 (1991}: Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33,644 
P 2d 355 !1982}; Johnson Equipment Inc v Nielson 108 Idaho 867 870, 702 P.2d 905 908 
/Ct. App. 1985). Thus, we conclude that the Leuzingers have presented no reviewable verdict or 
order regarding the statute of limitation defense for our consideration on appeal. Because we are 
remanding this case due to erroneous evidentiary rulings, the opportunity remains for the 
Leuzingers to further pursue the statute of limitation defense m the trial court. 
VJ. ATTORNEY FEES 
Finally, the Leuzmgers cross-appeal from the denial of their request for attorney fees on their 
counterclaim for intetierence with their lease agreement. They contend they are entitled to 
attorney fees under~· LC. § 12-120(3), [306] which provicies that the prevailing party in 
a lawsuit ansing from a commercial transaction is entitled to the award of a reasonable attorney 
fee. · 
The term "commercial transaction" is"defihed-by·the statute to mean "all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes." LC.§ 12-120(3). 
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transactmn" under I.C § 12·120(3i in Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson 125 Idaho 270, 
275 869 P.2d 1365 1370 ( "l94). 
The lease in question allowed Jud, and Doyle Leuzmger to utilize the Broken Wing Ranch for the 
purpose of operating a commercial cattle ranch. They did not maintain a home on the ranch 
property. Therefore, the lease was a commercial transaction, and the Leuz,ngers were entitled to 
reasonable attorney's fees. Upon remand the district court shall award to the Leuzingers the 
reasonable amount of fees incurred for that portion of this case relating to alleged breaches of the 
lease. 
The Leuzingers also requested attorney fees with respect to the remaining claims that were tried 
in October 1993. We need not address this request because we have determined that the verdict 
and judgment from that trial must be vacated. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In summary, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied·the Henricks' motion for a directed 
verdict, and we decline to review the trial court's denial of the Leuzingers' motion for summary 
Judgment. We find there was no error ,n the Jury mstruct,ons. We also conclude, however, tnat the 
Herricks were pre3udiced by the erroneous exclusion of admissible evidence. We therefore remand 
this case to the d1stnct court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Because each party has prevailed in part, no costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal. 
Chief Judge WA~T.E.!l.$ and Judge P.~[(.RY CONCUR. 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
RE: AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
/} 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, ROBERT ARON KANTOR, by and through his attorney of 
record, Scot M. Ludwig of Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP, Boise, Idaho and hereby submits 
this Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Re; Amended 
Counterclaim. 
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Plaintiff (Robert) is asking this Court to dismiss a portion of Defendant's (Sondra) Amended 
Counterclaim pursuant to Idaho Rule Procedure Specifically, Robert did not breach 
the parties' Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) by engaging in real estate work outside ofRokan 
Ventures because Rokan Ventures, through its Manager Michael Page, made it clear that Rokan 
Ventures would not create new ventures/syndications or do any new projects with Rokan Partners 
and Rokan Ventures bought out Rokan Partners' interest in Rokan Ventures. Second, Sondra can 
demonstrate no damages related to Robert engaging in real estate work outside of Rokan Ventures. 
Third, the provision requiring Robert to do real estate work through Rokan Ventures is a covenant 
not to compete and it is void because it lacks a time limitation and a geographic limitation and as 
such it is an improper restraint upon Robert's ability to earn a living. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Paragraph 16 of the PSA states: 
"16.01 Rokan Partners owns 25% ofRokan Ventures. 
16.02 Any new commercial real estate syndications or other commercial real estate activities 
that Robert intends to do, or does, become involved in shall be done in Rokan Ventures provided 
that any activity that Rokan Ventures declines shall not be done in Rokan Ventures. 
16.03 To the extent agreed upon with other members ofRokan Ventures, Robert may receive 
a salary or guaranteed payment from Rokan Ventures. Any salary or guaranteed payment in excess 
of $60,000.00 paid or payable to Robert by Rokan Ventures shall be paid to Rokan Partners and 
become an asset of Rokan Partners."1 
1Property Settlement Agreement, ,i 16. 
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Sondra has made the following allegations regarding paragraph 16 of the PSA in her 
"33. When the PSA was entered into, Rokan Partners was the principal entity by which 
Counterclaimant would realize any benefit from her community interest in the parties' business 
activities during their marriage through her 44% ownership in Rokan Partners. 
34. When the PSA was entered into, Rokan Partners owned 25% of another entity called 
Rokan Ventures. 
35. The PSA required of Counterdefendant that '[a]ny new commercial real estate 
syndications or other commercial real estate activities that Robert intends to, or does, become 
involved in shall be done in Rokan Ventures'(ifl6.02). 
36. The above requirement gave Counterclaimant an interest in Counterdefendant's 
ongoing commercial real estate activities through her interest in Rokan Partners. 
37. On or about January 1, 2013, Counterdefendant caused Rokan Partner's interest in 
Rokan Ventures to be sold for $41,675.48 in cash, along with other consideration. 
38. Counterdefendant continues to pursue commercial real estate activities for 
compensation, but together with the sale of Rokan Partner's interest in Rokan Ventures, he does so 
in such a way as to defeat the purposes of paragraph 16.02 of the PSA. Counterdefendant's conduct 
includes, but is not limited to characterizing his ongoing commercial real estate activities as personal 
consulting, for which Rokan Partners receives no benefit. 
39. Counterdefendant's conduct constitutes a breach of the PSA and/or a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
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40. a direct and proximate result of Counterdefendant's breaches, Counterclaimant 
is damaged in amounts to be proven at trial."2 
On October 29, 2012, Rokan Ventures, through its manager Michael Page informed Rokan 
Partners that it would no longer do business with Rokan Partners.3 In a letter to Robert from Mr. 
Page dated October 29, 2012, Mr. Page stated in clear and unambiguous terms that Rokan Ventures 
would not create new ventures/syndications in partnership with Rokan Partners.4 Mr. Page gave 
Robert two options, one was that Rokan Ventures would buy Rokan Partners' interest in the 
company, the second option was that Rokan Ventures would be dissolved. 5 On November 26, 2012, 
and pursuant to paragraph 2.13 of the PSA, Robert gave Sondra notice of the sale of Rokan Partners' 
interest in Rokan Ventures. 6 Robert explained to Sondra and her attorney why the sale of Rokan 
Partners' interest was necessary and how the sale was beneficial to the owners of Rokan Partners 
compared to a liquidation of Rokan Ventures. 7 Sondra took no action regarding the proposed sale 
until she filed a motion for TRO on March 5, 2013. This Court did not enter a TRO regarding the 
sale of Rokan Partners' interest in Rokan Ventures. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
2 Amended Counterclaim, Count One, 1 33-40. 
3A.ffidavit of Michael Page filed on March 7, 2013. 
4Affidavit of Michael Page, Exhibit B to Page Affidavit. 
5Id. 
6Affidavit of Robert Kantor filed on March 7, 2013, Exhibit B to Kantor Affidavit. 
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In a summary judgment proceeding the Court must construe all disputed facts in favor of the 
non-moving must draw reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record 
in favor of the party opposing the motion. Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 280 P.3d 176, 179 
(2012). However, summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LR.C.P. 56(c). 
The elements for breach of contract are the existence of a contract, the breach of the contract, 
the breach caused damages, and the amount of the damages. Mosel! Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & 
Co., 2013 Ida. LEXIS 51 (2013). 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises regarding terms agreed to by the parties, 
and requires that the parties perform, in good faith, the obligations imposed by their agreement. 
Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 137 P.3d 409,413 (2006). 
The covenant does not override an express provision in the contract. Independence Lead Mines Co .. 
supra, 143 Idaho at 26. The determination of whether the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
has been breached is an objective determination of whether the parties have acted in good faith in 
terms of enforcing the contractual provisions. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 
881, 891-892, 243 P.3d 1069, 1079-1080 (2010). 
Covenants not to compete are valid when they are reasonable as applied to the covenantor, 
the covenantee, and the general public. A non-compete covenant must be reasonably limited as to 
time, scope, and territorial extent. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524,527 - 528, 181 P.3d 450, 
453 - 454 (2008). If the covenant is not reasonably limited as to time, scope and territorial extent 
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covenant is void and unenforceable. Id. 
ARGUMENT 
Sondra's cause of action relating to Robert's real estate activities rely totally upon paragraph 
16 of the PSA. Sondra's pleadings admit that her only interest in having Robert perform deals 
through Rokan Ventures was because of her ownership interest in Rokan Partners. At the time the 
parties executed the PSA Rokan Partners had a 25% ownership interest in Rokan Ventures. It is 
undisputed that Rokan Partners now has no ownership interest in Rokan Ventures. Therefore, 
Sondra has no financial stake in whether Robert engages in real estate activities with Rokan Ventures 
or if he engages in real estate activities outside ofRokan Ventures. It does not effect her financially 
either way. 
There is also no dispute that Rokan Ventures was not going to do any more deals with Rokan 
Partners. Rokan Partners had two choices, either sell its interest to Rokan Ventures or obtain 
share of the liquidation proceeds after Rokan Ventures was dissolved. Robert informed Sondra 
the choices and offered his opinion that selling Rokan Partners' interest in Rokan Ventures made the 
most financial sense to the owners ofRokan Partners. Sondra did nothing in response to Robert's 
notice until March of 2013 when she filed her TRO Motion. By that time the sale of Rokan Partners 
interest had occurred. 8 Sondra has no evidence to support a claim that the sale of Rokan Partners 
interest was orchestrated by Robert to defeat the provisions of paragraph 16.02. She also has no 
evidence to support a claim that the sale was not in Rokan Partners best interest compared to Rokan 
Ventures being dissolved. 
8Affidavit of Michael Page filed March 7, 2013. 
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These undisputed facts show that Robert is no longer bound the PSA to perform real estate 
through Rokan Ventures because Rokan Partners no longer an ownership interest in Rokan 
Ventures and Sondra has no interest in Rokan Ventures. By her ovvn admission her only tie to 
Rokan Ventures was through Rokan Partners. Robert has not breached the PSA relating to paragraph 
16. Sondra has offered, and cannot offer, any admissible evidence to show that the sale ofRokan 
Partners' interest in Rokan Ventures was inappropriate or done with an intent to circumvent the 
provisions of paragraph 16. There simply is nothing to support a claim that Robert did not act in 
good faith and fair dealing when the decision was made to sell Rokan Partners' interest in Rokan 
Ventures. 
Sondra can show no damages related to Robert's real estate work. She admits in her 
pleadings that her only financial interest was that if the deals were done through Rokan Ventures that 
improved the financial position of Rokan Partners. Now that Rokan Partners is not an O\\'Iler of 
Rokan Ventures, Sondra is not damaged by Robert obtaining real estate work outside of Rokan 
Ventures. 
The provision of the PSA that Sondra is relying upon is a restraint upon Robert's ability to 
earn a living. It essentially is a covenant not to compete. Paragraph 16.2 of the PSA requires Robert 
to perform all real estate activities through Rokan Ventures. The covenant not to perform real estate 
work outside ofRokan Ventures has no time limitation and no geographic limitation and therefore 
it is unenforceable and void. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, supra. Sondra cannot bring a cause of action 
against Robert based on paragraph I 6.2 of the PSA because the covenant not to compete is 
unenforceable and void. 
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CONCLUSION 
should enter Judgment on behalf of Robert related to Sondra's claims related to 
paragraph 16.2 of the PSA for three reasons: l) Rokan Ventures refused to do any work related with 
Rokan Partners and Sondra can make no showing that Robert acted in bad faith when Rokan 
Ventures acquired Rokan Partners interest; 2) Sondra has no interest in Rokan Ventures now that 
Rokan Partners is no longer an owner and as such she is not damaged in any way by Robert engaging 
in real estate activities outside ofRokan Ventures; and 3) the provision of the PSA that Sondra bases 
her claim upon is in essence a covenant not to compete. This covenant not to compete is not limited 
in its duration or geographic area and as such it is unenforceable and void. 
DATED this~ of October, 2013. 
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i JoLynn Drage, Clerk District L..9:!:!rt Blaine Coun Maha 
IN 11iE DIS1RICT COURT OF THE FlFTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
IBE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2012-734 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
RECORDING OF QtJITCLAIM 
DEED 
C0l\1ES NOW the Plaintiff; ROBERT ARON KANTOR, by and through his attorneys, Scot 
M. Ludwig and Daniel A. Miller of Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP, and hereby moves this 
Court to enter its Order compelling the Defendant to record or allowing Plaintiff to record the Quitclaim 
Deed executed by Defendant in favor of Plaintiff. 
This Motion is made and based upon Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65( e ), the documents on 
file herein and the Affidavit of Robert Aron Kantor in Support of Motion to Compel filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
Oral argument is requested on this Motion. 
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DATED~y October,2013. 
LER • JOHNSON LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE · 
I hereby certify that on this if ..n..day of October, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy, of the 
foregoing document to be served u~e following as indicated: 
Daniel E. Williams 
Thomas, Williams & Park LLP 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Scot 
U.S. Mail 
_ Hand Delivery 
_ Overnight Courier 
-4acsimile Transmission 
/(208) 345-7897 
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FI LED A.M____,..,.,, 
OCT O 9 2013 
SCOT M. LUDWIG 
DA.NJ.EL A. MlLL.ER 
JoLynn Drage. Cieri( District 
Court Bialne Coun . Maho 
LUDWIG+ SliOUFLER + MILLER • JOHNSON, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
209 West Main Street 
Bois·e, JD 83702 
Telephone: 208-387-0400 
Facsimile: 208-3 87 -1999 
ISB 3506 
ISB 357J. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TJ:-tE FIFTH JUDlClAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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AF.FlDAVIT OF 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
COMPEL RECORO.lNG OF 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, bejng first duly swom upon oatb, deposes and says; 
J. 1 am the Plaintiff in the above entitl.ccf action and 1 make this affidavit ba.11ed upon my 
own persona!. knowledge a11d belief. 
2. On September 12, 2013, J was present at a hearing Ol\ my Motion for a prelitni11ru-y 
ir:i,illl'lttion asking the Court for !ill order prollibiti.ng Sondra Kantor from contacti11g the Bank of 
America which was being heard in conjunction with tbe- Defonda11t's Motion for a Preliminacy 
AFFIDA VlT OF ROBERT ARON KANTOR lN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL 
RECORDING OF QUITCLAIM DEED~ I 
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lnjunctioft a.'lk.i.ng that 1 be rcqu.u-ed to abandon my efforts for a loan. tfiodi.fication. and to be ordc.red 
to proceed with a short sale r:egarding my residence at 265 Golden Eagle Dr, Hailey Idaho ("hom.c"). 
Duri o.g that hearing, Sondra achoitted that paragraph 28 stated that "Sondl'a shall co~operate fo au.y 
manner needed to conclude such refinancing nftcr review of the ro:financing docttments and tcnns 
by her attorney." 
3. The hearing concluded after Sondra's te~timony with n stipulatio11 that l was not 
going to have to pursue a short sale, but ratJ1er wa:. going to proceed with my efforts to obtain a loan 
pri..ncipal reducti.on under the Depanment of Justice Settlement Prograin with the Bank of Amcr.i.ca 
or ather .1.oan modification program with the Bauk of America. 
4. Duri.ng the pei-lod from September l2, 2013, uutil the present day (berci11after 
''period") I have diligently been pursu.i.ng a loan modification and par.ttcipatio11 in tbc Department 
of Justice Settlement (hereinafter "SettJement"). 
5. Bank of Arnerioa bas required only a recorded. Quitclaim Deed from Sondra. to 
complete their loan modification review. Through counse.l and directly, I at all times infonned 
Sondra Kantor imd her boyfriend/advi5or Al Weter of the require1nent that a Quitclaim Deed of 
Sondra's in.terost .i.11 the Hotne to me was a .requirement for further an.cl finol collsidcratton by the 
Bnnk of America for inclu~ion in the Program. 
6. r was able to record a convemiation with myself aud Veronica Tovar r,f .Bank of 
America and during that conversation Ms. Tova,: co1lfmm,d tbat the Quitclaim Deed from Son.dra 
to me must be recorded or we would be relea8cd from comdde.ration. Sondra co.ntinues to refuse to 
rnyrequest to record a Quitclaim Deed de::ipitc assurance her ioto.1:cst will be protected contractually. 
7. There is st.it.I a possibility that Bank of Amerioo. will allow a m.odificatiou if the 
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Quitclaim Deed is reco.rdod but the o:fficial dea.dJine has passed and each passing doy rntt.kes it morlil 
un.like1y that the modification wHl occut because of the lack of a recorded Quitclaim Deed. I have 
hope that the Bauk wm still consider tbe modification because of the relatiom1hip I have developed 
with the Bank over the past several months. 
8. I am requesting that the Court order De.f:e:ode11t to record a. Quitclatm Deed on the 
Goldc1l Eagle .real property 10 me, or in tbe alternative give me authorizntioti 1:0 record th.c Deed. 
Regardless of the recorded Deed, l should be deem.eel as holding Sondt"'a's 50% interest io the Golden 
Eagle real property fo. ttust for her until th.is matter is re:iolved. 
DAT.ED This _j_ day of October, 20l3. ~ 
-~~) ROBERT ARON KANTOR v----
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO bcfor . c U1isq__ day of October, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I h·ereby certify tbnt on this t#tiay of Oetoberi 2013, 1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be serve upon t.be following as indicated: 
Daniel E. Willhuns 
Tboinas, William~ & Park LLP 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise; Idaho 83701 
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SCOT M. LUDWIG 
DANIEL A. MILLER 
LUDWIG. SHOUFLER • .V.U.L-"A.J..._,,H_. JOHNSON, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
209 West Main Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: 208-387-0400 
Facsimile: 208-387-1999 
ISB 3506 
ISB 3571 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2012-734 
ORDER 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the 12th day of September, 2013, on Cross 
Motions for Preliminary Injunction, with both parties being present with their respective attorneys 
of record, Scot M. Ludwig of Ludwig Shoufler Miller Johnson, LLP for Plaintiff and Daniel E. 
Williams of Thomas, Williams & Park, LLP for Defendant. 
During the presentation of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the parties reached 
ORDER- I 
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Stipulation that was placed on the record and which is incorporated into this Order as follows: 
Both Motions for Preliminary Injunction are withdrawn and shall not be filed again 
through the date of Trial; 
2. Both parties shall pay their own costs and attorney fees in the Cross Motions for 
Preliminary Injunction; 
3. Defendant, or her representatives, shall not contact Bank of America regarding the 
Golden Eagle debt until the time of Trial. Further, Defendant shall not pursue a Short Sale of the 
Golden Eagle real property until the time of Trial; and 
4. Plaintiff shall provide Defendant's attorney any correspondence and recordings he 
receives from Bank of America. In the event a telephone conference between Plaintiff and Bank of 
America occurs and there is no recording, Plaintiff shall send a summary of the content of said call. 
Plaintiff shall also deliver to Defendant's attorney any recording or correspondence he has had with 
Bank of America from August I, 2013 to present upon entry hereof. 
DATEDthis /~dayof 6~ ,2013. 
JUDGE ROBERT. 
ORDER-2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _1:t day of a~ , 2013, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated: 
Scot M. Ludwig 
LUDWIG + SHOUFLER + MILLER 
+ JOHNSON, LLP 
209 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Daniel E. Williams 
Thomas, Williams & Park LLP 
P.O. Box 1776 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
ORDER-3 
_ P(J.s. Mail 
_ Hand Delivery 
_Overnight Courier 
Facsimile Transmission 
(208)387-1999 
_0r.s. Mail 
_ Hand Delivery 
_ Overnight Courier 
Facsimile Transmission 
(208)345-7894 
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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DENNIS P. WILKINSON, ESQ. 
Idaho State Bar #6023 
F.iLEO-~-M.lP:~ :, 
r M~l 
NW r·~ 
~lynn Drage, Cieri< District 
·-·· ·-omt f3l~<!unty, Idaho 
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & ANDERSON, PLLC 
3480 Merlin Drive 
P.O. Box 50160 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone: (208) 525-8792 
Facsimile: (208) 525-5266 
Attorney for Defendant, Sondra Kantor. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2012-734 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
RECORDING OF QUITCLAIM 
DEED 
COMES NOW, Defendant/Counterclaimant, ("Sondra") by and through her attorneys of 
record, the law finn of Thompson, Smith, Woolf & Anderson, and hereby submits this 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Recording of Quitclaim Deed filed by the 
Plaintiff. This Objection is supported by the Affidavit of Sondra Kantor submitted herewith. 
AJW:UMENT 
The Counterdefendant brings the instant motion based on Rule 65(e), seeking injunctive 
relief. As the Court is aware an injunction is only granted in extreme cases where the right is 
very clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal. Harris v. Cassia 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO COMPEL RECORDING OF QU1TCLAIM DEED - 1 
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County, 106 Idaho 681 P.2d 988 (1984). Based on the pleading submitted by the 
Counterdefendant it is difficult to discern what the statutory basis is of the request and more 
importantly there is no apparent allegation that failure to grant the relief will result in irreparable 
harm. 
The Property Settlement Agreement {''PSA") entered into between the parties deals with 
the home at issue.1 Paragraph 5.01 of the PSA mandates that the home be sold as reasonably 
possible. 2 The PSA allows the Counterdefendant to stay in the home pending disposition of the 
real property. 3 
It is important to note that the home is encumbered with a significant mortgage for which 
both parties are obligated.4 According to his Affidavit the Counterdefendant claims that he has 
been working with Bank of America to effectuate a loan modification. He cites this as his 
rationale, that Sondra has an obligation to sign a quitclaim deed paragraph 28 of the PSA. 
Paragraph 28 states the following: 
In the event Robert shall obtain refinancing of any debts for which Sondra has 
liabUity, Sondra shall eo-ope.-ate in any manner needed to conclude such 
refinancing after review of the :refinancing documents and terms by her attorney 
and/ol" accountant. 5 
As a starting point, there is no evidence in the record that the Counterdefendant has in fact 
successfully obtained refinancing which would be a condition precedent to Sondra's obligation 
to execute any documents. Additionally, the tenn "refinancing" above indicates that it would be 
a mechanism for removing Sondra's name from the liability. It appears that this loan 
modification would not be a true refinance, rather it would simply change terms associated with 
1 Affidavit of Sondra Kantor at Bxlubit A 
2 Id. at paragraph 5. 
3 Id. 
4 Affidavit of Sondra Kantor at paragraph 18. 
5 Affidavit of Sondra Kantor at Edtlbit A paragraph 28. 
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the present obligation but would not release Sondra from mortgage liability. 
The Counterdefendant is asking the Court to force Sondra to quitclaim any interest she 
has in the home and give it to the Counterdefendant. He then is the owner of the home, left to 
enjoy the benefit of the modified loan and is free to transfer title at will. She would be left with 
no interest but a continued obligation to pay a mortgage for a home she doesn't own or occupy. 
The motion/request provides no scheme which would protect Sondra's interests in the home after 
executing a quitclaim. 
Forcing the execution of a quitclaim deed would likely result in irreparable hann to the 
Defendant. The additional problem associated with the Counterdefendant's basis for the request 
is that paragraph 28 of the PSA requires that there be full disclosure of the terms and a "review 
of the refinancing documents." No refinancing documents have been provided giving Sondra the 
ability to carefuliy scrutinize the proposed agreement. Clearly, the obligation to provide such 
documents is a condition precedent to any obligation Sondra would have to execute any 
documents. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons the Counterclaimant request should be denied. 
DATED this-;>+-day of October, 2013. 
THOMPSON, SMITH, WOOLF & 
ANDERSON 
By: 
nenn=is::-:P;:;-.~ffit ~n~n?~::::::::::::::,,,,-..,o;;;:;;:::r-
Attomey for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
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OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
P. 005/005 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below I at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by facsimile to them a true and correct copy of 
said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this J l day of October, 2013. 
Scot M. Ludwig~ Esq. 
LUDWIG SHOUFLER 
209 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Facsimile: (208) 387-1999 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
D Mailed D Hand Delivered \Faxed 
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DENNIS P. WILKJNSON, ESQ. 
Idaho State Bar #6023 
The Law Offices of 
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF 
& ANDERSON, PLLC 
3480 Merlin Drive 
P.O. Box50160 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone: (208) 525"8792 
Facsimile: (208) 525-5266 
Attorney for Defeudant1 Sondra Kantor. 
FILED~·~--
NOV O 1 2013 
JoLynn Drage. Clerk D1stncl. 
Courl Blaine Coun , Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF ARIZONA 
County of el ffi 12\, 
) 
: ss. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No, CV-2012-734 
AFFIDAVIT OF SONDRA KANTOR 
JN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND IN 
OBJECTION TO MOTION 
TO COMPEL RECORDING 
OF QUITCLAIM DEED 
SONDRA KANTOR, having first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I 1nake this affidavit of my own personal knowledge of the facts contained 
herein. 
2. That I am the Defendant/Countei·claimant in the above entitled action. 
APPIDAVlT OF SONDRA KANTOR. IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PAR.Tl AL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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on or Apl'il I entered 
("PSA'1 (Attached hereto as Exhibit A) with the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Robelt Kantor to 
settle divorce litigation between us in Blaine County Case No. CV-1 t-525. 
4. As set out in the terms of the Agreement under paragraph 2, I have a 44% interest 
in Rokan Partners. 
5. The Counterdefendant and I were represented by coUMel when we entered into 
thePSA. 
6. As part of the PSA the Countetde:fendant and I agreed that he would continue to 
conduct his real estate business th1·ough Rokan Ventures. This tern1 is contained in paragraph 
16.02 of tho PSA 
7. The purpose of that specific tru.'ln in the Agreement was that I, as a 44% owner of 
Rokan Partners, would receive income/compensation as a result of the Counterclaimants promise 
to conduct his business through Rokan Ventua-es. This provision was intended to provide me 
with a stream of income after the divorce. 
8. This was an essential te1m and was critical in my executing and agreeing to the 
tel'ms of the PSA. 
9. On or about November 26, 2012, I received an email from the Counte1:defendant 
providing me with notice that he was going to sen the interest that Rokan Pa1tne1·s had in Rokan 
Ventures. Attached hereto as Exhibit f(B" is a copy of that email/notice. 
10, The initial notice did not provide me with the details of the sale. I received no 
notice as to the actual details until the first week of Fcbt'UE.try, 2013. 
11. The sale of Rokan Ventures by Roka.n Partners significantly impacts what I 
expected to t'eceive under the PSA. With the sale ofRokan Ventures I cannot realize the benefit 
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bargain that I entered it,to with the Counterdefendruit. 
12. The sale occurred on Febntary 26, 2013. Priot to that date I was not provided 
with a closing statement ot final sale documents to review in connection with the sale. Attached 
hereto as Exhibit "C., is a copy of the Sate Agreement. 
13. The Counterdefendant and the majority owne1· of Rokan Ventures, Michael Page, 
are close personal ftiends and have been business partners for at least the past five (5) years. The 
transaction at 1ssue was not "an arm's length,, transaction. 
14. The Counterdefendant continues to work with and provide services to Rokan 
Ventures and the Counte1·defendant and Michael Page continue to share the same office suite. 
15. I am aware of and have reviewed the Counterdefendant1s Motion to Compel 
Recording of Quitclaim Deed. 
16. It is my unde1-standi11g that the Countel'defendant is seeking a loan modification 
and not a refinance. 
17. I have not been provided with any refhuu1ce documents to review pm·suant to 
paragt."aph 28 of the PSA. 
18. Although I have not had the opportunity to review any documents, it is my 
understanding that I would remajn liable for the mortgage loan. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3 / day of October, 2013. (U-~-
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Notary Public for Arizona 
Commission Expires: (M ;J::J, JO/(,, 
® 'IIICKI INTIIEl<IN Nolarf Publlo • Arkonl PlmlCo1111t, My Comm. ... Feb 22, 201& 
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CERllFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a licensed attorney in Idaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, and that on the .3J_ day of Octoberi 2013. I served a true and com~ct copy of the 
AFFIDAVIT OF SONDRA KANTOR IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OBJECTION TO MOTION TO COMPEL 
RECORDING OF QUITCLAIM DEED on the parties listed below, by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon. 
Scot M. Ludwig. Esq. 
LUDWIG SHOUFLER 
209 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Facslmfle: (208) 387-1999 
0 Mailed O Hand Delivered \ Faxed 
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PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this 241h day of April, 2012, by and 
between Sondra Kantor, hereinafter referred to as "Sondra, 11 and Robert Kantor, hereinafter 
:referred to as "Robert." 
1. RECITALS; This Agreement is made with reference to the following facts: 
1.01 The partfos hereto were married on the 8th day of June, 1968, in Houston, 
Texas, and ever since have been and still are Husband and Wife. 
1.02 The parties have three adult children. 
1.03 Unhappy differences have arisen between Robert and Sondra, as a result 
of which they have agreed to separate and enter into this Agreement. 
2. ROKAN PARTNERS: The parties own an interest in Rokan Partners, an Idaho 
limited partnership. The parties agree that the ownership in Rokan Partners shall be as follows: 
• Rokan Corporation, a Delaware corporation: 6% 
• Robert: 44% 
• Sondra: 44% 
• Geoffrey F. Kantor: 2% 
• Aron B. Kantor: 2% 
• Joshua M. Kantor: 2% 
2.01 Rokan Corporation is the sole general partner of Rokan Partners. 
2.02 Robert is the president ofRokan Corporation. 
2.03 AU stock in Rokan Corporation is owned by Century Trust (in a trust 
agreement dated January 1, 2006). 
2.04 Rokan Partners owns an interest in PK Ventures LLC reflected in the 
operating agreement dated January l, 2012. 
PROPERTY SE'ITLEMENT AGREEMENT, P. 1 
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2.05 Roka.n Partners shall own any interest in all of the entities attached in the 
described Property and Debt Schedule (hereinafter "PDS") where the remarks have the 
initials RP. 
2.06 It is the intent and the agreement of the parties that except as specifically 
provided herein. all interest in alt other real estate including but not limited. to 
syndications where the parties have direct or indirect ownership interest shall be assigned 
to Rokan Partners. 
2.07 Robert and Sondra shall not sell, transfer, encumber, or in any way convey 
their interest in Rokan Partners unless both parties agree to the sale or conveyance. 
2.08 The parties shall make such changes to the Rokan Partners agreement 
necessary to ensure that no members can be admitted to Rokan Partners without the 
written consent of both Robert and Sondra during their lives. 
2.09 Other than ordinary and necessary expenses in connection with the assets 
of Rokan Partners, neither Robert nor Sondra shall receive directly or indirectly any 
compensation from Rokan Partners other than as stated in this agreement. Further, 
Robert and Sondra shall ensure that all documents reflect the fact that other than as stated 
in this Agreement, no one else shall directly or indirectly receive any payments from 
Rokan Partners. Robert may, under this Agreement, employ and pay such maintenance 
personnel and attorneys, accountants and bookkeepers as he deems necessary for 
operations of Rokan Partners. It is specifically provided that except as provided herein, 
no one shall employed by Rokan Partners without the written consent of Sondra, which 
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, P, 2 
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2.10 Ayako has prepared and shall continue to prepare the books and records 
and tax returns for Rokan Partners. Ayako shall continue to receive reasonable 
compensation for performing the services that have been performed in the past. A 
replacement for Ayako shall be a person agreed upon by Robert and Sondra. 
2.11 The management of Rokan Partners is by Rokan Corporation. Robert is 
the president of Rokan Corporation and is thus managing Rokan Partners. There shall be 
no other person or entity managing Rokan Partners without the written consent of Sondra 
and Robert. 
2.12 Except for what is reasonably necessary for operations of Rokan Partners, 
Robert shall cause Rokan Partners to distribute the available cash of Rokan Partners. The 
parties acknowledge that there is a requirement for pro rata distributions to all partners. 
Notwithstanding.. Robert agrees that each month cash available to be distributed to Robert 
or Sondra shall be distributed as follows: the first $6,000 available shall be distributed to 
Sondra, the next $6,000 available shall be distributed to Robert, the next $4,000 available 
shall be distributed to Sondra, the next $4,000 available shall be distributed to Robert and 
thereafter available cash shall be distributed equally to Robert and Sondra. Provided 
further, that if in a month Sondra has received more than Robert, the next month before 
going through the priority of distribution set fo1th herein, Robert shall receive the first 
a.mount to equalize the distribution from the prior month. Further notwithstanding the 
above provisions. Robert shall use best efforts to ensure that Sondra. receives $6000 from 
Rokan Partners on the first day of each month beginning June 1, 2012. 
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2.13 Prior to sale of any asset of Rokan Partners, Robert shall provide written 
notice to Sondra, as much in advance as possible under the circumstances, including all 
details of the proposed sale. 
2.14 When Robert (whenever a reference is made to Robert the parties 
understand and agree that the reference is to Robert acting in his individual capacity, his 
capacity as president of Rokan Corporation1 or his capacity as a member or partner in any 
other entity where the parties directly or indirectly have some ownership interest) 
receives any financial reports on any of the entities, he shall forward those financial 
reports to Sondra. 
2.15 Anytime Ayako or any substitute bookkeeper prepares reports, monthly 
!edgers or general ledgers of Rokan Partners, those reports shall be forwarded to Sondra. 
2.16 The parties shall cause the first amendment and the second amendment to 
the Rokan Partners agreement to be signed. The form of the second amendment is 
attached to this Property Settlement Agreement. 
2.17 Attached hereto is a listing of known contingent liabilities. lf Robert 
believes a contingent liability should be paid, Sondra shall not unreasonably deny consent 
to Rokan Partners making a deemed distribution to Robert and Sondra to pay said 
liability. Such deemed distribution shall not be considered a distribution for purposes of 
the distributions pursuant to 2. J 2. 
2.18 Rokan Partners shall continue to pay the parties· son Shalom's loan for 
graduate school. 
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2.19 The parties acknowledge that the parties' son Aaron owes Rokan Partners 
$90,000. 
2.20 Coincident with the signing of this Agreement, Rokan Partners shall 
distribute $10,000 to Scot Ludwig and $10,000 to Cosho Humphrey to be applied on 
attorneys fees and cost of each party. Any remaining fees and cost shall be the obligation 
of the respective parties. 
3. PK VENTURES, LLC: 
3.01 Rokan Partners owns an interest in PK Ventures, LLC. 
3.02 Robert shall receive no compensation, directly or indirectly, from PK 
Ventures, LLC. Robert acknowledges that with regard to the operation of PK Ventures, 
LLC, he has the same fiduciary obligation to Sondra that he owes with regard to Rokan 
Partners or any other entity in which the parties have a joint ownership interest. 
4. CENTURY TRUST: 
4.01 Century Trust will receive funds through its ownership interest in Rokan 
Corporation. 
4.02 Any funds available for distribution from Century Trust to Robert (or his 
successor upon his death) shaU be distributed equally to Robert (or his successor upon his 
death) and Sondra, There are presently 2 Genworth Term Life Insurance Policies in 
effect and held by Century Trust. Policy #5, 984,615 shall be discontinued as of Robert's 
701h birthday. Policy #826603 l shall be continued, and the premiumf shall be paid by 
Century Trust, for the 10 years following Robert's 70th Birthday. 
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4.03 Funds distributed from Rokan Corporation to Century Trust, in excess of 
the amount needed for payment of the premiums on the policy set forth above, may be 
distributed quarterly in equal amounts to Robert and Sondra. These amounts shall not be 
considered in the calculations set forth in Section 2.12. 
4.04 Robert agrees that the Century Trust documents shall be amended to 
provide that the only trustees of Century Trust shall be Robert, Sondra, and their three 
children. The amendment to be signed by the parties, entitled First Amendment to the 
Century Trust, is attached hereto. Neither Robert nor Sondra shall have the power to 
make an appointment or give their interest in the Century Trust to anyone other than their 
three children. 
5. REAL PROPERTY: The parties own real property located at 265 Golden Eagle 
Drive, Hailey, Idaho. 
5.01 This real property shall be sold as soon as reasonably possible. 
5.02 Pending the sale or disposition of this real pl'operty, Robe1t shall maintain 
the property and pay all utilities provided to the property. Any capital improvements will 
be paid one half by each party. Capital improvements will only be made if agreed upon 
by both parties in writing or ordered by the court. 
5.03 Each party shall provide to the other any information either party receives 
that may be relevant to the ownership. sale, rental or other disposition of said property. 
6. US DIGITAL GAMING: AIi present or future interest of either Robert or 
Sondra in US Digital Gaming, Inc. (USDG), a Delaware corporation, shall be assigned to Rokan 
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Partners. Sondra shall be promptly provided with and informed of any available information 
received by Robert regarding USDG or our interest therein. 
1. KF.LLC: 
7.01 The parties own KF. LLC. 
7.02 Neither party shall receive directly or indirectly any compensation from 
KF, LLC except as stated herein. 
7.03 All funds available to be distributed from KF, LLC shall be divided 
equally between Robert and Sondra. 
8. KANTOR FAMILY, LLC: 
8.04 Robert and Sondra shall have an equal ownership interest in Kantor 
Family, LLC. 
8.05 Robert shall not receive directly or indirectly any compensation from 
Kantor Family, LLC. 
8.06 Any funds availe.ble to be distributed to Robert and/or Sondra from Kantor 
Family, LLC, shall be divided equally between Robert and Sondra. 
9. OTHER OWNERSHIP INTEREST: On the attached PDS under business 
interests, there are other entities in which Robert and Sondra personally own an interest. The 
parties shall each continue to own one half of the interest in the entities where there is an "X" 
under both the column entitled "To Husband" and the column entitled "To Wife". To the extent 
either party receives financial information concerning these entities, or any other entity where the 
parties have on ownership interest (such as described in paragraphs 3, 6, 7, and 8 of this 
agreement), that party shall immediately forward the information to the other parry. 
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10. HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND FURNISffiNGS AND OTHER TANGIBLE 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
10.01 On the attached PDS, commencing at ltern 119 is a listing of tangible 
personal property. 
10.02 Robert is awarded the items under the column entitled "To Husband" as 
indicated with an "X" or a dollar amount. 
10.03 Sondra is awarded the items under the column entitled "To Wife" as 
indicated with an "X" or a dollar amount. 
10.04 Where there is an item that does not include an allocation to Robert or 
Sondra, that item shall be sold in a manner agreed to by the parties in writing. The first 
$35, i 56 of proceeds shall go to Sondra. The proceeds in excess of $35,156 shall be 
divided equally between Robert and Sondra. In the event the items do not produce at 
least $35,156, Robert shall immediately pay to Sondra one half of the difference between 
the proceeds received and $35,156. For example, if the proceeds are only $30,156, 
Robert shall immediately pay to Sondra the sum of $2,500. 
10.05 Prior to a sale, either party may elect to take an item of personal property 
to be sold at a value agreed upon by the parties in writing. 
10.06 Jf an item of property is not listed on the attached POS the parties shall 
either agree to a value and allocation or sell the item in the manner described in this 
paragraph lO. 
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2011. 
11. EX~LUSIVE RESORTS; 
11.01 The parties have an ownership interest in Exclusive Resorts (held in the 
names of their children). 
11.02 Sondra shall be given the password to Ex.elusive Resorts. 
11.03 Robert shall use best efforts to sell Exclusive Resorts. Any net proceeds 
shall be paid one half to Robert and one half to Sondra. Jf Robert has a buyer for 
Exclusive Resorts, Sondra shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the sale. 
12. 2011 TAX RETUR.'NS: The parties shall file married filing joint tax returns for 
13. MEADOWS STORE ROOM: Sondra shall be given a key to and be allowed to 
use the Meadows store room. To the extent the parties have any property in the Meadows store 
room that is not listed on the attached PDS, those items shall be equally divided between Robert 
and Sondra. 
14. VALLEY CLUB MEMBERSHIP: The Valley Club membership owned by 
Robert and Sondra is up for sale. Upon sale, the parties shall each receive one half of the net 
proceeds Pending the sale. Robert shall be obligated to make the required minimum payments 
and any payment for his use of said membership. 
1S. AIRLINE MILES: The parties agree that as of January l, 201 l rhe mileage or 
points balances on Robert's credit cards were as follows: 
• American Express Centurion Acct# ... 6"81004 - 610.234: 
• Delta Sky Miles Amex Acct # ... 8-3002 - l 0,800; 
• Wells Fargo VisaAcct# ... 4652-390,461 
Total: 1,011,495 points 
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As of February l, 2011, Sondra had 71,000 miles in her Delta Sky Miles Accounts. 
Robert shall transfer to Sondra one-half of the difference, which is 470,248 (1,011,495 less 
71,000 = 940,495 divided by 2 and rounded up). 
16. ROKAN VENTURES: 
16.01 Rokan Partners owns 25% ofRokan Ventures. 
16.02 Any new commercial real estate syndications or other commercial real 
estate activities that Robert intends to, or does, become involved in shall be done in 
Rokan Ventures provided that any activity that Rokan Ventures declines shall not be 
done in Rokan Ventures. 
16.03 To the extent agreed upon with the other members of Rokan Ventures, 
Robert may receive a salary or guaranteed payment from Rokan Ventures. Any salary or 
guaranteed payment in excess of $60,000 paid or payable to Robert by Rokan Ventures 
shall be paid to Rokan Partners and become an asset of Rokan Partners. 
17. PAYMENT OF DEBTS BY ROBERT: Robert shall pay the following debts: 
17.01 The debts described as Items A, B, C, E, F, and Pon the attached PDS. 
17.02 One half of the contingent liabilities including attorney fees related to the 
contingent liabilities. 
· 17.03 Any other debts incurred by him. 
18. PAYMENT OF DEBTS BV SONDRA'. Sondra shall pay the following debts: 
18.01 The debts described as Ttems D, Q, T, V and Won the attached PDS. 
18.02 One half of the contingent liabilities including attorney fees related to the 
contingent liabilities. 
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18.03 Any other debts incurred by her. 
19. JOINT DEBTS: The debt described as Item U on the attached PDS shall be paid 
from Rokan Partners. Payments on this joint debt shall be a deemed distribution to Robert and 
Sondra and such deemed distributions shall not be considered a distribution for purposes of the 
distributions pursuant to 2.12. 
20. DONOR ADVISED FUND: Robert shall make arrangements so that Sondra can 
designate $1,000 per year from Donor Advised Fund to a qualified charity. 
21. ROBERT'S AMERICAN EXPRESS CENTURION CARD: Sondra shall 
have a gold card that is associated with Robert's American Express Centurion card so long as 
Robert maintains his membership and Sondra shall be solely reasonable for any charges she 
makes. 
22. DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY: Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, 
each of the parties hereto may in any way dispose of his or her property of whatever nature, real 
or personal; and the parties hereto, each for himself and herself, respectively, and for the 
respective heirs, legal representatives, executors and administrators and assigns, hereby waives 
any right of election which he or she may have regarding the estate of the other, or any right to 
tnke against any last will and testament of the other, and hereby renounces and releases all 
interest, right or claim that he or she now has or might otherwise have against the other, under or 
by virtue of the laws of any state or country. 
23. BINDING EFFECT: All of the provisions of this Agreement shall be binding 
upon the parties hereto and their respective heirs, personal representatives and assigns. 
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24. AGREEMENT MAY BE SUBMJTIED TO COURT: The parties agree that 
this agreement shall not initially be submitted to the court but shall be kept private between the 
two parties. However, if either party believes there is a need to seek court involvement with 
regard to any provision, that party may submit this agreement to the court and upon request the 
court shall incorporate this agreement as a supplemental judgment of the court. 
25. ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS: The parties hereto agree to make, execute and 
deliver such deeds or other documents as may be requested by the other to cany out the full 
performance of this Agreement. 
26. ADVICE QF COUNSEL: The parties hereto stipulate that he or she has been 
represented by counsel and is familiar with the terms and conditions of this Agreement. 
27. SEPARATE PROPERTY/INCOME AFTER SIGNING OF AGREEMENT: 
The parties· hereto stipulate and agree that from and after the date of the signing of this 
Agreement, any and all property or income acquired or earned by either party hereto shall be the 
separate property of the party who has acquired or earned it and the other party shall have no 
claim thereon. The parties agree that any income earned by either party after the date of signing 
this Agreement shall be the separate property of the party earning the income, and any income on 
separate property shall be separate property from and after the date of signing this agreement. 
28. DEB:tS AFTER SIGNING OF AGREEMENT: The parties hereto stipulate 
and agree that from and after the date of the signing of this Agreement, any debts incurred by 
either party hereto shall be the separate debt of the party incurring the debt and shall not be a 
community debt. The parties hereto agree not to incur any debt for which the other party may be 
liable, In the event Robert shall obtain refinancing of any debts for which Sondra has liability, 
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Sondra shall co-operate l11 any manner needed to conclude such refinancing after review of the 
refinancing documents and terms by her attorney and/or accountant 
29. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS: 
.l8,0l The parti!:ls hereto both stipulate and agree that they have read and fully 
understand this Agreement . 
.28.02 The parties hereto agree that they have entered into this Agreement 
without undue influence or fraud or coercion or misrepresentation or. for any other like 
cause. 
28,03 If a.ctfon is instituted to enforce any of the terms of this Agreement, then 
the losing party agrees to p~ to the prevailing party all costs and attorneys' feev incurred 
in that action. 
28.04 Each of the partie$ hereto represents to the othct· that they have made {ull 
discloS\lre of all community assets and community Ua.bilities of which they are aware:. 
28.05 The: parti~s herci:O .stipttlato and agree that the division of community 
assets provided for in this Agrooment is fair and equitabl.e . 
.. 
P. 01 
TN WITNEi'SS WHERSOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the day 
~ . . 
V : I 
and year first al:iovt }r_itw,,,. · 
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STATEOF:::J:.~ ) 
f )ss. 
Couotyof~~ _J 
On this~ of~ • 2012, before rne, the unde~lgned notary public in and 
for said State, personally apperedS(}NDRA LOUISE KANTOR, known to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to n,e that 
slie executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have l1ereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the 
day and year first above written. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Staine ) 
On this'{Jfi_ day of~ 2012, before me, the undersigned notary public in and 
fot said State, personally appeared B,OBBR,t ARON KA'NTQR,, known to me t'o be the pel'Son 
whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument. and acknowledged to me that 
he ex.ecut~d the same. 
(N WITNESS WHEREOF, l have hereunto &et my h811d and affixed my official seal the 
day and year first above written. 
r 
~fj~ 
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CASETffLE: 
CA$E NO: 
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 
rre,11c 
II<), PROP6Rn' DESCRlf'TION 
1 REAL PROPERTY: 
2 265 Golden Eagle D1. S .. Hailey, ID 
63333-5130 
3 Mackey Cebi11 
4 INVS:SnlEN'l' PROPEl'\'TY: 
5 Helm Station. Ketchum, 10 
6 ~ Wesl~{i°LaWI&), Kotchum. ID 
1 The Meaao~"ll. l<elchum. 10 - mobile 
home park (The Meadows. LLC) 
'-s The MeadOW& (Clear Creel< -
DaveloJ)ment L11nol, Ke1chum, ID 
9! 6roactfo(d Roao (Clear creel<). 
Hafley.10 
10 The Ketchum Depot, Kelcl\um, ID 
11 E11terprlse 6usinees Pan,;, Flag~lart. 
fl:!. 
12 200 Partnars, LLC (Staples), 
, ,Wenatchee. WA 
I 1:31 R & R (540 N. 2nd Ave), Ketcum. ID 
(R& R, LLC) 
14 Gateway, Wenatchee, WA 
(Gateway Proporties, LLC (WA)) 
15 Snuct<s Allto, ao1se, ro 
i 
16 CE. LLC (,221 Airport Wil)', Hailey, 
ID) 
17 O~I: HOUSfil, Ketchum. ID (OKI: 
House, LLC) 
16 HP 21!, Bol,c, ID 
19 
20 Lot 7, Block 4, Halley, ID (Lo\ 1, 
(Block 4, LLCJ 
:21 V1:dley Center, 8&M\lue, ID (Vslley 
Center, LlC> 
22 i Bro,idway Bob, Boise, 10 
23 Milek Center, Halley, ID 
~ Friedman Park. Hailey, ID 
25 Americana, Boise, ID 
26 !11 Land. Ketchum, ID 
27 311 Building, Ketchllm, ID 
r==nnex, Boise, 10 
wil!. Pocatello. ID 
30 711 N. Mam street, Haney, 10 
S1 St lukei. So!Se. ID 
37.f 1-100'1 River cente,. Hooelrlvor. OR 
r 
7S5056] 
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I 
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Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor 
CV-2011-0000625 
618/1968 
F No. 
CH FILE NO.; 
COM?LAlNt FU.ED: 
21579-001 
1125/2011 
P .
CHS EVALUAT(ON AND ALLOCATION 
I f/!ARKET VALLI~ LIE.NS EQUITY 
. 
. 
$ 1.800.000 $ 1.077.737 722,263 
$ 2,200,000 $ 755,HJ& 1,444,814 
$10:S22.1os $ 5,500,000 5.:S22.709 
$ 2,!i00,000 $ :uoo.coo :S00,000 
$ 350,000 $ 400,000 (50,000) 
s 1,S00,000 $ 1,212,139 681,861 
S 1,750.000 $ 1,106.552 643,448 
$ 2..730,000 i 848,952 1,881,046 
S 1.250.000 $ 900,000 360,Ut.JD 
$ '.350,000 $ 250,325 'il9.675 
I 
$ 1,000,000 $ ?33.!l8i 266.113 
$ 600.000 500,000 
S 1,100.000 $ 247,194 852,806 
$ 3,254,000 S 3,254.137 (137; 
l 
s 200.000 200,000 
$ 500,000 500.000 
I 
S 1.062,483 s 490.3116 :572,137 
$ 3,000,000 $ 3,000,000 . 
$ 1,100,000 $ 1,100,000 
-
$ 7,008,824 $ 4,289,006 2,719,E,1!> 
$ 300.000 $ 600,000 (300.00Q) 
$ 1,400.000 $ 1,050.000 350,000 
$ 1,000,000 $ 600,000 400.000 
S 1.200,000 $ 816,000 322,000 
ll 4,150,000 S 4,150,000 . 
f:24,200.000 S 15,337,ll;j,II 8,662,001 
$13,000,000 S 7 500,000 $.500,000 
! 
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CASETITLEt 
CASE NO: 
DATe OF MARRIAGE: 
PROPERTY OEsCRIP"TION 
210 C41pilol, Sakml, OR 
B0i11e ~11d, Boise, ID 
8390 Golden Trout St, BQi&6, ID 
10699 W. 1,/sllCk R<I. B01ae, 10 
83717 
BUSINESSES: 
TN! Century Tru.t 
l<F, U.C 
SLK. LtC 
SLK Develoment, LLC (75% 
onwe1$hip by KF, LLC) 
Oo11bla Di.lmond Partner$, LLC 
SC Rancll, LLC 
G 
Rarnon f>ark Associates, Ud. 
HCC, LLC 
K.antQr Family, U.C (CO) 
49 Sprll'l!l C1eek l~vestors. LLC 
-
50 SVR M;inagement. LLC 
S 1 Rokan Property Se,vices, LLC 
52 Mid Valle;' Waler Company, LLC 
53 Mid Valley Sewer i.;ompany. LLC 
54 8ulllon Square, LLC (ID) 
55 Sage CRlf, LLC (ID} 
56 Ii, K. Marine, Inc. (100% ownership 
1.>y KF, LLC) 
67 ,-KFI, LLC • UQUIDATED 
Sil ftollan CorporatiOn (6% interest in 
Ro"'" Partner») 
&9 Ror.an f'artneri. 
6(1 
a, 
62 Broadw,;ry Bob. LLC 
63 Highlat>ck Station. LLG (10) 
64 lb! Homes. u.c {LLC) 
65 ISi Idaho, LLC 
66 KWH Partnership 
67 MIP, LLC 
68 Roken Oregon, LLC 
69 RVL, LLC 
70 
1, 
7Z VtSIOA Op11cal Partnen;, LL.C 
785058_7 
n·\pdt. 
FAX No. 
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CH FILE NO.: 
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CASE TITLE: 
CASE~O: 
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 
m!M 
1/Q. PROPERT'I' DISscRIPTION 
13 RV Hood River, LLC (65% 
owner&hip by Rokan Partner!) 
74 Hood River Cent~!. Ll.C (ID) 
7f;i John Alan Partn&rs, II, LLC 
76 RQkan Venture;, LLC 
77 200 Partner., LLC (10} 
78 31{Flrst Avenue Menager:-., l.l.C 
79 Medical Buikllng JnvosllnEtnt Group. 
LLC 
so PK Venlllres 
~ !:aii!man lnV1!1$tOl'S, LP. 
82 
83 
84 RETIREMENT, BANK ACCOUNTS, 
ll'M;STMl:NTS, CASH ANO UFi:: 
INSURANCE: 
~85 Zions Sank Ac;ct # ... 4$4-4 (in 
Robert's name only) 
86 US flank Acct # ... 5836 (in Robert's 
naml'l only) 
67 Wellf. Fargo Saving! Acct 
#163~03.2237 (In Robert's name 
only) 
87a Waiki faftjlo Ch&eklng Acct Ii .. , 1653 
(lfl Robert's name only) 
88 • ~anll of America Checking Acet 
# .. -5236 (in Sondra·:. name only) 
89 ~I< or Ame~ Sllviogs lv;el. 
# ..• 5236 (In Sondra·, natne) 
90 Sank or America Checking Aoi;t 
n ... 0161J On Som:mfs n;1me ooly) 
91 Bank of America S11111ngs Acct 
# ... 0188 (In S0hdr111s nema only) 
92 Bank of the Wei~ AOC!. 'fl7? 
93 Oppenheimer Ac.cl #024•1647036 
{KFI LCC • Rotiert Kantot Trus~ -
PAS Cambiar) 
94 Oppenh11imer Acct #G24-1S45B40 
(KFI LCC. Robel1 Kaf!W Tr<.rstl!>e) 
95 Oppenheimer Acct tfG:24·164 7044 
(KFI LCC • Robert Kantor Trustee. 
PAS PIMCO COMM) 
78S058_7 
. 
FAX No. 
PROPERTY AND DEBT 
Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor 
CV-2.011~0000525 
618/1968 
CH FILE NO.: 
COMPLAINT FILED; 
21579-001 
1/2512011 
P. 023/054 
CH'S EVALUAilON ANO ALLOCATION 
MARKET TC 
VAI..UE LlliNS l;Q\J'ITY CIS HUSQANO 
. 
' 
. 
X 
. 
s 420 420 C 
s 4,755 4,156 C 
; 3,275 3,275 C 
. 
C 
. t.: 
s . C 
C 
l 
$ c 
-Yo 
Wl'FE 
X 
X 
X 
REMARKS Exh# 
RP 
~p 
owned by Rokan Ver1ture.s 
RP 
RP 
RP 
RP 
RP 
as of 9f19/1 1, Robert I 
Slopped Ciepcsitiflg his 
Soc;ial Secijr!\y chec;ks imo 
\hi$ bcc:ount after 8118110 
as or 9/1511 i Oniy 
Robert·, social seev111y 
checks deposill::d lo thi&c 
account 
B& of 9/1 3/11 
I v10$e<.1 
' !llooed 
a qf January :.ru12 
CI09&Cl I 
as ol Janv;iry 2012 
Closeo 
i 
i 
Closed 
Closed 
. 
. 'L. 
4116120t2 3·34 PM ~ 
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I 10: 01 AM 
CASE TITLE: 
CASE NO: 
DATE Of MARRIAGE: 
llnl 
NO. l'ffOPERTY 01:SC~PTION 
96 Opp•nhelmer Acct #G2+ 164705'1 
(l<F I LLC - Robert A l<anto r Trustee • 
PAS Van ECII) 
87 Oppenheimer Apct #624-1647089 
(KFI LlC • RObert A Kantor Tn.istee , 
Star-Schafer) 
98 OppenheitJ1er Acct #G24·i647077 
(KFI LCC • Rob6rt Kantor Truitee • 
PASl'IIFJ) 
99 Oppenheimer Acct. #G2,M647093 
(Kf'I LCC - Robert Kanl<>r Tr11stee • 
STAR NEW PA iH} 
100 Opl)lll1h&lmar Acct #G:24-1647101 
(KFI LCC - Robert K9ntor Ttusleet • 
PAS ACORN) 
101 Oppenheimer Acc(#G24-15A7119 
(Kl"! LCC - Rooer1 Kantor Trustee • 
PAS GS) 
102 Schwab Account 
103 Scllwsb Acct #9164-9408 (in 
Joshua's ~e) 
104 Schwab Ao::! #2224-8757 {in Aron':1 
name) 
105 SchWab Acct #5138-7096 (in 
Shelom·s hamo) 
106 schWab Acct #5196-5397 (111 
Sondra'~ name) 
107 Schwab Acct #32'1V-1359 (in 
Sondr1ii'& name) 
108 First Colony Tci,rn Life lm,unanc. 
Policy No. 5.98.4.615 (death benefit 
$2.5M) Issued August 1, :2002 • 
1n~ured: Robert 
~ 'Genworth Term Ute Insurance 
Polley #8266031 (century Trust 
\Agreement did 8/6/02) Issued Auguit 
14, 2003 (di,ath benaf,t S1 .SM)• 
Insured; Robert 
110 Air Miles - Oelta 
111 American fxpre.s Ce,nturion Acct 
#1 "'409S6736 (American cXJ)l'!IS& 
Acal#, 6-1004) Membership 
Rewan:!& Points - Total: 409,238 
112 Wells Fargo Bank Acc:t Jru;i:i;J1 
(Rokan Psrtnen.) 
'""Ti3 Wells Farge Mooey Malket Acd. 
,a782 (Ro1<11n Portner&) 
11-4 2lons Bank Acct iro494 (In Robert's 
nam!J) 
FAX No. 
PROPERTY AND DEBT SCHEDULE 
Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor 
CV-2011-0000525 
6/8/1968 
CHFILE NO.: 
COMPLAINT FILED: 
21579-001 
1125/2011 
P. 024/054 
CH'S EVALUATIO.N ANO ALLOCATION I 
MAAKE'l' ro TO 
Wlfll 
WJ.ue LIEN$ t!QUrTY C/S HUSBAHO Ft!!IAAl'tkS &hf 
$ . C Close<! 
$ 229 229 C Closed 
$ - - C l;l0Sed 
$ $ 55 (56) C Closed 
s . C Closed 
j 
$ C Clo~ l 
~ 
$ :Z.936 2,936 Na as of 9130111 
$ 2.261 2.261 n/~ as or S/30/11 
$ 3.937 3,937 f'VII 89 of 9/30/t t 
. C $ 1.434 as of 9130111 
C $ 224 a$ of 9130" 1 
C ru, cash 11tloe 
I 
l 
-
C no ti!ISh value 
C x 
X X ;is of i111i1. Ciiv1de ana 
transfer 
i 
$ 31.577 M.577 RP 
'137 
$ 17,040 17,040 Rt' 
440 
; 4.!0 420 X as of 12130/10 
441 
688 
RI l 0: 01 
CASE TITLE: 
CASE NO: 
OATE OF MARRIAGE: 
DEBT 
Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor 
CV-2011-0000526 
6/8/1968 
No. 
CH File NO.: 
COMPLAlNT FILED: 
21579-001 
1125/201 'I 
P. 025/054 
CH'S EVALUAllON AJJD ALLOCATION 
...... 
11(). 
116 
11S 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
~·u 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
·--:iJ, 
""132 
133 
134 
135 
116 
137 
138 
139 
HO 
i41 
142 
143 
'"144 
Pf'I.OPER.TY Dl:SCRlf'TlON 
Bank of the Wast Acct (in Sondra's 
name) 
Bank of Amertca Acct (ill Sondra's 
nam9) 
VEHICLES: 
2008 Red Jeep Cherokee. VIN 
# ... 152115 
2007 GMC PenaU. VIN ft-... 256S94 
1979 Mercedei; 450, VIN tl...067978 
HOUScHOLO GOOOS & 
Fl,lRNlSHlNGS: 
Household, 
1:1eneh. upholst~~ Nav.iio rug-
diwnagea 
Chinese apotnecary cabinet 
A~c:he basket round 26il'ideep 
Pine chest. black knobs S clrawer 
otiental 4 floor cabinet 
wood fnam& chair, woven seat & 
back 
WoOd ClesK with primitive top 
Nativ~ Amer1e.1n t:,asKet, round 17 
1/Z" X 10"deap 
Pair of hammered l:>r:ass & ceramic 
t.irnP5 
Amer. lndlan baal<et 15X14" 
Amer. Indian bas\:el 16X12" 
Pair of gee&e ceramJC 
Cabinet Pine e2x1 8x?8 
Coffee table G119st S11t1ng area 
Pine olock 
Pine 5 drawer c1ie,t. woo1;1 lalo1Ja 
Armoilil,pine 
Kingbed/pire bedstead Shalom's 
room 
HeadbO~rd Beo.Atoo, Huntzinger 
Antique wood bench. mudroom (2) 
76505.8.7 
h:\pds 
r,wtKl:t 
VAI.IJE 
$ 21.000 
$ 2-4,000 
s e.ooo 
$ 650 
$ 1,1:1\1\J 
$ 2.800 
$ 55D 
$ 950 
$ 185 
$ -450 
$ 650 
$ 600 
s 225 
$ 450 
$ m 
$ 1,WU 
s 26:! 
s 200 
$ 850 
$ 1,000 
$ 1,000 
$ 4,000 
$ 850 
-------------·----------· ·----·---·------ ··-·--·--------------· -------- ------
LIENS 
I 
! 
-
1'0 
ECIUIT'I Cl$ HUSS.ANO 
' 
. 
21,000 C 
24.000 C X 
e.ooo C 
. 
. 
650 s 850 
1,800 $ 1.$00 
2,800 
560 
950 s 950 
185 
460 
6SO 
600 
225 
450 
300 
1,200 
26& 
200 $ 200 
850 
1,000 
1,000 
4,000 
850 X 
Page: 5 
TO 
WIFI£ 
X 
X 
X 
x 
X 
RIS:MARKS Em# 
iilfo onlained from Idaho 
OMV Wtb-site 
iofo t>blaincd from ldallo 
OMvWeb-site 
sell to Riohard Baskin •nd 
divide proceed equally 
Perr.onal property 
epprabel by Otwicl 
Huld'IIIIS dated 7 /8/11 299 
Hutvl'tina 
Hutchin& 
·-Hulch1n!I 
Hutchins 
Hutcllim; 
ttJtchitl6 
Hut;::hins 
ttutcnl~ 
Hulclllns 
l1t1tchins 
H11ld\1ns 
Hu\Chtns 
I 
r\ulch1ns - I 
Hutci'lm& 
Hulchins 
HII\Ghins 
• Hutchin;. 
Hutehins 
Sell --
~~~ t:Sotl - 01\c In his 
411612012 3.34 PM 
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I 
I 
RI 10: 01 AM 
CASE TITLE: 
CASE NO: 
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 
ITa.l 
II<> PRO!>ERTY Dl?SCRIPTION 
145 Partoeta de!lk 
146 Frent:11 Buffet 
147 Mvrano pedest;,1 vao" 
146 17th century clock 
149 Vintage woQd buffet 
150 Steinway pie.no 
1!$1 JaCODean cl'le&I 
1$2 English toolbath 
153 Hunuinger bed-maslsr bedroom 
replacement value 
-·· Oriental bedstand tablf:.-left-154 
155 FuJian Bed-1>id& tat:>l, rlgtit 
156 Upright piano 
i 1S7 Hawaiian pool ts ble 
158 Preoor Stmtch tralnar 
159 Sa1bdt 
16G Tcctrix exercise bike 
161 Ab Sclssor 
162 SST Stretch trainer 
163! Vectra Total Gym 
164 Pree.or walker 
165 Prcoor AMT Stepper 
166 Fishing rod collectl<111 
167 Fishing flies 
168 Gun colleetion 
169 Watches if real 
170 
171 Furniture: 
H2 Blue sofa and Ci'oalr (MoVI~ R.oom) 
I 
173 Green $of& (Upstairs Sitting Room) 
174 L.Mng Room Suede Love Seat and 
Chai~ 
175 Wving Room Sof" 
176 Breakfast !&ble,ancl c:haira 
177 Ba1stools (6) 
176 oming Room Table and Chairs 
FAX No. 
PROPER.TY AND DEBT SCHEDULE 
Robert Kantor v. Sondr;i Kantor 
CV-2011-0000525 
6/8/1968 
CH FILE NO.: 
COMPi..AlNT FIL.ED: 
21579-00i 
i/25/2011 
P. 026/054 
CH'S EVACUATION ANO ALLOCATION 
-
MARKET TO TO 
WIFE 
VALUE LIENS EQUIYY CIS HU$BAt1D REMARl<S bhtl 
s 8,250 6,2.50 l111;urance 11st: Hutchins 
$1000 
$ ),000 3,000 H111ehlnti 
$ 250 250 Hutr;hin& 
$ 3,100 3,100 Hulctlina 
$ 650 &50 Hutoltlns. 
$ 3a;ooo 30,000 Hut<:hln&-Scll 
$ 500 !KJO s 500 Huti;lllmr. 1iBid $500, found 
Otle OC\llne 1h lJK for 750 
Pounds/$1200/$2350 
lnaurionce 11:st 
$ 2.500 2.500 fmuran,;e list-Ask Oeanna 
Mefin 
$ 10,000 10,000 L.A. Da.ign Conc:epts, 
lroniM rQp. 
$ 645 645 $ 645 Hulchlt\s 
.. 
$ 45D 45Q s 4SO Hutchin~ 
$ 450 450- S¢1d 
$ 2,000 2,000 $ 2.000 Hutchin:. valued Ill 
si,COWlnsvrance val1Jod at 
I S? ,000 on 4113/91 
s 300 300 X X Hutchin~ 
s 225 225 i . 
$ 950 950 X . 
$ 80 80 
$ 95 9{j ' 
$ 3,000 3,000 . 
s 1,200 1,200 X . 
$ 4,500 4.500 $ \,60() . 
. X . 
. X . 
. X . 
s 1,500 1,500 X . 
, 
-
-
X 
X 
l 
. X 
. : 
-
Pa!JC 6 
t,Sf< 
411.612012 J.34 PM 
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•----------------- ------------------------ -------
I 
rrfl' 
NO. 
t7$ 
180 
181 
182 
163 
'i84 
--rn 
186 
187 
188 
189 
190 
1'il1 
192 
193 
104 
I 195 
196 
197 
19\l 
CASE TITLE; 
CASE NO: 
0·02 AM 
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 
PROPf~'!YDESCRIPTION 
LH:muy Gl1airs and Ottoman 
Ov11I Del!k 8 or A 
I.amp in Sh11lom's room 
Sofa In Guest Sitting room 
oma11 d11sk/tilble in Up$ti,; SitlinQ 
Antique wing ollatr 
MaasageChtiWs{2) 
Outdoor turnUure 
Dt:$ktop Computer in bob'e urnce 
Leptop computer In Kiti;;hen 
(/ncludil'\g music end family photOG) 
Art: 
Bronze "Go for Broke·, library 
Hat oolleclion-6 
Peter Beard book 
Trinh Nguyen Panels 
lnaz Storef pieces 
Chl'iStlanse11 off 
Fighting Lion 
Ma,geux Walter -Paperweight• 
Big 5lot-uonzalei; 
199 'cut t.oos&-Oan Snyder 
20C CrayOtl$-NlUh11n Kane 
201 Cnewea Rultir·Steinberg 
20.2 ?ortl'al! of Navejo Code Talker, 
Gorman bronze 
20! Ceramic and Paper Fens, Luoe 
2041 Giraffil by Dentzet c. 1890 
205 Robert Henri 
206 • CheTCoal-H. C. OaviK 
207 Hambv19er in Pilnidise-Sctul'ldler 
2011 Stttlng lr1(j1an woman, Gorm1111 
209 Sliver c1eek b)' Hugtt Mossman 
210 Turbaned womel\, Oliviera 
210a Red Enc.au&tle, purchased from Gail 
$evern 
211 H.C. D11vi&s "Hllns Hoffmall" 
212 ''Close To;tt~r" by Karel Appel 
213 fMh L!tolt Photo Collagas 
21-4 "Gren Peche" Gonza~$ 
215 Three C0Uu.9e1-Weber 
76505!U 
PROPERTY AND DEBT SCHEDULE: 
Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor 
CV-2011...0000525 
6/8/1968 
CH FILE NO.: 
COMPLAlNT FILED: 
21579-001 
1/2512011 
P. 
CH'S EVALUATION AND ALLOCATION 
NIA~ TO TO 
V\1~1: 
VAl-01; 1.lEllS EQUliY CIS KUSEIAND fitl:M.JI.R"-S 
$ soo 
$ 1.000 1.000 s 1.000 Huteh\ns 
X 
-
$ 6,750 5,75-0 j Bob's offteEr. Insurance l~I 
$ 500 500 $ 500 
~ 
X X io be shared 
}( 
X 
-
$ 2,500 2,500 Aron's 
$ 1,500 1,500 $ 1,500 s 1,500 
$ 3,800 3,800 $ 3,SOO 
-
' 
15,000 15,000 
$ 6,300 6,300 $ 8,300 
$ 8,00Q ll.000 $ e.ooo 
$ 10.()0Q fo.ooo s 10,000 recen lly porci\ased for 
S.10,000.00 
$ 3,500 3,500 $ 3,500 
. X 
. Louise 
. S~elom 
X I Louise 
. )( -lour.ii! 
. 
X 
s 15.500 1°5:500 s 15 !',00 ins11ra/\Ce Lfr.t: 'TBA 
fl!l,1,1 
I 
$ 1,600 1,500 $ 1.500 111sur11nce list; TEIA·Loulsc 
$ 10,000 10,000 ~ X 
. iBA-1..ouiee 
. X 
$ 18,000 l 15,000 
X 
. X 
. X I x See lneurance Usl . 
t 
)t; l uA Lou,se 
i X TBA•Loulse/S"'l.11 
i 
-
~ u j 
4/16n012 3:34 PM ;1,,_ Page7 
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CASE TITLE: 
CASI: NO: 
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 
•YE11 
uo. PROPflt'l'V DESCRIPTION 
216 App&I sculpture fJS,h 
.217 Appel Painting "Anlmar 
:ml "Mother' Oorman 
219 H.c. C>aviee "At tile Opera" 
no H.c. oavi6S "Rainy Day" 
n1 "Oven oar Gonzales 
222 Moonnght Table. Steinberg 
223 Got YI\ Covared, Pernie 
224 Larg& Photo '"FIim• collage, Litoff 
225 Various Prints as per Hutchifis 
Appcalsal 
226 t.111der The 8ed. Ga.nan Wilson 
227 lfl th& Mirror, 1 ooiter 
i 
226 Animation Cells by Ron Searle. rrom 
Dick Deadeye 
229 PeltUS "StuUy 11" 
2.30 Pai Cheng Portfollo-Lithos. 
131 P\caseo Etching 
zsz Vanous etchingi. 
235 Alrlcan, M'lencan Indian. Latin 
Amelican 1111 Collecrion 
234 CarouGel Ho11e. Green & Gold 
235 Carou:iaiil Hor&&, Whl!e/Lavor,det 
2:lii Appel Pann&rs 
237 Rot>ert's Art (Prices based on 
RObllr't'B eelimated value.s for 2004 
Idaho Trienniel): 
2.38 Camp I-I-ope 
239 VVhtte I-lope 
240 WtiileFlower 
241 12 Hearlti 
242 Thufies 
24~ "L" 
244 
2451 co1111ignment fr()m 1.wo11<: 
t'IO 1311t1inc:e in Stack and White 
247 
2'48 Art in and &rQIIOd K~ntor koml!: 
249 Creation 
250 Flower (at Mary's) 
Z!:>1 Louise's 6reel11ut 
7850513_7 
No. P. 028/054 
PROPERTY AND DEBT SCHEDULE 
Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor 
CV-2011-0000525 
6/8/1968 
CH FILE NO.: 
COMPLAINT FILED: 
21579-001 
'1/25/2011 
CH'S EVALUATION ANO ALLOCATION 
-· MARKl;:1 j()' TO 
.Wll'EI VALUE Lre~s SQUITY C/S 1-ll.lSBANO RS.MARKS 
. ToJoih 
····· 
. To Shalom 
. X 
. 
.!JJ-Y 
-
,x 1BA•Loutse 
-
X l'BA-1.0t11se 
s 750 7SO $ 750 insurance List 
. X l TBA-Louise 
. X 
$ 2,500 2,500 lnsurance List:TSA-Suzy 
FIND 
$ 4,500 4,500 Insurance nl!'l:TSA-Suiy 
FINO 
$ zooo 2,000 il 2,000 1 Hutchin& 
$ 650 650 $ 650 IMur1mee Ust 
$ 1,200 1,200 per Suzy Locke • Sell 
. X 
X 
-
X X FindAppra1ser-lnsu1arice 
Ust !lh0\\1'$ s,2535 total; 
Hutchin& sl1ows 1 basket 
as i2600 
s 7,000 7,UUV lnsu10nce Ll$t 
$ 7,000 7,000 111,11rance Li~t 
X 
. ll S0,000 lnCIUdes value ot ctem 
Nos.238,239,2~1.242. 
246 
. X 
. X 
. X 
. X 
X 
. 
X 
. 
. 
I I 
. X 
I . .x 
. X 
EXh'4' 
' I 
Sk 
PSQtl B 4/1 l!l2012 :!:34 f'M 
692 
I 
Rl I 0: AM 
CASE TITLE: 
CASE NO: 
DATE OF MARRIAGE;; 
!TIii,\ 
NO l'ROPl!IO'Y DESCRIPTION 
262 Double Hearts Table 
253 Hean on Kltohen giss, bar 
254 Living Room MCDlle 
25~ t::1le 
255 carpets: 
257 Herlz..t.lbra,y 
258 1:ntryway-f>er$lan wool-
M!llliyer/Sarouk Wool 8'6' x 
12'6"L31'{le blue and old rose rosette, 
rose flel(l 
259 Media Room-Large neWl"r rlJQ 
260 Great room. Tibetan refu9ees· 
261 Dining Room Rug 
-·· Persian su11 Kug 262 
263 Betoucms:tan Wool rug, blue & 
brown 
264 Turkoman wool 37" x 4', old rooe w/ 
! blue loi:ange 
26!'.i F'er&iall wool 4'1 o· x 1•r Deep blue 
Field 
766 P¢r&tan Wool 5' >: 7'3" SIJarDeep 
bl11e rectangular field with red wien 
I 11oratl1!s repetitivt: 
26i Angollan wool Mat 2' x 3'6" llKI 
sel'rated border wt 3 oroi!./\ge 
9eomeirle8 
-26!! Persian l<ilim rug. 4'6" x 6'4" Rose & 
gold fielel w/ bluo & Ivory lloriate 
261:i Caucasian wool rug 37' x 6'2" deep 
blue ftelcl WI vMd me<iallion& 
27c n,ni~ wool tog 4'4" x 6'2"Sky bh,,e 
cartoocne wl omate old rooo and 
ivory 111edallio11 
271 Herlz Rug Roumanar 7'3" ,c 18':r 
272 Sterifcarpet 
~273 Outdoor Furniture: 
267 
~-288 otMr· 
289 Jewelry ill Sondra's po&eeesion 
290 
294 ExclusM, RetoltG 
L 29: 
785058_1 
h:lpds 
No. 
PROP:6:.RTY AND DEBT SCHEDULE 
Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor 
CV-2011--0000525 
6/8/1968 
CH FILE NO.: 
COMPLAINT FILED: 
21579-001 
1125/2011 
P. 029/054 
CH'S EVALUATION AND ALLOCATION 
MARJ<EJ TO TO 
WlF'!! 
VALUE LIENS f!QUlli' Cl$ H~l!!.&.Jllg REMARKS Exll# 
X 
. X 
X 
X 
! 
$ ~.obo 29.000 inaurance List r-i 
' . 
$ e;,ooo 5,000 $ 5,000 IM~nce L.1$t ii 
TBA Tarry Reicl1Nancy 
l Norris 
I TBA Terry Reicl/Nancy -· --
jNorrts 
TBA Terry f{eidJNanoy 
Norris 
s 1,000 1.000 ! Insurance Li&t -
$ 475 4fl> lnsu,ence L.ill 
$ 800 800 ltiSV<3ncia Lis! 
$ 2,500 2.500 I nsural\Cf! ist 
s 2.250 2.2s,r --- _,, 11'1$Uftll'ICI!! l!st; Ubraiy 
under desk? 
s 265 265 lnsurence Ust 
s 1.800 1,800 Insurance, Li$! 
$ 1,500 1,500 Insurance list 
$ s-so 950 lns.urenoe List 
$ 7,500 7,500 10,uran ce t.lSi~:in 
i ,,toreroom, FINO 
I I lns.urance Ust--in 
i . stoR,room. FINO 
. )C, X 
- . 
. I 
$ 75,000 75.000 s X gifts 
. 
. X .x 
. I I\ 
~S_K_ 
Page 9 4/16,'2012 :'l:34 PM 
693 
IY&.! 
'f(>. 
296 
297 
A 
B 
C 
0 
JE 
F 
K 
L 
0 
p 
Q 
T 
u 
V 
w 
X 
l l O: AM 
CASE TITLE: 
CASE NO: 
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 
PROPf!RTY OE$CRl?Tl0N 
Llabillti&& 
Well& Far90 Acct # ... 0590 (in 
R\lbert's name only) 
B \lf A Amex-ll'll54e/1&32 (Sondra'$) 
B of A Visa tt971lil {Sondra's! 
Oalta Amex #3006 
Amencsn Express Acct lf.,.3-82002 
(In BOb'~ nam&) 
Americ:an Eli:prll&& Centurion Card 
(n 13ob's name) Acct# •. M1004 
-l>t~ 
Sltl!S 3156A 
8&1IC..lli'!lll~Wfte.· 
Allotney$ Fees - Scot LudWig 
~teveM Pierce e. Ass0o1a1e11 
Stevesevem 
US Bank 
Doctor - SF· S0nt1r11 
Remaining lees owed to Cosho-
Humphrey 
TOTAL ASSl::TS 
u,,-,-ERENCE 
AMOUNT TO EQUALIZE 
EQUAUZEO COM. PROPERTY 
185058_8 
ll:\pds 
FAX No. 
PROPERTY AND DEBT SCHEDULE 
Robert Kantor v. Sondra Kantor 
CV-2011--0000525 
0/8/19613 
CH FILE NO.: 
COMPLAINT FILED; 
21579-001 
1/25/2011 
P. 030/054 
CH'S EVALUATION AND ALLOCATION 
MA'RKET lo TO ! WIFE! 
VAi.VE LIENS EQUITY C/S HUSBAND IU!MARI\& j i:Eh * 
-
. 
. 
$ 38,581 (38,:>111) $ (36,561 I& of 10/10/11 
$ 40,000 (40,Wll) $ (40,000) 
$ 18,000 (1&]00) $ (18,000) 
$ 4,uvv (4,000) X --. 
$ 3,046 (3,048) X ,s of 10/10/1, 
$ 6,172 (8,172} fX 11s. of 9t1!jl! 1 U;sd to 
I pay Sondra's amimey fees 
-~ ~ ·~ ,~ entity I 
-· --$ 390.000 (390,000) 
,. 
pen;ona! t·-.. - $ 1,00Q QOO -~ .. 
-
)( ~ $ 7,500 (7,600) X expo~·fees 
X expert fees I 
$ 25,000 (25,000) 
$ 1,000 (f;DOO) IX 
. X 
. 
96,(3$,396 64,91Z.641 31,!i23,755 7S.l>l:i4 40,4u& 
. {35.1!18) 
(17,578) 17,578 
Proof $ 115,972 $ 57.986 $ 57,966 
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SECOND A.lvIENDMRNT TO THE RESTATED AGREEMENT OF 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
OF 
ROKAN PARTNERS, AN IDAHO LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
P. 031/054 
In accordance with paragraph 11.15 of the Restat:ed Ag:reement of Limited 
Partnership {"Restated Agreement"), the undersigned, being all of tb.e Partners (col-
lecth•ely "Partners"), adopt this Second Arnend.meni to t.he Restated AgreernQnt 
(this "Amendment''), effective April_, 2012. 
RECITALS - PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
A. Rokan Co:rporation1 a Delaware corporation, is the General Partner of 
the Partnership. 
B. Robert A Kantor ("Robert") is the Ptesident of Rokan Corporation. 
C. Robert and Sondra L. Kantor ('Sondra") entered into a Property Set• 
tlement Agreement effective March_, 2012 ("Property Settlement Agreement"). 
D. Certain terms of the Property Settlement Agreement require that the 
Partners amend the Restated Agreement. 
RECITAL- RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERABILITY 
E. The Partners desire to amend and supplement the Agreement to 
change the restrictions on transferability of their respective Percent In Interest. 
AMENDMENTS-PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
NOW THEREFORE, Rokan Corporation, Robert and Sondra agree to the fol~ 
lowing amendments to the Restated Agreement. 
1. The Partners amend Exhibit A to the Restated Agreement to provide 
that the Partners and their respective Percentage Interests are as follows: 
Rokan Cru,>oration 
Robert 
Sondra 
Geoffrey F. Kantor 
A:ron B. Kantor 
SECOND AMENDMENT TO RESTATED AGREEMENT 
813706~ 
6% 
44% 
44% 
2% 
2% 
RI !0: No. P. 
Joshua M. Kantor 2% 
2. The Partners amend paragraph 5.1 to provide that, in addition to the 
other requirements of paragraph 5.1, the General Partner shall not admit o:r substi-
tute a Partner without the written consent of all Partners. 
3. The Partners amend paragraphs 3.2.5, 3.2.7, 5.1 and 5.3 to provide 
that, in addition to the other :cequ.irements of paragraphs 3.2.5, 8.2.7, 5.1 and 6.3, 
neither Rokan Corporation, no:r Robert nor Sondra shall receive directly or indirect-
ly :any compensation. from Rok.an Partners other than as stated in the Property Set-
tlement Agreement. 
4. The Partners amend paragraph 5.1 to provide that, in addition to the 
other requirements 0£ para.graph 5.1, there can be no person other than Robert or no 
entity other that Rokan Corporation managing Rokan Partners without the written 
consent of at least 60% of the interests held by the Partners. 
5. The Partners amend paragraphs 3.2.5 and 3.2.7 tC> provide that, in a.d-
ditio:n to the other requirements of paragraph 3.2.5 and 3.2. 7, distribution~ to Rob-
ert and Sondra shall be made as stated in paragraph 2.12 of the Property Settle· 
ment Agreement. The Partners have attached a copy of paragraph 2.12 of the Prop· 
erty Settlement Agreement true Amendment as Exhibit 2. 
6. The Partners amend paragraph 5.l(h) to provide that, in addition to 
the other requirements of paragraph 5.l(h), the General Partner cannot amend the 
Agreement in any way that would injure any Partner without Sondra's written con-
sent. 
7. The Partners amend Article VIII to provide th.at. in addition to the 
other requirements of Article VIII, prior to the sale of any asset of Rokan Partners, 
Robert shall provide written notice to all of the Partne,..s, as much in advance aa 
possible under th8 circumstances. including all details of the proposed sale. 
8. Robert and Sondra agree to convey the assets, subject to the liabilities, 
listed on the attached Exhibit I to the Partnership and the Partnership acc:epts 
such assets and liabilities as. assets and liabilities of the Partnership. 
9. The Partners agree that the foregoing amendments shall be applied in 
the broadest possible way to give effect to Robert and Sondra's intent as expressed 
in this Amendment and in the Property Settlement Agreement. If there is a conflict 
between any te:r:m of the Restated Agreement and this Am.endrnent or the Property 
Settlement Agreement, this Amendment or Property Settlement Agreement will 
take precedence. 
SECOND AMENDMENT TO RESTATED AGREEMENT 
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Ma r. 6. 2 ~ 13 2: 32 PM LSMJ-LAW fk ,73C ' 6/30 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SBLL ROKAN PARTNERS' SHARE OF ROKAN 
'VENTURES 
To; Sondra Kantor and Stanley Welsh, attorney of record in.1h.e Divorce proceedinss: 
From: Robert A Kantor, 'President Rok.an Corporation' 
A fu1I copy of the purobase and sale agreement 'Will be furnished to Sondra K811.tor and 
h.er attorn~B as it is: fi.mshed. This sale is a result ofRokan. Ventures r&fusal· to particip11te 
in any further real est.ate deals so long as Rokan Partners re:rnaill$ an o-wner/participant. 
· ·· · - ·· ~· · · ··-(a G8f)Y ~~ lettet.from Michael Page willkprovided). IfRokan Partners refuses 1o 
9·d 
sell its intwesti Rokan Ventures will just cease to do any additional transactions and \viU;.-------
be liquidated over some period of time. 
The cash price pald fortbt .intet~stbo,ug..'~i.d is (or will be), in the opinion of Robert 
Kanto:r, the maximum possib1o.·valtie,a.f'&o-1am Partner's sbate of the underlying assets of 
Rokan Ventures witb ~ ~~flt~ the $ale of a minority interest. In addition; Rokan 
Partners will be assigned its pro•rata. snare of every profits interest O'Ytned by Rokan 
Ventures at tho tilno th.e transaction becomes effective. 
Because of 1hi; continuing requitement of Rokan Pmtners for cash, the proceeds from this 
sale wifl assist with the ability of Rokan Partners to make capital distributions to the 
o\l'II'.le(s. 
I 
I 
9£LL8Z680l JOlUl:l}I 8JpUOS 
"9" 
------- -- -- --- - ---- -- ----- - - - - - ---- ---- - --- --- --
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REDEMPTION AND FULL LlQUlDA TION AGREEMENT 
ANO AUTHORIZING RESOLUTION 
ROKAN PARTNERS, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
an Idaho limited partnership 
and 
ROKAN VENTURES, LLC 
an Idaho limited liability company 
THIS REDEMPTION AND FULL LIQUIDATION AGREEMENT ANO AUTHORIZING 
RESOLUTION (" Agreemenr) Is affective as of January 1, 2013 (~Effective Date'') by and 
between Rokan Ventures LLC, an Idaho limited liability company ("Company") and Rokan 
Partners, Umlted Partnership, an Idaho llmited partnership ("Rokan Partners"). 
RECITALS 
A, Rokan Partners currently holds a 24.80% membership interest in Company. 
B. Company desires to distribute to Rokan Partner& · a cash paymeni and a 
membership interest in each of the following entitles (!iac::h of which Is an Idaho limited llablllty 
company}: RV Hood River LLC, RV Boise Bend LLC, RV Rokan Americana LLC, and RV Idaho 
BB LLC (collectlvety, the ·Rv Companies"), In full redemption and complete liquidation of 
Rokan Partners mel'!'lbership Interest In the Company. 
C. The membership interest to be distributed to Rokan Partners in each of the RV 
Companies Is set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto (collectively, ''Distributed Interest"). 
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufflclency for 
wt:iich are hereby acknowledged, th8 parties hereto agree a$ follows: 
1, Treatment of Distrtbutions. The Distributed Interests In the RV Companies and 
the Cash Payment (as defined below) to Rokan Partners, as provided in this Agreement, shall 
be considered a full redemption and compiet& Hquidatlon of all of Rokan Partners membership 
Interest in the Company. 
2. Distributions of Memb!rJ;hip Interest. Company hereby agrees to distribute to 
Rokan Partners the Distributed Interest and Cash Payment (as &et forth below) in complete 
liquidation of Rokan Partners interest In Company: 
(a) The Oisb1buted Interest in each of the RV Companies, as set forth on 
Exhibit A attached hereto. 
(b) Ca$h payment In the amount of $41.675.48 ("Cash Payment") to be paid 
concurrently herewith. 
REOEIV'J'TlON AND LIQUIDATION AGREEMENT~ 1 
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3. Acceptance of DistobuUoo. Rokan Partners hereby accepts the Distributed 
Interest in the RV Companies and the Cash Payment In full redemption and complete liquidation 
of Rokan Partners interest in Company. 
4. Substitute Member. It is agreed that Rokan Partners wilt be deemed to be a 
"substitute member" of each of the RV Companies With regard to the Distributed Interest for all 
purposes of the Operating Agreement for each RV Company. 
5, ~signatjgn. Concurrently herewith, Robert Kantor ("Kantor") does hereby 
r~lgn (I) as a Manager of th& Company; and Oi) as registered agent of the Company. Kantor 
agrees to execute any and all other documents necessary or convenient to carry out such 
resignations. Within five {5) business days after the Effective Date, Michael E. Page ("Page;, 
as the Man21ger of Company, shall caU$$ the. Articles of Organization flied with the Idaho 
Secretary of State for Company to be amended to reflect the withdrawal of Rokan Partners as a 
Manager and the reslgnatlon of Kantor as the registered agent of Company. 
6. Assignmgnt. Concurrently herewith, the Company, as the manager of each of 
fue RV Companies, ehall execute an assignment to transfer the Distributed Interest to Roken 
Partners. effectl\te January 1, 2013. 
7. Member's Interest. Effective January 1, 2013, the books and records of each RV 
Company shall reflect the (i) Distributed Interest to Rolcan Partners; and (ii} Rokan Partnf:)rs 
membership interest of each of the RV Companies pursuant to the schedule attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
s. Amerodment to Operating flgreement for Company. The Operating Agreement of 
the Company shall be amended c·Arnendment Provisions; to provide that (i) Page, as the 
sole remaining Manager of the Company, Is authorlted to act ae the sole Manager of Company, 
with full authority, and any provisions In the Operating Agreement of the Company that require 
both Managers to approve or authorize any matters shall be amended provide that the sole 
Manager shall be entitled to approve or authorize such matters; QI) replace EXhfbtt B of the 
Operating Agreement (Peroentage Interests) with post..cfistribution Membership Interests of 
each member as set forth in Exhibit B attached hereto; and (iii) require that all management 
fees paid directly or indirectly by the RV Companies to the Company will be allocated solely to 
the Company and. Rokan Partners shall not have any right to such management fees. Each of 
the Members of the Company, by their consent to this Agreement, agree (i) that the Amendment 
Provisions shall be binding on all of the Members of the Company as of the Effective Date; (ii) to 
the extent of a conflict between the Operating Agreement and the Amendment Provisions, the 
Amendment Provisions shall control, and {Ill) to promptly execute and deliver an amendment to 
the Operating Agreement to effectuate the Amendment Provisions. 
9. USDG Note - Companv. Pursuant to Section 4.9 of the Operating Agreement of 
the Company, the Company Is the holder of that certain U.S. Digital Gaming ("Usoo•) Note{s) 
and related USDG assets ("USDG Assets") that are being carried on the books and records of 
the Company. The USDG Assets are held by Company, as nominee, for the benefit of the 
Rokan Partners and the Michael E. Pago 2008 Revocable Trust ("Page Trust"), one-half each. 
Rokan Partners and Page Trust do hereby authorize the Company to distribute the USDG. 
Assets to Rokan Partners and Page Trust (one-half each), or alternatively continue to hold the· 
USOG Assets ag nominee solely for the benefit of Rokan Partnere and Page Trust. Rokan 
Partners agrees and Instructs the Company to pay one--half (1/2) of the note payabte by Rokan 
Partners (approximately $22,500) dlreetly to the Page Trust from ihe Cash Payment to be paid 
to Rokan Partners under Section 2(b) above. 
REDEMPTION ANO LIQUIDATION AGREEMENT. 2 
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10. f\nacgnda Mitters. Company is a party to certain litigation flied by Stiwlyn Inc., 
as plaintiff, against the Company and other parties named ~in1 in the District Court of Blaine 
County, Idaho andJor U.S. District Court. The parties commonly refer to liiUch litlgation as 
• Anaconda Litigation". Rokan Partners hereby agrees to remain l'lable for its proportionate 
shat& (based on its prior Pereentage Interest of Company 24.80 percent) of any liablltty, claims 
or costs Incurred.by Company arising from or ln connection with the Anaconda Litigation to the 
extent such oosts exceed the $75,000 currently reserved by the Company rAnaconde 
Reserve;. If the cost& of the Anaconda Litigation exceed the Anaconda Reserve, Rokan 
Partners authorizes the RV Companies to pay its proportionate share of the Anaconda Litigation 
costs directly from Rokan Partners distributions from the RV Companies. If the total cost of the 
Anaconda Litigation is less than the Anaoonda Reserve, the Company WIii pay to Rokan 
Partners its proportionate share of the remaining Anaconda Reserve. 
11. Cootlnuation of Business: 
(a) The business of Company shall be coritlnued by It.a Members and the 
business of RV Companies shall be continued by its Members. 
(b) Rokan Partners expressly acknOwledgei- and agrees that It will have no 
further rights to any profits or disiributlons cf the Company from any source (except as 
expressly provided herefn with regard to the USDG Assets and Anaconda Litigation). 
(c) Rokan Partners acknowledges tha1 it wlll have no ftlrther or ruture Interest 
in the business operations or future projects of the Company. 
· (d) For a period commencing on the Effective Date of this Agreement and 
continuing for twenty-four (12) calendar months thereafter, Rokan Partners sigrees to continue 
to use the Company, and/or its subsidiaries, to proVide property and entity management 
services for an projects currently being managed by Ventures andfor Its subsidiaries unless 
such termination Is for cause as per the Individual management agreements. The fee and 
payment structure for suoh property management services shaU remain as in affect on the 
Effective Date. Provided, however, if Rokan Partners sells any of Its existing project(s) to an 
unrelated third party during suoh 24-month period, such third party buyer will not be required to 
retain the Company for property management services. 
12. Release. Except as provided herein With respect to the USDG Assets and the 
Anaconda Litigation: 
(a} The Company and Rokan Partners hereby release each other and their 
respective shareholders, members, managers, officers and emp1oyees from eny and an claims, 
damages, liabllltles or causes of action, whether known or unknown, arising out of the Company 
and/or the relationship among the Company and Rokan Partners. 
(b) Rokan Partnera ac:eepts the Cash Payment and Distributed Interest in full 
and total satisfaction of its membership Interest in the Company, aod hereby waives any and all 
clalms it may have ag1::1lnst the Company, including without limitation its members, mam~gers 
and employeee. 
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13. Consent to Transfer RestrjQlioos. The Manager of the Company, as the Manager 
of the RV Companl&s, hae obtained all consents and approvals required from the Members of 
RV Companies for the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, and for Rokan Partners 
shaff be treated as a Substitute Member of RV Companies as to the Distributed Interest. · 
14. Gener@I Pr.ovisigo: 
(a} This Agreement may be executed in one or more duplicate counterparts, 
eac;h of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which tog~her shall constitute one 
and the sam& instrument. Facsimile transmission of any signed original of this Agreement 
and/or retransmission of any signed facslmlle transmission shall be the same as ~Hvery of an 
original. 
(b) If any action is inst!Med hereafter to enforce any of the te1TTis of this 
Agreement by the partJes hereto, or If any party hereto Is required to a$sert the terms of this. 
Agreement a& a defense to any action, the prevaiHng party in such action shall be entitled to 
recover from the other party a reasonable sum for its attorney's fee8, plus reasonable costs and 
expenses of prosecuting or defending the action. 
(c) This Agreement shall be governed and construed ln accordance with the 
laws of the State of Idaho. 
(d) Each party agrees to take such further actions and execute such · 
instructions and documents as are necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agr&ement. 
[Signature Page to Folluw] 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Agreement effective 1s of 
the Effectlve Date. 
COMPANY: 
ROKAN PARTNERS: 
KANTOR: 
ReOEMPTION AND LIQUIDATION AGREEMENT· 5 
16742421111 t11231M1J 
ROKAN VENnJRES LLC, 
an Idaho limited HabUity company 
By:~:;;.;,.. . .. P-ag"""e-,-Ma-na_g_e_r ____ _ 
ROKAN PARTNERS, an Idaho limited 
partnership 
By: ROKAN CORPORATION, a 
Delaware corporation, Its General Partner 
By: 
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Consent and Approval of Members 
The Members of the Company do hereby consent to and approve the foregoing 
Agr&ement 
REDEMPTION AND LIQUIPATION AGREf!MENT• 6 
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Mlohael E. Page, Trustee of the Michael e. 
Page 2008 Revocable Trust 
' 
ffMce,.1.ff. ~(JyJ 
~onioa Hanson 
~-Tony St. George 
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EXHIBIT A 
f '\ 
t_ ,) 
New Percentage Interests for RV Companies 
6hll!! d Rokllln Vanttnl 
RV Hood Rl\ler 
RV Boise Bend 
RV Rokan Americana 
RV Idaho BB 
,,. 
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M.000% 
88.000% 
S0.000% 
80.600% 
3.000% 
.. ~ 1.050% 
21.824% 2.640o/o 
7.-440% 0,000% 
19.964% 2.416% 
P. 040/054 
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25.270% 
53.536% 
22.000% 
58.121% 
704 
---- - ---~ --- --
NOV/01 /20!3/FRI 10 :05 AM FAX No . 
. ' 
\ , ) 
EXHIBIT B 
New Percentage Interests for Rokan Ventures 
an P.t.rwn LP 
tge, 1l>fl'/ 
JoMSotro 
Total 
Total minus redeemed partners 
Exlt!IIT B - REDEMPTIOH AGREl$Ml:iNT • 8 
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e.7% 12.05% 
46.7% 63.30% 
24.8% 0.00% 
11,8% 1B.:M% 
3.°" 0.00% 
100.0% 100. 
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ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION 
OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST 
{RV ROKAN AMERICANA) 
P. 04 
THIS ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST 
{"Assignmtnt; Is entered into effective as of the 1ct day of January, 2013 ("Effective 
Date"), by and between RV Rokan Americana LLC, an Idaho limited liability company (·Rv 
Rokan Amertcanaj, Rokan Ventures LLC, an Idaho limited liability company {"Ventures") 
and Rol<an Partners Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership ("Rokan Partners"). 
RECITALS 
A. Rokan Partners holds a 24.80 percent membership interest In Ventures (the 
"Rokan Partners Membership Interest") pursuant to the Operating Agreement of 
Ventures, effective as of January 1. 2011 (the "Ventures Operating Agreement"). 
B. Ventures, Rokan Partners, and Wali Investments LLC ("Wali") are the 
members of RV Rokan Amerioana pursuant to that certaln Operating Agreement effective 
as of December 1, 2011 ("RV Rokan Americana Operating Agreement;; 
c. Rokan Partners and Ventures entered into that certain Agreement for 
Redemption, Uquldation and Partial Distribution and Authorizing Resolution effective as of 
January 1, 2013 tDistrlbution Agreement") whereby Ventures agreed to distnbute 10 
Rokan Partner& a 7.440 percentage membership interest In RV Rokan Americana ("RV 
Distributed lnterest'1 in distribution and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership 
Interest. 
D. Ventures desires to assign to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed Interest. as 
a redemption and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership Interest, and .Rokari Partners 
desires to accept ttie RV Distributed Interest, as a redemptiol) and llquidatlon of its interest 
ln Ventures, and to assume all the rights and obligations arising under the RV Operating 
Agreement. 
AGREEMENT 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and conditions 
contained herein and recitals set forth above, which are incorporated herein, and other good 
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, 
the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Assignment. Effective as of the Effective Date, Ventures hereby assigns 
and conveys to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed Interest, together with any and all other 
rights with respect thereto arising under the RV Operating Agreement. Ventures covenants 
and warrants to Rokan Partners that the RV Distrfbuted lntere$t is free and clear of any 
encumbrances or claims of any third party. 
2. Assumption. Effective as of the Effective Pate, Rokan Partn~rs hereby 
assumes the RV Distributed Interest, together with any and all rights with respect thereto 
arising under the RV Operating Agreement. 
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3. RV Rokan Americana Consent RV Rokan Americana hereby (i) consents 
10 the assignment of the RV Distributed Interests to Rokan Partners, and (ii) agrees that 
Rokan Partners shall be deemed to be a "substitute member" of RV Rokan Americana as to 
the RV Distributed Interest. 
4. Attorneys' Fees. In the event of any controversy, claim or action being flied 
or instituted between the parties hereto to enforce or Interpret the terms and conditions of 
this Assignment or doeument.s related thereto, or arising from the breach of any provision 
thereof, the prevalling party will be entitted to receive from the other party all cosl'S, 
damages, and expenses, Including reasonable attorneys' fees through all levels of action, 
incurred by the prevailing party, whether or not such controversy or claim ls litigated or 
prosecuted to Judgment The prevailing party will be that party who is awarded Judgment as 
a result of trial or arbttration, or who receives a payment of money or other concession or 
agreements from the other party In settlement of claims asserted by that party, 
5. Succession. This Assignment shall be binding upon and shall lnure to the 
benefit of the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties. 
6. Governing Law. This Assignment shall be governed by and construed In 
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho. 
7. Time. Time is of the essence of this Assignment. 
8. Counterparts. This Assignment may be executed In any number of 
counterparts, and once so executed by all parties hereto each such counterpart shall be 
deemed to be an original instrument, but all counterparts together shall constitute but one 
agreement. 
[End of Text] 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Assignment 
effective as of the Effaotiva Date. 
COMPANY: 
ROKAN PARTNERS: 
RVtDAHO: 
ROKAN VEN'rURES LLC, 
~n Idaho limited liability company 
By:~~-·-·-
e1E.Page 
M ager 
ROKAN PARTNERS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership 
By: 
By: 
RV ROKAN AMERICANA LLC, 
an Idaho limited liablllty company 
By: Rokan Ventures LLC, Manager 
e, Manager 
ASS18NMEfU AND ASSUMPTION OF MEMS!MHIP INTER!;ST • 3 
l67SS34v2 {l 1239-11} 
P. 044/054 
708 
NOV I ! 0: 06 AM FAX No. 
ASSIGNMENT ANO ASSUMPTION 
OF MEMBERSHIP INT!REST 
(RV IDAHO BB) 
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THIS ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION OF MEMBERSHlP INTEREST 
('"Assignment) Is entered into effective as of the 1• day of January, 2013 ("Effective 
Date"), by and between RV Idaho BB LLC1 an Idaho limited Uabtrity company ("RV Idaho"}, 
Rokan Ventures LLC, an Idaho limited liability company ("Ventures") and Rokan Partners 
Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership ("Rokan Partnersj. 
RECITALS 
A. Rol<an Partners holds a 24.80 percent membership interest In Ventures (the 
"Rokan Partners Membershtp Interest") pursuant to the Operating Agreement . of 
Ventures. effective as of January 1, 2011 (the "Ventures Operating Agreement"). 
B. Ventures, John Alan LLC and Wali Investments LLC ("Wall") are the 
members of RV Idaho pursuant to that certain Operating Agreement effective as of January 
1, 2011 ,:'RV Idaho Operating Agreement"); 
C. Rokan Partners and Ventures entered into that certain Agreement for 
Redemption, Liquidation and Partial Distribution and Authorizing Resolution effective as of 
January 1, 2013 ("Distribution Agre&ment") whereby Ventures agreed to distribute to 
Rot<an Partners a 19.964 percentage membership Interest in RV Idaho ("RV Distributed 
lnter-ast") In distribution and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership Interest. 
D. Ventures desires to assign to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed Interest. as 
a redemption and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership Interest, and Rol<an Partners 
destres to accept the· RV Distributed Interest, as a redemption and liquidation of Its interest 
in Ventures, and to assume all the rights and obligations arising under the RV Operating 
Agreement 
AGREEMENT 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and conditions 
contained herein and recitals set forth above, which are lncorpomted herein, and other good 
and.valuable conslderatlon, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, 
the parties hereto agree as foHowG: 
1. Assignment. Effective as of the Effective Date, V&ntures hereby assigns 
and conveys to Rak.an Partners the RV Oistrlbuted Interest, together with any and all other 
rights With respect thereto arising under the RV Operating Agreement. Ventures covenants 
and warrants to Rokan Partners that the RV Distrlbuted Interest ls free and clear of any 
encumbrances or claims of any third party. 
2. · Assumption. Effective as of the Effective Date, f(okan Partners hereby 
assumes the RV Distributed Interest, together with any and all rights with respect thereto 
arising under the RV Operating Agreement. 
ASSIGN\'IEm AND ASSUM?TION OF MEMB!RSHIP lw-mRESi -1 
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3. RV Idaho Consent. RV Idaho hereby (Q consents to the assignment of the 
RV Distributed Interests to Rokan Partners, and (if) agrees that Rokan Partners shall be 
deemed to be a "substitute member" of RV Idaho as to the RV Distributed Interest 
.. 
4. Attomeys' Fees. in the ·event of any controversy, claim or action being filed 
or instituted between the parties hereto to enforce or Interpret the terms and conditions of 
this Assignment or documents related thereto, or arising from the breach of any provision 
thereof, the prevailing party will be entitled to receive from the other party an costs, 
damages, and sxpen$e&, includlng reasonable attorneys' fees through all levels of action, 
incurred by the prevailing party, whether or not such controversy or claim is litigated or 
prosecuted to judgment The prevailing party wlll be that party who is awarded Judgment as 
a result of trial or arbitration, or who receives a payment of money or other concession or 
agreements from the other party in settlement of cla\ms asserted by that party. 
5. Succession. This Asslgnment shall be binding upon and shall Inure to the 
benefit of the heirs, personal representatives. successors and assigns of the parties. 
6. Governing Law. This Assignment shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho. 
7. Time. Time is of the essence of this Assignment. 
8. Counterparts. This Asslgnment may be executed In any number of 
counterparts, and once so executed by an parties hereto each such counterpart shall be 
deemed to be an orlg\nal instrument, but all counterparts together shall constitute but one 
agreement. 
[End of Text] 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Assignment 
effective as of the Effective Date. 
COMPANY: 
ROKAN PARTNERS; 
RVIDAHO: 
ROKAN VENTURES LLC, 
an Idaho limited llabiOty company 
ROKAN PARTNERS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHlP, an Idaho limited partnership 
By: Rokan Corporation, a Delaware 
corpor n, its General P. rtner 
By: 
RV IDAHO BS LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company 
By: Rokan Ventures LLC, Manager 
Ase1GNMENT AND ASSUMPTION OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST• S 
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ASSIGNMENT ANO ASSUMPTION 
OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST 
(RV HOOD RIVER) 
p 
'. 
THIS ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST 
("Assignmenr) is entered Into effective as of the 1st day of January, 2013 (0 effecttve 
Date"), by and between RV Hood River LLC, an Idaho limited llablllty company ("RV Hood 
River"), Rokan Ventures LLC, an Idaho limited liabil!ty company ("Ventures") and Rokan 
Partners Limited Partnershlp, an Idaho limited partnershlp (''Rokan Partners"}. 
RECITALS 
A. Rokan Partners holds a 24.80 percent membership Interest In Ventures {the 
''Rokan Partners Membership Interest") pursuant to the Operating Agreement of 
Ventures, effective as of January 1,· 2011 (the "Ventures Operating Agreement''). 
B. Ventures. John Alan LLC, The Michael Edward Page 2008 Revocable Trust, 
Rokan Partners, and Wali lnvestrnents LLC are the members of RV Hood River pursuant to 
that certain Operating Agreement effective as of August 24, 2009 ("RV Hood River 
Operating Agreement") and subsequent assignments; · 
C. Rokan Partners and Venture& entered into that certain Agreement for 
RedemptJon, Liquidation and Partial Distribution and Authorizing Resolution effective as of 
January 11 2013 ("Distribution Agreement') whereby Ventures agreed to distribute to 
Rokan Partners a 8.680 percentage membership interest In RV Hood River ("RV 
Distributed Interest") In distribution and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership 
Interest. 
D. Ventures desires to assign to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed Interest. as 
a redemption and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membershlp Interest, and Rokan Partners 
desires to accept the RV Distributed Interest, as a redemption and liquidation of its interest 
in Ventures, and to assume all the rights and obligations arising under the RV Operating 
Agreement 
AGREEMENT 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and conditions 
contained herein and recitals set forth above, which are Incorporated herein, and other good 
and valuable comllderation, the receipt and sufficiency of w.hlch are hereby acknowledged, 
the parties hereto agree as foll~: 
1. Assignment Effective as of the Effective Date, Ventures hereby assigns 
and conveys to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed Interest, together with any and all other 
rights with respect thereto arising under the RV Operating Agreement. Ventures covenants 
and warrants to Rokan Partners that the RV Distributed Interest ls free and clear of any 
encumbrances or claims of any third party. 
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2. Assumption, Effective as of the Effective Date, Rokan Partners hereby 
assumes the RV Distributed interest, together with any and all rights with respect thereto 
arising under the RV Operating Agreem~nt. 
3. RV Hood Rlver Consent. RV Hood R{ver hereby (i) consent. to the 
assignment of the RV Distributed Interests to Rokan Partners, and (II) agrees that Rokan 
Partners shall be deemed to be a -substitute member" of RV Hood River as to the RV 
Distributed Interest 
4. Attomeys' Fees. In the event of any controversy, claim or actlon b&lng fifed 
or instituted between the parties hereto to enforce or Interpret the terms and conditions of 
this Assignment or documents related thereto, or arising from the breach of any provision 
thereof, the prevailing party will be entitled to receive from the other party all costs, 
damages, and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees through all levels of action, 
incurred by the prevailing party, whether or not such controversy or claim is litigated or 
prosecuted to Judgment. The prevailing party wilt be that party who le awarded judgment as 
a result of trial or arbitratlon1 or who receives a payment of money or other concession or 
agreements from the other party 1n settlement of claims asserted by that party. 
5. Succession. This Assignment shall be binding upon and shall inure to the 
benefit of the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties. 
6. Governing Law, This Assignment shall be governed by and construed In 
accordance with the laws of the Stats of Idaho. 
7. nme. Time is of the etssence of this Assignment. 
8, Counterparts. This Assignment may be executed in any number of 
counterparts, and once so executed by an parties hereto each such counterpart shall be 
deemed to be an original instrument, but all counterparts together shall constitute but one 
agreement. 
[End of Text] 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Assignment 
effective as of the Effective Date. 
COMPANY: 
ROKAN PARTNERS: 
RV. HOOD RlVER: 
ROKAN VENTURES LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company 
Sy: 41// 
~'-:,,,"E-. P-a.-g_e _______ _ 
Manager 
ROKAN PARTNERS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership 
By: Rokan Corporation, a Delaware 
corporatto lts General Partner 
By, 
RV HOOD RIVER LLC, 
an Idaho limited llability company 
By: Rokan Ventures LLC, Manager 
AsslGNMENT ANO ASSUMPTION OP Ml:!MSl:RSHIP INTeRESi • 3 
RV Hoed River 
714 
NOV /0 l RI ! 0: 08 AM FAX No. P. 051/054 
ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION 
OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST 
(RV BOISE BEND) 
THIS ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST 
("Assignm&nt") is entered into effective as of the 181 day of January, 2013 ("Effective 
Date"), by and between RV Boise Bend LLC. an Idaho llmlt&d liability company ("RV Boise 
Bendj, Rokan Ventures LLC, an Idaho limlted Oablllty company ("Ventures") and Rokan 
Partners Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership ("Rokan Partners"). 
RECITALS 
A.· Rokan Partners holds a 24.80 percent membership interest in Ventures (the 
"Rokan Partners Membership Interest") pursuant to the Operating Agreement of 
Ventures, effective as of January 1, 2011 (the "Ventures Operating Agreement"). 
B. Ventures, John Alan LLC and Wali Investments LLC ('Wan; are the 
members of RV Boise Bend pursuant to that certain Operating Agreement effective as of 
March 11 2011 ("RV Boise Bend Operating Agreement") and subsequent assignments: 
C. Rokan Partners and Ventures entered Into that certain Agreement for 
Redemption, Liquidation and Partial Distribution and Authoriz:ing Resolution offective as of 
January 1, 2013 ("Dl&b1bution Agreementu) whereby Ventures agreed to distribute to 
Rokan Partners a 21.824 percentage membership Interest ln RV Boise Bend ("RV 
Distributed Interest•) in distribution and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership 
Interest 
D. Ventures desires to assign to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed Interest, as 
a redemption and liquidation of Rokan Partners Membership Interest. and Ro'kan Partners 
desires to accep1 the RV Distributed Interest, as a redemption and liquidation of its Interest 
In Ventures, and to assume all the rights and obligations arising under the RV Operating 
Agreement. 
AGREEMENT 
NOW THEREFORE. In consideration of the mutual promises and conditions 
contained herein and recitals set forth above. which are Incorporated herein, and other good 
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of Which are hereby acknowledged, 
the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Assignment. Effective as of the Effective Date, Ventures hereby assigns 
and conveys to Rokan Partners the RV Distributed lnterast, together with any and an other 
rights With respect thereto arising under the RV Operating Agreement. Ventures covenants 
and warrants to Rokan Partners that the RV Distributed Interest ls free and clear of any 
encumbrances or claims of any third party. 
2. Assumption. Effective as of the Effective Date, Rokan Partners hereby 
assumes the RV Distributed Interest, together with any and all rights with respect thereto 
arising under the RV Operating Agreement. 
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RV Boise Bend Consent RV Boise Bend hereby (I) consents to the 
assignment of the RV Distributed Interests to Rokan Partners, and (ii) agrees that Rokan 
Partners shall be deemed to be a "substitute member" of RV Boise Bend as to the RV 
Distributed Interest. 
4. Attornaya• Fees. In the event of any controversy, claim or action being flied 
or Instituted between the parties hereto to enforce or Interpret the terms and conditions of 
this Assignment or documents related therato, or arising from the breach of any provision 
thereof, the prevailing party will be entitled to receive from the other party ali costs, 
damages, and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees through all levels of action, 
incurred by the prevailing party, whether or not such controversy or clalm is lltlgated or 
prosecuted to judgment. The prevalllng party wm be that party who is awarded judgment as 
a result of trial or arbftratton, or who receives a payment of money or other concession or 
agreements from the other party In settlement of claims asserted by that party. 
5, Succession, This Assignment shall be binding upon and shall Inure to the 
benefit of the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties. 
6, Governing Law. This Assignment shall be governed by and construed In 
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho. 
7. Time. Time is of the essence of this Assignment. 
8. Counterparts. This Assignment may be executed in any number of 
counterparts, and once so executed by all parties hereto each such counterpart shall be 
deemed to be an original instrument, but all counterparts together shan constitute but one 
agreement. 
[End of Text] 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Assignment 
effective as of the Effective Date. 
COMPANY: 
ROKAN PARTNERS: 
RV BOISE BEND: 
ROKAN VENTURES LLC, 
an Idaho limited liablJlty company 
By: ~"-#,E.J,,.-;g-e ______ _ 
Manager 
ROKAN PARTNERS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, an Idaho limited partnership 
By: Rokan Corporation, a Delaware 
corporaf its General Partner 
By: 
RV BOISE BEND LLC, 
an Idaho limited llablllty company 
By: Rokan Ventures LLC, Manager. 
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October 29i 2012 
Robert Kantor 
Rokan1Partners 
PO Box 1271 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Dear Bob, 
FAX No. e 
. · .. .. 
' ) 
' .. < ~ 
ROKAN VENTURES LLC 
over the past two years our relationship has s"'ccessfully syndicated the Hood River, Boise Bend 
and Idaho BB properties, along with continuing to operate our property and entity management 
business~. During that same period of time the financial health end corporate governance of Rokan 
Partners has deteriorated to a point where I am no longer comfortable creating new 
ventures/syndications in partnership with Rokan Partners. Unfortunately, that leaves us with two 
options for moving forward; 
1) The first and preferred option is to buy Rokan Partners out of Rokan Ventures. The 
purchase price would consist of a share of the individual upside companies that Rokan 
Ventures LLC owns, and a cash payment representing your proportional share of the 
remaining equity in the company. 
2.) The second option would be 1:o dis.solve the company according to the terrni. of the 
operating agreement 
Whlle both options result In the same effective position for Rokan Partners, the first option ls 
easier on the long term employee1, of the company( our ongoing relationship; and the continued 
management of the con:ipanies in the portfolio, many of which are controlled by Rokan Partners. It Is 
my hope that we can successfully work through these Issues in a timely basis and look forward to 
continuing our relationship on a stronger foundation. 
Rokan Ventures LLC 
PO Box 1271., Ketchum> Idaho 83340 • 208.726.1780 
P. 054/ 054 
I 09:41 AM P. 002 
DENNIS P. WILKINSON, ESQ. 
Idaho State Bar #6023 
FILED ~-~----
1 NOV O 1 2013 ~ 
_iuL ynr, Drage Clerk District 
Coun E,1;;.me Count . Idaho 
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & ANDERSON, PLLC 
3480 Merlin Drive 
P.O. Box 50160 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone: (208) 525-8792 
Facsimile: (208) 525-5266 
Attorney for Defendant, Sondra Kantor. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
ROBERT ARON KANTOR, 
Plaintifti'Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
SONDRA LOUISE KANTOR, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2012-734 
DEFENDANT~s RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RE: AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
· COMES NOW, Defendant/Counterclaimant, ("Sondra") by and through_ her attorneys of 
record, the law firm of Thompson, Smith, Woolf & Anderson, pursuant to Rule 56( c) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby submit this Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Amended Counter/claim filed by the Plaintiff. As 
demonstrated below, there are genuine issues of material fact relating to Sondra's Counterclaim 
and the Plaintiffs Motion should be dismissed. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This controversy stems from tenns contained in a Property Settlement Agreement 
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entered between the parties on or about April 25, Judgment was entered the 
parties divorce case in Case No. on April 30, 2012, largely based on the terms 
contained in the PSA. The PSA, among other things, contained essential terms related to 
property division, the sale of a home and the parties' respective interests in certain business 
entities. 
On October 11, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint with the District Court alleging 
Breach of Contract and Injunctive Relief On August 9, 2013, Sondra filed an Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim alleging Breach of Contract/Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealtng related to the home owned by the parties (set out in paragraphs 19-31 of the PSA) and to 
Rokan Ventures (set out in paragraphs 32-40 of the PSA). The Plaintiff filed this present Motion 
for Partial Smnmary Judgment, Re: Amended Counterclaim, seeking a finding from this Court 
that there is no factual controversy related to Sondra's Counterclaim alleging that the Plaintiff 
violated the terms of the PSA with respect to Rokan Partners and Rokan Ventures. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There are two sections of the PSA that directly address the parties' agreement regarding 
Rokan Partners and Rokan Ventures. Paragraph 2 of the PSA states as follows: 
2. "RO KAN PARTNERS: The parties own an interest in Rokan Partners, an Idaho 
limited partnership. The parties agree that the ownership in Rokan Partners shall be as follows: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Rokan Corporation, a Delaware corporation: 6% 
Robert: 44% 
Sondra: 44% 
Geoffrey F. Kantor: 2% 
Aron B. Kantor: 2% 
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Joshua M. Kantor: 2% 
Rokan Corporation is the sole general partner of Rokan Partners. 
2.02 Robert is the president of Rokan Corporation. 
2.03 All stock in Rokan Corporation is owned by Century Trust (in a trust agreement 
dated January 1, 2006). 
2.04 Rokan Partners owns an interest in PK Ventures LLC reflected in the operating 
agreement dated January 1, 2012. 
2.05 Rokan Partners shall own any interest in all of the entities attached in the 
described Property and Debt Schedule (hereinafter "PDS") where the remarks have the initials 
RP. 
2.06 It is the intent and the agreement of the parties that except as specifically provided 
herein, all interest in all other real estate including but not limited to syndications where the 
parties have direct or indirect ownership interest shall be assigned to Rokan Partners. 
2.07 Robert and Sondra shall not sell, transfer, encumber, or in any way convey their 
interest in R.okan Partners unless both parties agree to the sale or conveyance. 
2.11 The management of Rokan Partners is by Rokan Corporation. Robert is the 
president of Rokan Corporation and is thus managing Rokan Partners. There shall be no other 
person or entity managing Rokan Partners without the written consent of Sondra and Robert. 
2.12 Except for what is reasonably necessary for operations ofRokan Partners, Robert 
shall cause Rokan Partners to distribute the available cash of Rokan Partners. The parties 
acknowledge that there is a requirement for pro rata distributions to all partners. 
Notwithstanding, Robert agrees that each month cash available to be distributed to Robert or 
Sondra shall be distributed as follows: the first $6,000 available shall be distributed to Sondra, 
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next $6,000 available to be distributed to Robert, the next $4,000 available shall be 
distributed to Sondra, the next $4,000 available shall be distributed to Robert and thereafter 
available cash shall be distributed equally to Robert and Sondra. Provided further, that if in a 
month Sondra has received more than Robert, the next month before going through the priority 
of distribution set forth herein, Robert shall receive the first amount to equalize distribution from 
the prior month. Further notwithstanding the above provisions, Robert shall use best efforts to 
ensure that Sondra receives $6000 from Rokan Partners on the first day of each month beginning 
June 1, 2012."1 
As set forth above, Sondra owns a 44% interest in Rokan Partners. Rokan Partners 
owned a 25% in Rokan Ventures. Paragraph 16 of the PSA sets out the following: 
16. "ROKAN VENTURES: 
16.01 RokanPartners owns 25% ofRokan Ventures. 
16.02 Any new commercial real estate syndications or other commercial real 
estate activity that Robert intends to, or does, become involved in shall be done in Rokan. 
Ventures provided that any activity that Rokan Ventures declines shall not be done in Roka.n 
Ventures. 
16.03 To the extent agreed upon with the other members ofRokan Ventures; 
Robert may receive a salary or guaranteed payment from Rokan Ventures. Any salary or 
guaranteed payment in excess of $60,000 paid or payable to Robert by Rokan Ventures shall be 
paid to Rokan Partners and become an asset ofRokan Partners." 
On or about February 26, 2013 1 the Counterdefendant sold Rokan Partner's interest in 
1 Affidavit of Sondra Kantor in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment hereinafter rcfened to 
as "Kantor Aff'' at Exhibit A. Certain paragraphs were intentionally left out to include 2.08, 2.09, 2.10 and 2.13-
2.20. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
722 
RI 09:42 AM FAX No. P. 006 
Rokan Ventures for the effective date of the sale being January 1, 2013.2 The benefit 
of the PSA, at the time of bargaining, to Sondra was that she would realize income generated 
through the Counterdefendant's work at Rokan Ventures.3 She would receive that benefit 
through her ownership interest in Rokan Partners which in tum had an ownership interest in 
Rokan Ventures. 4 
The essence of the Counterclaim is that by selling Rokan Partners' interest in Rokan 
Ventures the Counterdefendant has defeated the purpose of paragraph 16.02. The purpose of that 
particular paragraph from Sondra's perspective was that the Counterdefendant would continue to 
generate income through Rokan Ventures which in turn would benefit Rokan Partners. Now that 
the interest has been sold, Sondra derives absolutely no benefit from any work that the 
Counterdefendant might do in accordance with paragraph 16.02. 
STA..~ARD OF REVIEW 
Under Idaho law, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings> depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits. if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 
56(c); see also Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583j 
587 (1996). In applying this standard, the Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of 
the non~moving party, and will draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the 
record in favor of the party opposing the motion. McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 937 
P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997). If the adverse party sets forth facts sufficient to establish that there is a 
genuine issue for trial, the moving party is not entitled to summary judgment. Baxter v. Craney, 
135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263,267 (2000). 
2 Kantor Aff at paragraph 12; Kantor Aff. E::dubit C. 
3 Kantor Aff at paragraph 7. 
' Pleue see Kantor Aff at Exhibit A paragraph 2. 
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The Summary Judgment Rule (LR.C.P. 56(b)) provides: 
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crosswclaim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in that party's favor as to all or any part 
thereof. Provided, a motion for summary judgment must be filed at least 60 days 
before the trial date, or filed within 7 days from the date of the order setting the 
case for trial, whichever is later, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact relating to 
the liability of the moving party and the moving party is thus entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Ktng v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 908-09, 42 P.3d 698, 701-02 (2002). In order to determine 
whether judgment should be entered as a matter of law, the court must examine the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file. Roberts v. Wyman, 135 Idaho 690, 694, 23 P.3d 
152, 156 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Generally, when considering a motion for summary judgment, the court '"liberally 
construes the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draws all 
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.'" King, 136 Idaho at 909, 42 P .3d at 
702 (quoting Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574, 576, 944 P .2d 709, 711 {1997)). A mere scintilla 
of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts, however, is insufficient to withstand summary 
judgment; there must be sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably return a verdict 
resisting the motion. Harpole v. State, 131 Idaho 437,439, 958 P.2d 594, 596 (1998). 
Moreover, a party opposing summary judgment cannot demand a trial simply because of 
the Hspeculative possibility that a material issue of fact may appear at that time." Heath v. 
Honker's Mini~Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 714, 8 P.3d 1254, 1257 (Ct. App. 2000). Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56(e) is identical to its federal counterpart and, thus, federal law is instructive 
in an analysis of whether summary judgment is appropriate in this matter. Id. at 713, 8 P.3d at 
1256. It is not the intent of F.R.C.P. 56, nor is it the intent of I.R.C.P. 56, "to preserve purely 
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speculative issues of fact for trial." Id., 8 P.3d at 1256 (quoting Exxo11, 
Comm 663 F.2d 120, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
v. Fed. Trade 
Here, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in Sondra's favor, there are 
genuine issues of material fact and summary judgment should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The record establishes that the Property Settlement Agreement ("PSA") is a 
binding contract between the parties whose purpose has been thwarted by the 
Plaintiff's conduct. 
In any contract action, a valid contract must first be established. A valid contract 
must be "complete, definite and certain in all its material tenns, or contain provisions which are 
capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 750· 
751, 864 P.2d 194, 196 - 197 (Idaho App.,1993) (citing Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105 
Idaho 346, 348, 670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983). Once a valid contract is established, the court can 
determine what acts are to be performed by the contracting parties. Dale's Serv. Co., Inc. v. 
Jones, 96 Idaho 662,664,534 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1975). 
The basic elements of a contract are subject matter, consideration, mutual assent by all 
the parties to all the terms, and an agreement that is expressed plainly and explicitly enough to 
show what the parties have agreed. 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts§ 19 (2d ed.2009). 
Formation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced 
by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract. P.f). Ventures. 144 Idaho at 238. 159 P.3d at 875. 
This manifestation takes the form of an offer and acceptance. Id. In a dispute over contract 
formation it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove a distinct and common understanding 
between the parties. Id~ Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 703, 779 P.2d 15, 17 
(1989}. There must be a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the agreement. Hess v. 
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'Wiieeler, 127 Idaho 151. 154, 898 P.2d 82, 85 (Ct.App.1995); see also MIF Realty L.P. v. 
Rochester Assoc., 94 F.3d 752, 756 (8th Cir.1996). A contract must be complete, definite, and 
certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being 
reduced to certainty. Kohring. 137 Idaho at 99. 44 P.3d at 1154; Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp .• 
105 Idaho 346, 348. 670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983). Every contract requires some consideration to be 
valid. Sirius LC v . .Erickson, 150 Idaho 80,244 P.3d 224, Idaho 2010. 
The PSA has all the required elements of a valid contract. There appears to be no dispute 
between the parties that the PSA is in fact a valid contract. As such, the terms and conditions set 
forth in the PSA are binding on both parties. This includes the contract read as a whole and also 
the specific terms at issue in this litigation. 5 
The Counterlcaim filed by Sondra alleges breach of contract and a breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. 6 Idaho law "implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
when doing so is consistent with the express terms of an agreement between contracting parties." 
Noak v. Idaho Dep't of Correction. 152 Idaho 305, 309, 271 P.3d 703, 707 (2012). "When it is 
implied, '[t]he covenant requires that the parties perform, in good fai~ the obligations imposed 
by their agreement., ,, Id. (quoting Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738. 750, 9 
P.3d 1204. 1214 (2000}). Such a claim may only be asserted by parties to a contract. Id. "Even 
then, one can maintain a claim for breach of the covenant only when he or she 'is denied the 
right to the benefits of the agreement [the parties] entered into:" Id. 
The actions taken by the Counterdefendant were not taken in good faith and clearly 
Sondra was denied the right she had to the benefit of the agreement she entered into. 
5 Kantor Aff. at E::tlu'bit A. 
6 Please see Amended Counterclaim filed August 9, 2013, and on file with the Court. 
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The fundamental purpose of the PSA was violated when the Plaintiff sold 
Rokan Partners' interest in Rokan Ventures. 
P. 010 
A breach of contract is material or substantial if it "touches the fundamental purpose of 
the contract and defeats the object of the parties in entering into the contract." Tentinger v. 
McPheters, 132 Idaho 620, 622, 977 P .2d 234. 236 (Ct.App.1999), quoting Ervin Constr. Co. v. 
Van Orden. 125 Idaho 695,699.874 P.2d 506, 510 {1993). 
The fundamental purpose of the PSA as it relates to Paragraph 16 and the income to be 
received by the Counterdefendant was that Sondra would receive a stream of income as a 44% 
owner ofRokan Partners.7 By his conduct the Counterdefendant gutted the obligation he created 
by contract and essentially made paragraph 16.02 meaningless.8 This is the essence of Sondra's 
Counterclaim. 
The Plaintiff' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment claims that Sondra's cause of action 
relating to the Counterdefendant' s real estate activities relies solely upon paragraph 16 of the 
PSA.9 This is patently untrue. Her cause of action relies primarily on the provisions of 
paragraph 2 of the PSA giving her an interest in Rokan Partners. Paragraph 2 of the PSA gives 
context to Paragraph 16. Paragraph 16.02 merely provides a framework whereby Sondra 
receives compensation due to her ownership in Rokan Partners as set out in Paragraph 2. When 
the interest in Rokan Ventures was sold by Rokan Partners the Counterdefendant cut Sondra out 
of any potential profits and violated the fundamental purpose of the agreement. 10 
It is well established Idaho law that whether a contract was breached is a question of fact. 
Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73,205 P.3d 1209, Idaho (2009). Likewise, whether the breach 
7 Kantor Aff. at paragraphs 4 and 7. 
s Kantor Aff. at paragraph 11. 
9 See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment page 6. 
10 Kantor Aff. at Exhibit A paragraphs 6, 7 ,8 and 11. 
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was material is also a question for the finder of fact Id. The question for the finder of fact in 
this case is whether the Counterdefendant' s conduct in gutting paragraph 16.02 to avoid paying 
Sondra the agreed upon compensation constitutes a breach of the PSA. 
The actions of the Counterdefendant clearly violate the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing as pleaded in the Counterclaim. Violation of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is tied to the performance of the contract, and a violation of the covenant occurs when 
either party violates, nullifies, or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract. Boise Mode, 
UC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99,294 P.3d 1111, Idaho (2013). 
The PSA imposed a binding obligation upon the Counterdefendant in accordance with 
paragraph 16.02 to continue to run his real estate business through Rokan Ventures. The only 
reason to do this was so that Sondra would receive compensation as a member of Rokan 
Partners. The sale clearly violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as it significantly 
impaired the benefit of the contract that Sandy entered into. 
B. Paragraph 16.02 ls an enforceable term and is not subject to the analysis 
surrounding covenants not to compete. 
The Counterdefendant argues that Sondra cannot being a cause of action against him 
based on paragraph 16.02 "because the covenant not to compete is unenforceable and void." 
Paragraph 16.02 of the PSA requires that the Counterdefendant conduct his real estate dealings 
through Rokan Ventures. Toe proper analysis for the Court to conduct in this context is to 
detennine whether the contract tenns are "complete, definite and certain in all its material tenns, 
or contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Lawrence 
supra. 
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The Coooterdefendant does not argue that the term is ambiguous or uncertain. Rather, he 
argues that the tenn is a covenant not to compete. When interpreting a contract the Court 
detennines the intent of the contracting parties at the time that the contract was entered into and 
does so by viewing the contract as a whole. Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251, 178 P.3d 616. When 
looking at the PSA as a whole it is clear that the reason the parties entered into paragraph 16.02 
was to provide Sondra with compensation associated with the Counterdefendants future real 
estate work. This Counterdefendant had the added benefit of having the advice of counsel at the 
time he entered it. 
Looking at the contract term and understanding that the Counterdefendant received 
numerous benefits as a result of the PSA it clearly is enforceable. In the employment context, 
non-compete agreements should expressly limit the scope of activities the employee is prohibited 
from performing. Pinnacle Performance, Inc., v. Hessing, 135 Idaho 364, 368~69, 17 P.3d 308, 
312-13 (Ct. App.2001). 
Restrictive covenants in an employment contract, though enforceable, are disfavored and 
will be strictly construed against an employer. Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc .. 141 Idaho 
415, 111 P.3d 100. A covenant not to compete is reasonable only if the covenant: (1) is not 
greater than is necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate business interest, (2) is not 
unduly harsh and oppressive to the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public. Freiburg at 
116. 
As a starting point, the Counterdefendant is not the employee of Sondra. This is not a 
covenant not to compete subject to the traditional analysis associated with such contracts 
between an employee and employer. The strict level of scrutiny applied to contracts between 
employees and employers is not applied in other cases. For example, non-compete covenants 
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ancillary to the sale of a business are not subject to as strict of a construction as those contained 
employment contract. Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251, 178 P.3d 61 
There is nothing in the record or surrounding the PSA that would lend itself to analyzing 
it as a non-compete agreement. It simply as a matter of law is not such an agreement. The 
provision when read in context was an agreement to conduct business through a particular entity 
to benefit Sondra. The Counterdefendant has already wrongfully rid himself of the obligation to 
compensate her as agreed upon when he sold the partnership interest in Rokan Ventures. He 
now seeks to use his wrongful conduct as the basis to further shed his contractual obligations. 
C. Damages. 
The Counterdefendant argues that Sondra has no damages because the interest in Rokan 
Ventures has been sold. The damages associated with the Counterdefendant's conduct are 
expectation damages in connection with his continued real estate work through Rokan Ventures. 
It is important to note that the Counterdefendant offers no other argument or basis for claiming 
that Sondra has no damage. 
His argument is based purely on his action in violating the contract by liquidating the 
interest in Rokan Ventures. Now he asks this Court to reward hin1 for his wrongful conduct. As 
a matter of law the Counterdefendant cannot breach the contract to set up a situation where he 
can later benefit by claiming that Sondra has no damage. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons the Counterclaimant has good claims for breach of contract 
and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. There are factual issues surrounding 
those causes of action precluding a grant of summary judgment in this case. As such, the Court 
must dismiss the Counterdefendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
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DATED this 4-aay of October, 2013. 
FAX No. 
THOMPSON, SMITH, WOOLF & 
ANDERSON 
P. 014 
By:~~==~==~----
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
Attorney for Plaintiff/C01.mter-Defendants 
and Third Party Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
P. 015 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by facsimile to them a true and correct copy of 
said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this '3 , day of October, 2013. 
Scot M. Ludwig, Esq. 
LUDWIG SHOUFLER 
209 West Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Facsimile: (208) 387-1999 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
D Mailed D Hand Delivered \Faxed 
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